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Abstract
Remote electronic voting has long been considered a panacea for many of the problems with
existing, paper-based election mechanisms: assurance that one’s vote has been counted as cast;
ability to vote without fear of coercion; fast and reliable tallying; improvement in voter turnout.
Despite these promised improvements, take-up of remote electronic voting schemes has been
very poor, particularly when considering country-wide general elections.
In this thesis, we explore a new class of remote electronic voting protocols: speciêcally, those
which êt with the United Kingdom’s requirement that it should be possible to link a ballot to a
voter in the case of personation. We address the issue of revocable anonymity in electronic voting.
Our contributions are threefold. We begin with the introduction of a new remote electronic vot-
ing protocol, providing revocable anonymity for any voter with access to an Internet-connected
computer of their choice. We provide a formal analysis for the security properties of this protocol.
Next, we are among the êrst to consider client-side security in remote electronic voting, providing
a protocol which uses trusted computing to assure the voter and authorities of the state of the
voter’s machine. Finally, we address revocable anonymity more generally: should a user have
the right to know when their anonymity has been revoked? We provide a protocol which uses
trusted computing to achieve this.
Ultimately, the work in this thesis can be seen as a sound starting point for the deployment of
remote electronic voting in the United Kingdom.
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1 Introduction andMotivation
I consider it completely unimportant who in the party
will vote, or how; but what is extraordinarily important is
this—who will count the votes, and how.
— Josef Stalin
Designing electronic voting protocols is notoriously diﬃcult: so much so, that despite a wide
breadth of work in the êeld, very few electronic voting systems have been deployed on a country-
wide basis. Indeed, early forays into electronic voting have resulted in widespread criticism of
the election process, and questions as to the reliability and trustworthiness of machines used to
process votes (Mercuri, 2002; Cranor, 2001; Jorba et al., 2003; Chaum et al., 2005; Dill et al.,
2003). In the United Kingdom, despite considerable research into the deployment of electronic
voting, and a number of local trials, it seems unlikely that a practical solution will be deployed in
the near future.
The main diﬃculty in designing suitable e-voting protocols is in the satisfaction of an ever-
growing, apparently contradictory set of requirements: foremost, one must preserve the secret
ballot: i.e., a voter’s vote must remain unlinkable to them. Compounding the set of requirements
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ascribed to traditional, paper-ballot elections (such as those currently used in the UK), however,
is an extra set of requirements, augmented by security researchers over the past twenty years.
Requirements that are not enforced in current election practices (such as individual veriêability:
the ability to verify that one’s vote is counted as cast—a notion which does not currently exist in
the UK) form an important part of the criteria by which any new electronic voting protocol is
deemed to be acceptable.
Much recent researched has focused on the design of remote voting protocols: namely, those
that do not restrict the physical location of the voter, instead allowing them to use any Internet-
connected machine to vote. The appeal of remote voting lies mainly in the beneêt it oﬀers:
increased turnout of marginal voters—those that are politically engaged, but unwilling or unable
to visit polling stations. However, the cost is clear: a decrease in the trustworthiness of the
environment in which one votes means more work is required to satisfy the aforementioned
requirements.
Working to increase the ‘security’ of an electronic voting protocol often increases its com-
plexity. Thus we are left with the juxtaposition of novice end-users, who are unwilling to trust
protocols which use complex cryptography, and security researchers, who include said cryptog-
raphy so that e-voting protocols are trustworthy. As we will discuss, cryptography is a necessary
factor in any remote e-voting scheme.
The electoral systems of the United Kingdom (and New Zealand) are somewhat unique, in
that they have an unusual legal requirement: it must be possible for an authority to trace a voter
from their ballot, given the appropriate legal permission (Blackburn, 1995; Jonker and Pieters,
2010). Typically, such permission is given in the case of personation (say, for example, a voter
attempts to fraudulently vote on behalf another voter who has died, or is otherwise unable to
vote). It is for this reason that in the UK, ballots are numbered:
Present practice in the UK involves the ballot papers carrying an inconspicuous iden-
tiêcation number…The voter number, as given in the electoral register, is recorded
on the counterfoil when the voter is given her ballot paper in the voting station
(Randell and Ryan, 2005, p. 3)
In keeping with research in surrounding computer security êelds, we term the ability to trace vot-
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ers revocable anonymity. This thesis is concerned with the design of trustworthy remote electronic
voting protocols, which provide revocable anonymity.
1.1 Approach
The aim of this thesis is to explore the design and feasibility of remote electronic voting protocolswhich
permit revocable anonymity, as required in UK general elections. Here, we provide an outline of
the approach we take to solving this problem.
We begin with an extensive analysis of the problem domain: êrst, we explore the requirements
which we strive to satisfy, then discussing much of the most important work in electronic voting
in recent history. We address protocols designed under a number of methodologies, including
paper-based, “end-to-end veriêable” protocols. We then proceed to explore several research
questions, leading to a number of contributions:
Remote Electronic Voting with Revocable Anonymity Above, we noted that one driving
factor of electronic voting is the ability for voters to participate remotely, over the Internet. One
expected beneêt of this is increased overall turnout. However, the ability to vote remotely is
seemingly in direct contrast with the requirement for one’s vote to remain private, and for voters
to remain uncoercible. In the UK, we have a further requirement: the ballot must be in some way
linkable to the voter, given the necessary authority. Our primary contribution is the design of
two remote election protocols, which permit revocable anonymity: the êrst protocols to provide
a practical manner in which to do this, without any extra hardware requirements.
Integrating Trusted Computing with Electronic Voting A particular problem with many
existing election protocols is that they trust the state of the machine the voter uses. What if
the machine is compromised? It then becomes the ‘weak link in the chain’, allowing man-in-
the-middle style attacks on the voter. Our work considers the introduction of trusted computing
(speciêcally, use of the TPM) in order to assure the trustworthiness of an unknown, remote voting
client. Again, we are the êrst to consider this and to provide a detailed protocol speciêcation.
4 Chapter 1. Introduction and Motivation
Auditable Anonymity Revocation An interesting sociological issue arises from revocable anon-
ymity: should a user who is traced be able to determine that this is the case? Continuing from
our work on the use of trusted computing in electronic voting, we explore the issue of how a
voter might be notiêed if her anonymity is revoked. We detail a protocol which uses the TPM
to provide such assurances, and which in fact could be used for any area of computer security in
which revocable anonymity is an issue.
Formal Protocol Veriêcation We extensively verify our work using ProVerif, an automated
reasoning tool based upon the applied pi calculus, drawing on the work of several authors in the
êeld of formal veriêcation. We formalise a number of our requirements in the language, testing
that each is satisêed.
1.2 Thesis Organisation
This thesis is organised in a further seven chapters, as follows.
Chapter 2: Background Information We begin with a summary of the requirements and
properties which we wish to satisfy in our work. This is followed by a detailed discussion of
electronic voting protocols and systems from the past 25 years. We adopt the approach of dividing
the protocols according to the cryptographic primitives on which they are based: blind signatures,
mix networks, and homomorphic encryption and tabulation of votes. We separately address
paper-based protocols such as Prêt-à-Voter, which often use a combination of these preliminaries,
but adopt them in a markedly diﬀerent manner.
Chapter 3: Preliminaries In Chapter 3, we discuss the cryptographic primitives and notation
which we use, as well as elaborating on some other preliminaries: namely, trusted computing and
the direct anonymous attestation protocol.
Chapter 4: Revocable Anonymity in Electronic Voting In this chapter, we discuss the êrst
of our protocols, which integrates remote, coercion-resistant and veriêable electronic voting with
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revocable anonymity. We believe this protocol to be the êrst work which achieves these properties,
and thus the êrst to be suitable to a UK election scenario.
Chapter 5: Using Trusted Computing We next discuss the design of a related protocol, which
uses the TPM (in particular, the DAA protocol) to ensure the trustworthiness of a remote client.
Again, the protocol provides (optional) revocable anonymity.
Chapter 6: Making Anonymity Auditable In Chapter 6, we explore whether it is possible
for a voter whose anonymity is revoked to be informed of this fact. We discuss the related work
of a number of authors, and then again use the TPM to produce a solution.
Chapter 7: Formalisation of Security Properties Our penultimate chapter provides an ex-
tensive formal security analysis of the protocol discuss in Chapter 4. We adopt the applied pi
calculus and the automated reasoning tool ProVerif, in combination with the work of a number
of authors on the formalisation of security properties in electronic voting, to prove the security
of our êrst protocol.
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Work Finally, we conclude the thesis, and make com-
ment on future avenues for further work.
Remarks on Notation
In this work, as with much other work in computer security, we adopt the convention that the
legitimate, honest voter is female. Speciêcally, she is denoted Alice. Where necessary, a non-
speciêc party that Alice communicates with is named Bob. Other named entities are generally
referred to in a sans-serif typeface, or with a single letter, viz. A. Cryptography and mathematical
calculations are denoted by italicised serif type, except where we refer to functions that we have
already deêned, such as the generation of a designated-veriêer signature, denoted in sans-serif
type, viz. DVSignAlice!Bob(m). The only exception to this is where we discuss commands in the
TPM’s application programming interface, which are denoted in slab-serif text, viz. TPM_Quote.
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Finally, we adopt a “message sequence chart” approach when protocols by way of a diagram.
In the êgure below, the protocol being represented involves the encryption of a message m with
Bob’s public key being sent to Bob. Bob replies with his signature on the plaintext m.
Figure 1.1 An example protocol diagram
{m}Bob
sign
Bob
(m)
Alice Bob
2 BackgroundInformation
Chapter Overview
In Chapter 1, we introduced the topic of this thesis, and the motivation for its completion. In this
chapter, we continue to introduce the thesis by way of a detailed discussion of relevant background
material. For a thesis combining remote electronic voting with revocable anonymity, there is a
considerable amount of relevant material.
We begin with a discussion of electronic voting, starting with a discussion of the most im-
portant requirements of a remote electronic voting protocol, covering many of the important
aspects of recent electronic voting protocols, and summarising the reasons why these protocols
are not suitable for our aims. We then discuss the many ways in which anonymity and revocable
anonymity are enforced in security protocols.
Revocable anonymity is not a notion that has previously been considered with regard to
electronic voting. However, it has been addressed in depth in other areas, such as electronic
commerce, where there is a wide breadth of work. We discuss this work in depth, focusing on a
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number of important works, and then ênish the chapter with a discussion of Trusted Computing
and the Trusted Platform Module, which are of critical importance to us for one of the protocols
presented later.
2.1 Remote Electronic Voting with Revocable Anonymity:
Requirements
Before we begin to discuss previous work in electronic voting, we discuss, in Table 2.1, what we
consider to be the most important requirements for any new remote electronic voting protocol,
having considered a wide breadth of work in the êeld. For each requirement, we give a brief
description.
The three properties voter privacy, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance, which we can loosely
group as all being privacy-related, are increasingly strong forms of the requirement that a voter
should not be linkable to her vote. Intuitively, however, some of these properties present an
obvious conëict. A voter needs to be able to identify that her vote was counted as cast (Individual
Veriêability). Yet, how can she do so without gaining enough information to also prove to
a coercer how she voted, thereby breaking Voter Privacy (and its related properties, Receipt
Freeness and Coercion Resistance)? One approach, as we discuss later, is for the authorities to
produce a proof which convinces the voter, but no-one else—by virtue of the fact that the voter
could produce the proof herself. Remote Voting presents a clear clash with Coercion Resistance:
it is far more diﬃcult to prevent a voter proving to a coercer how she is voting when she is
not physically isolated in a known, trusted location. Further, as Chevallier-Mames et al. (2006)
note, unless all voters on the electoral roll participate in the election, Universal Veriêability is
incompatible with Voter Privacy.
The extra properties that we add (revocable anonymity, and coercion resistance in the physical
presence of a coercer) further complicate the requirements: if a voter’s anonymity is revoked, is
only that voter aﬀected? Can she determine that she has been traced? To what extent can we
require that an election protocol must be resistant to a physical coercer, standing over the shoulder
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Table 2.1 Summary of Properties and Requirements
Property Description
Correctness and
Eligibility
Only eligible voters should be able to vote, and there should be
no trace of the protocol resulting in a successfully counted vote,
by Alice, for candidate i, that did not begin with Alice voting
for i
Uniqueness Only one vote per voter should be counted
Receipt-Freeness The voter should be given no information which can be used to
demonstrate how they have voted, once voting is complete
Coercion-Resistance It should not be possible for a voter to prove how they voted or
are voting, even if interacting with a coercer during voting
“Invisible Absentee”
Coercion-Resistance
Strictly a subproperty of coercion-resistance: the voter should
remain resistant to coercion even in the physical presence of a co-
ercer
Individual Veriêability A voter should be able to verify that their vote has been counted
correctly. Also known as Voter Veriêability.
Universal Veriêability Any observer should be able to verify that all votes have been
counted correctly. Sometimes worded as “the published out-
come is the sum of all votes”
Fairness No-one can gain any information about the tally (or partial tally)
of the election until the end of the voting process
Voter Privacy
(Anonymity)
Neither the authorities nor any other participant should be able
to link any ballot to the voter having cast it, unless the protocol
to revoke anonymity has been invoked1
Revocable Anonymity It should be possible for an authorised entity to reveal the identity
of any single voter, by linking her ballot to her
Remote Voting Voters should not be restricted by physical location (i.e., it
should be possible to vote over the Internet)
of the voter? This latter property, invisible absentee coercion-resistance, could be seen to have its
roots in the notion of duress passwords (Clark and Hengartner, 2008; Stefanov and Atallah, 2010),
an idea which has received little direct research attention.
Many electronic voting protocols have claimed to satisfy the above properties. In the next
section, we discuss what we consider to be the most important protocols in the êeld.
1Note that voter privacy is never achieved in the strongest possible sense: if all voters were to vote the same way,
then all votes are identiêed. Hence we say that no-one should learn more than that which is obtained from the tally.
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2.1.1 The Capabilities of the Coercer
An interesting question to consider is what the coercer, in the context of the properties above, is
able and unable to do in our work. We begin by noting that, importantly, the coercer is not able
to simulate the voter for the entire duration of the voting protocol. For us, we guarantee this by
requiring that the voter’s registration must be done in-person—a requirement that is placed upon
many related electronic voting protocols. This means that the coercer is not able to witness for
certain any of the private information which is given to the voter at the start of the protocol (secret
keys, or random values which the voter chooses or is allocated in order to prove the authenticity
of her vote). It follows that the attacker can alsonot simulate any party who is responsible for issuing
keypairs to Alice—as we will discuss in Section 4.5, such an ability, in many standard electronic
voting protocols, would again allow the attacker to simulate Alice entirely.
As a direct consequence, the coercer is never certain of whether any information provided to
him by the voter or not is valid (i.e., the voter is ‘coerced’), or fake (i.e., the voter is ‘cheating’—we
deêne these terms further in Section 7.5.3—by simply claiming that a given value is valid, when
it is in fact not). At any point after registration, the coercer is able to simulate the voter—but
cannot determine whether his vote is counted or not without being certain that he holds the
correct private key for a voter. However, we note that the legitimate voter is always able to
vote once unobserved. This is an assumption widely believed to be the minimal requirement for
coercion-resistant voting: if we did not have it, the coercer could trivially simulate all of the
voter’s attempts to vote, or simply suppress her voting entirely.
The coercer is able to simulate any authority in our protocols, except for the judge (whom
we trust out of necessity), and subject to the trust assumptions placed on each of our protocols
(see Sections 4.3.2, 5.2.2 and 6.2). We use threshold decryption to ensure that a quorum of
collaborating members of an authority group is required to decrypt votes, or generate threshold
signatures. If any quorum is of size t for a group size n, we assume that the coercer can corrupt
up to t  1 members of that group, including himself if appropriate. Where our communication
channels are public, the coercer can read a message on any channel, and decrypt it subject to
having the correct decryption key. He can intercept any message and later replay it, and can
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temporarily block any message (though we assume resilient channels, to achieve liveness). Finally,
the coercer is able to inject data into the channels arbitrarily.
2.2 A Brief History of Electronic Voting
In this section, we discuss a number of protocols important to the history of electronic voting. As
we will discuss later, these protocols can generally be divided into a number of categories, relating
to the cryptography that they use, or the type of election protocol (paper-based, veriêable paper
trail, and so on).
Despite a considerable amount of research in the êeld of e-voting, it has enjoyed little real-
world, large-scale success: electronic voting terminals (or DRE—Direct Recording Electronic
voting—machines) introduced in the United States have been criticised on numerous occasions,
and proven to be insecure (Dill and Castro, 2008; Dill et al., 2003; Bannet et al., 2004; Kohno
et al., 2004; Mercuri, 2002; Bannet et al., 2004), as has its attempt at a remote electronic voting
protocol for use by the military, SERVE (Jeﬀerson et al., 2004). The British government, however
enthusiastic (even stating in 2002 that “by 2011, much of the ground should have been prepared
for an e-enabled election” (Local Government Association, 2002, p. 1)), has thus far failed to
implement a credible electronic voting solution, but has made some eﬀort in this direction (Storer
and Duncan, 2005, 2004). Indeed, one of the only countries considered to have successfully ad-
dressed electronic voting in national elections is Estonia, having held national electronic elections
in 2005 (Madise and Martens, 2006).
We will consider, in this section, why electronic voting has not been as successful as it arguably
should have been, and what can be done to improve uptake. We êrst begin with a discussion
of important developments in the êeld. Electronic voting protocols can be placed into one of
four categories, based on the methods used to record and transmit votes, and to elicit anonymity
and veriêability. Earlier protocols are frequently based on the blind signature primitive, originally
invented by David Chaum for use in digital cash protocols (Chaum, 1982, 1985, 1988). Many
more protocols use mix networks, again a primitive introduced by Chaum (Chaum, 1981), to
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elicit voter anonymity. A third popular technique, eliciting both simple tallying techniques and
strong voter anonymity, is in using homomorphic encryption to encrypt and sum ballots. Finally,
we have a number of paper-based and E2E (“end-to-end”, universally veriêable) protocols, which
either involve the user voting on paper, or having access to some sort of voter veriêable paper
trail (VVPAT) as evidence of their vote being cast. Strictly speaking, these protocols often use
techniques from the previous three categories. However, because of the substantial diﬀerences in
how voters vote here, we discuss them separately.
2.2.1 Blind Signature-Based Protocols
Many early electronic voting protocols (and some more recent) are based on the blind signature
primitive invented by Chaum (1982) (Dini, 2003; Chang and Lee, 2006; Chen et al., 2004). A
blind signature is one in which the content of the message being signed is kept hidden from the
signer (envision a message being placed in a carbon-lined envelope, and then the envelope being
signed by someone with no knowledge of the contents). It follows that the “blinding” can then
be removed, giving a signed unblinded plaintext message. A typical message m would be signed
using a regular RSA signature scheme by calculating md mod N, where d is the secret signing
key, and N is the public modulus. The typical RSA blind signature would proceed by selecting a
random blinding factor v, coprime with N as follows for a message m. Then:
m0 := mve mod N
s0 := (m0)d mod N
where e is the public exponent. Note that m0 was signed with no knowledge of m, to give s0. The
signed, unblinded message can easily be recovered:
s := s0  v 1 mod N
:= md mod N
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because ved  v. Note that it is not possible for the signer to link the blinded signature to the
unblinded one, without knowledge of v. Some consideration has been given to fair blind signatures,
which alleviate this problem somewhat (Claessens et al., 2003). Blind signature-based protocols
are also inherently incompatible with universal veriêability, since the authorities are generally able
to add spurious ballots to the tally (a notion known as ballot stuﬃng).
2.2.1.1 Chaum: Unconditionally Secret Ballots
Chaum’s early work on electronic voting suggests a protocol in which the following properties
are satisêed:
1. A voter’s privacy/anonymity is only violated by cooperation of all other voters
2. Voters can ensure that their ballots are counted
3. Voters wishing to disrupt an election can only cause a small delay before being ejected
In the protocol he details, Chaum provides unconditional security against tracing the senders of
messages, and uses blind signatures to do this. The protocol involves a voter, Alice and organisation
Admin, and follows the order below for issuing a ballot:
1. Admin broadcasts to all participants:
• A security parameter s
• Another integer parameter n
• An RSA modulus N
• A prime number d > N
• n random units of the ring of residue classes mod N (‘units mod N’), vj where j 2
f1; : : : ; ng
2. Alice sends to Admin M = (mi;j) : mi;j  vπi(j)rdi;j where i 2 f1; : : : ; sg, with πi random
permutations of f1; : : : ; ng, and ri;j random units mod N
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3. Admin sends back to Alice C, a ‘random nonempty proper subset’ of f1; : : : ; sg
4. Alice sends to Admin:
• An element k 2 f1; : : : ; sg n C
• P = (pi;j) where pi;j = πi(j) for i 2 C
• pi;j = π
 1
k (πi(j)) for i =2 C
• Q = (qi;j) where qi;j  ri;j for i 2 C
• qi;j  rk:π 1k (πi(j))r
 1
i;j for i =2 C
5. Admin veriêes that each row of P is a permutation of f1; : : : ; ng; that mi;j  vpi;jqdi;j for
i 2 C, and that qdi;j  mk:pi;jm 1i;j for i =2 C
Step 1 above forms only the preliminary phase of the election, and is done only once. Admin also
broadcasts an assignment of an outcome to each vi.
During the registration phase, each voter communicates with Admin. If Admin agrees that the
voter can register, then voter Alice and Admin conduct the ballot issuing protocol given above.
This results in a tuple of n elements mk;i, of which the voter selects one, denoted bl for the lth
voter. The ênal result of the registration phase is the set of bl. Disputes can still be made at this
stage without revealing votes.
Finally, in the voting phase, Admin broadcasts the dth roots of all of the bl values. The lth voter
can then recover the dth root on a vi value by dividing the dth root of bl by the corresponding
rh;j. The voter then (anonymously) broadcasts the root of the vi recovered. The ênal number of
votes for each candidate is the number of dth roots of vi values corresponding to that candidate
(Chaum, 1988, pp. 178–180)
This protocol is, of course, rather complex. More importantly, there is a security risk in
only using one Admin—a large degree of trust is placed on this entity, which could misbehave
and thereby disrupt the election. This would not result in incorrect results, as voters can verify
that their votes are counted, but would lead to the election being voided. As Chaum suggests,
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the protocol is robust (but as noted by Fujioka et al. (1993), it is not fair, as intermediate election
results can be determined by the authorities, nor does it guarantee privacy if the voter complains).
2.2.1.2 FOO, and Related Protocols
Any treatment of electronic voting protocols would be incomplete without a discussion of Fujioka
et al.’s protocol (1993), commonly termed FOO. Based on the earlier work of Chaum (1988) on
blind signatures, it is generally accepted to be one of the êrst credible (fair, anonymous) electronic
voting protocols, and has spawned many descendants.
The FOO’92 scheme includes voters, an administrator and a counter (which could be a public
bulletin board). Voters and the counter communicate via anonymous channels (implemented by
a mix network, for example). The protocol uses a bit-commitment scheme, a standard signature
scheme, and a blind signature scheme. As in the paper, the following notations are used. Note that
the authors do not detail how each primitive (e.g., bit-commitment scheme, signature scheme,
blinding technique) is implemented:
Vi: Voter i
A: Administrator
C: Counter
(v; k): Bit-commitment scheme for message v using key k
i(m): Voter Vi’s signature scheme
A(m): Administrator’s signature scheme
A(m; r): Blinding technique for message m using salt r
A(s; r): Technique to retrieve a message from a blind signature
IDi: Voter Vi’s identity
vi: Voter Vi’s vote
The protocol proceeds in six stages, which the authors brieëy deêne:
1. PreparationThe voter êlls in a ballot, encrypts and blinds it and sends it to the administrator
2. Administration The administrator signs the blinded message and returns it
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3. Voting The voter unblinds the signed encrypted vote obtaining a signed vote, and anony-
mously sends it to the counter
4. Collecting The counter publishes the ballots received
5. Opening The voter sends a decryption key for the vote anonymously to the counter
6. Counting The counter counts the votes and announces the results
The scheme seems thus far to be quite elegant and simple. The authors now go into more detail
about how it works—this detail is summarised below.
Preparation
1. Voter Vi selects a vote vi and completes a ballot xi = (vi; ki) using a random ki
2. Vi calculates message ei using blinding algorithm ei = (xi; ri)
3. Vi signs si = i(ei) and sends the tuple hIDi; ei; sii to Admin
Administration
4. Admin checks that Vi is authorised to vote. If not, the tuple is rejected.
5. If Vi is authorised, Admin checks that Vi hasn’t already voted (applied for a signature)1. If
Vi has voted, the tuple is rejected
6. Admin checks the signature si on ei usingVi’s public key. If it is valid, Admin signs di = A(ei)
and sends di as a certiêcate of authorisation to Vi
7. At the end of this stage, Admin announces the number of voters who were given authori-
sation to vote, and publishes the list of allowed hIDi; ei; sii tuples2
1It should be noted that in this manner, Admin is able to form a list of entities who have voted. This should be
avoided if possible, as it is a small breach of anonymity.
2Again, this makes the fact that a voter applied to vote public, and is therefore undesirable—the voter’s ID should
be hidden in some way.
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Voting
8. Vi unblinds the received signature of ballot xi by yi = (di; ri)
9. Vi then checks that yi is a valid signature on xi. Else, vi claims that the signature is invalid
by showing hxi; yii to Admin1
10. Vi sends hxi; yii to the counter through some anonymous channel
Collecting
11. Counter C checks the signature yi on xi using Admin’s public key. If the check is successful,
C forms a vote number l and enters hl; xi; yii onto a list.
12. Once all voters have voted, C publishes the list, such that all voters will be able to access it,
and all voters will be able to verify that each xi is legitimately authorised by Admin.
Opening
13. Vi checks that the number of ballots on the list is equal to the number of voters (i.e., all
voters requesting signatures have to vote). If not, a voter Vi can use his blinding factor ri to
prove this to Admin.
14. Vi checks that their ballot is on the list, otherwise using the hxi; yii values they have as proof
15. Vi sends the key ki with the vote number l to C through the anonymous channel
Counting
16. C opens xi = (xi; ki) using ki for the vote numbered l, and retrieves vi. It checks that vi is
a valid vote, then adds the vote to the list
1Note that showing this pair does not give Vi’s identity if done over an anonymous channel. However, arguably
the voter would have to authenticate herself to Admin again to prove that the value of yi was meant to be a signature
on xi and wasn’t just, for example, made up. This means that again, Vi’s identity is potentially released.
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17. The ênal tally is simply the number of votes for each candidate, which is announced at the
end of the counting stage.
This protocol is noted for being particularly elegant, eﬃcient and secure. There is no way for
the public to disrupt the election, nor for the voter to change their mind1; it is not possible to
double-vote, and, because the voter’s ID value is only given to Admin, there is no way to link Vi
and vi, provided anonymous channels are used to communicate with at least one party. Further,
counting is only done at the end of the voting stage (Fujioka et al., 1993, p. 249), meaning that
the counter cannot inëuence the vote by releasing tally information. This means that fairness is
maintained. What is more, the system provides no receipt of voting to the voter (merely a proof
that their vote is permitted, without detailing what the vote is), meaning that receipt-freeness is
maintained. The protocol is not, however, coercion-resistant: neither are many of its descendents.
However, the protocol does suﬀer from a number of problems. As the authors suggest, if
Admin is found to have committed any fraud, then the entire voting process is voided. This is not
overly surprising, but is highly inconvenient. Perhaps, if several administrators (with a single list
of voters) worked as a group, then a smaller proportion of voters could be asked to recast their
votes instead.
The assumption of anonymous channels would presumably involve mix networks, and so
cannot be considered an issue. However, the stages in which the election is conducted are prob-
lematic. FOO is a three-phase protocol, in which all voters must synchronise at the end of each
phase: the administration phase must be complete before voters can check the list and vote; the
collecting phase must be complete before voters can check for their votes on the list and submit
their hl; kii tuples. Note further that voters are actively involved in interaction with the authori-
ties during tallying as well as voting, which is particularly inconvenient—voters are, in the current
system, apathetic at best; a system requiring them to return twice or more to complete their vote
is unlikely to be accepted.
The other issue is that the protocol is not coercion-resistant —an adversary could easily tell a
voter to vote a certain way if they were voting remotely, and the bit-commitment scheme means
1This presents a problem: one way to avoid voter coercion is to allow a change of mind!
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that said voter is then unable to void her previous vote and vote again. Further, as noted by Ray
et al. (2001), the encrypted ballot, cast by the voter, contains her signature (meaning that the
ballot can be identiêed). This removes anonymity from the voter. A ênal point is that no voters
are able to abstain—if someone does, then the authorities can conspire to vote on the abstainer’s
behalf.
Furthermore, as the authors state, the Tallier issues a signed receipt to the voter. This allows
the voter to prove that they voted, if not how (the paper does not go into detail).
As mentioned earlier, a number of protocols have been spawned from FOO (Herschberg,
1997; Cranor and Cytron, 1997; Foster et al., 2006). Sensus (Cranor and Cytron, 1997) has
received particular attention. The protocol claims to solve some of the problems with FOO: the
voter does not have to participate in the ênal tallying stage (and does not need to synchronise
with other voters after voting), and the voter can explicitly state that they choose to abstain. As
in FOO, it is still possible for invalid votes to be added to the tally by the tallier, who may be
dishonest (note that the authors claim that the voter only needs to trust the pollster); further, this
is only detected by “any party who checks the authenticity of the validation certiêcates for all
ballots”. For a large voting population, this is completely unrealistic and would take too much
time.
Cranor and Cytron make a number of strong assumptions about their protocol, which draw
question to its applicability:
• The authors assume that a vote cannot be traced to its voter by tracing packets sent over
the network—hence, an anonymous channel which does not show even the presence of
communication is assumed
• The voter is assumed to use a computer in which it is “not possible for clear text messages
to be intercepted”, hence no part of the system can be ‘hacked’
• The authors assume that messages from voters “will not arrive at the validator and tallier in
the same order”, else unlinkability between votes and voters is clearly violated if the tallier
and validator collude
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The protocol is a close implementation of FOO, adapted for a real-world scenario by the
introduction of a pollster—an agent that executes “cryptographic and data functions” on the voter’s
behalf (who must therefore be trusted). This in itself is a security issue, as is the authors’ admission
that, given two identical ballots, only one would be counted. Note further that although a voter
can state that they wish to abstain, a misbehaving voter may deliberately not indicate this. Such
misbehaviour again allows authorities to conspire to vote on that voter’s behalf. Finally, as noted by
Dini (2003), if the machine the voter uses crashes between contacting the validator and receiving
a certiêcate back, the voter is never able to vote.
2.2.2 Mix Network-Based Protocols
Mix networks (Chaum, 1981) are a cryptographic primitive designed to simulate an anonymous
channel between two endpoints, through a chain of proxy servers. They can be divided into two
types: decryptionmixes and re-encryptionmixes. Decryptionmix networks are the sort êrst proposed
by Chaum, but both types work on a similar principle. In order to anonymously send a message
m from Alice to Bob, Alice sends the message, encrypted in some way, to an intermediate mix proxy
mi. A number of other participants, each with their own messages for other destinations, do the
same. When the mix proxy has received a suﬃcient number of messages, it forwards them in a
random order to the next stage of the chain (which could be the intended destination, or another
mix, depending on the desired level of anonymity). The way in which messages are handled
at each mix in the mix cascade is where decryption and re-encryption mix networks diﬀer. In a
decryption mix, Alicemust not only know the public key of her intended recipient, but also all of
the public keys for each intermediate mix proxy. She êrst encrypts the message with Bob’s public
key, and then that, plus the destination of the message (Bob), with the mix which will receive the
message before Bob does, then the one before that, and so on. In Chaum’s work, a random seed
ri is added at each stage; this is not necessary for probabilistic encryption schemes:
frn; frn 1; f:::fr2; fr1; fr0;mgBob; Bobgmix0gmix1 :::gmixn 2gmixn 1
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Alice begins by forwarding the encrypted message to mixn 1, who removes the êrst layer of
encryption, giving
frn 1; f:::fr2; fr1; fr0;mgBob; Bobgmix0gmix1 :::gmixn 2g
and then forwards the ciphertext tomixn 2. The process continues until Bob receives and decrypts
the message. Note that only one member of the mix cascade needs to be honest in order for Alice
to remain anonymous, even if all other mixes collude. One of the main failings of decryption
mixes, however, is that a single mix failure causes the message to be lost (as, at some stage, it will
be not be realistically possible to decrypt it). Solutions to this problem involving a threshold mix
using ElGamal threshold decryption have been presented (Jakobsson, 1998). The work required
by the message originator is also proportional to the number of mixes.
The alternative re-encryption mix networks rely on public-key encryption schemes that permit
re-encryption, such as ElGamal (discussed in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.4). Alice, the originator of the
message m, does not need to know the number of mixes in the cascade, and only one encryption
is required of Alice. She encrypts m with the public key of the mix itself, and forwards the
ciphertext to the êrst mix server. This server takes a batch of input ciphertexts, re-encrypts
them using some random seed, and forwards a random permutation of these re-encryptions to
the next mix server. When the exit mix (the last mix server) receives the batch of ciphertexts, a
quorum of cooperating mix servers can jointly decrypt the ciphertext, thence forwarding it to its
destination. Re-encryption mix networks are clearly more robust, and require less work for the
message originator. Much work has been done on further increasing this robustness (Jakobsson
et al., 2002; Boneh and Golle, 2002; Holle et al., 2002; Golle et al., 2004; Wikström, 2005; Sako
and Kilian, 1995) by making mix networks veriêable: i.e., able to prove that they are handling
inputs in the correct manner.
Many election schemes assume the availability of an anonymous channel (including FOO,
discussed earlier), implicitly meaning a mix network of some sort. Here, we discuss some of the
most important protocols which use mix networks to ensure voting security.
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2.2.2.1 Sako & Kilian
The Sako-Kilian protocol (Sako and Kilian, 1995) was the êrst to use ElGamal re-encryption to
provide a provable, universally veriêable mixnet for electronic voting. Although the protocol does
not assume a physical voting booth (an assumption which would rather hinder remote voting),
it does assume the existence of a private, physical untappable channel, which is extremely hard to
create.
The authors êrst explain a standard zero-knowledge bit commitment scheme, involving a
prover committing to a value b by generating a pair (B; Sb), where B is a “blob”, and is sent to
the veriêer. The prover can later apply a protocol open to B by sending Sb to the veriêer, which
allows the veriêer to generate b using the two values B; Sb. The bit-commitment scheme used by
Sako and Kilian is such that it is computationally infeasible to generate another Sb such that b can
be obtained in any other way. A chameleon blob is one that allows the veriêer, on input (B; b), to
generate the correct Sb. The protocol uses chameleon blobs to allow the veriêer to forge proofs.
Sako and Kilian’s protocol details a universally veriêable mix network, whose security is en-
sured by forcing each mix server to prove that messages are being correctly processed. For brevity,
and as it is not appropriate to the focus of this work, we do not discuss this here.
Protocol The protocol is summarised by the authors in four steps:
1. First, for each voter i, the ênal counting center posts encryptions of 1-votes and 0-votes
(note that this protocol therefore only allows for elections with two possible outcomes, in
its basic form). The center commits, using chameleon bit commitments, to the random
ordering of these votes, and proves the pairs are correctly constructed. He opens the order-
ing to the voter (i.e., reveals the order by applying open to the chameleon commitment),
through the aforementioned untappable channel
2. Each mix server shuﬄes the two votes for each voter, committing to that shuﬄe using
chameleon commitments, and proving the correctness of every shuﬄe, again revealing this
shuﬄe to the voter on the untappable channel
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3. The voter, keeping track of the initial ordering and how the order was permuted by each
mix, knows which vote is which, and can submit one of these votes
4. All votes are sent to the counter using a veriêable mix network, and thence tallied.
Sako and Kilian provide a more detailed set of implementation steps:
Constants
p = kq+ 1 (p; q prime);
g = (g0)k mod p (g0 is a generator,
mod p)
Centre j’s public key yj = gxj mod p
Centre j’s secret keys xj
Voter i’s public key i = gai
Voter i’s secret key ai
1-vote m1
0-vote m2
The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. The last mix centre, n, executes the following for each voter i:
• Commit a random bit string π(i;n) length l + 1 using public key i. Let π(i;n)k denote
the kth bit of this string.
• Generate v0 = (Gn;Mn) = (gr2n ;m0:yr2n). G andM represent two parts of the message
sent to each mix; r is a random number, which is fresh for each message pair.
• Generate v1 = (G0n;M0n) = (gr2n 1 ;m1:yr2n 1). In both of the above, y represents
Q
yi.
• Place (v0; v1) if π(i;n)1 = 0 and (v1; v0) otherwise. Prove that the placed pair is a
combination of 1-vote and 0-vote in a similar technique to those described previously,
l times (l is a security parameter)
2. The centre reveals to the voter which vote is the 1-vote, by decommitting π(i;n)
3. The next centre, n  1, execute the following with each voter i:
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• Commit a random bit string π(i;n 1) length l + 1 using public key i. Let π(i;n 1)k
denote the kth bit of this string.
• Generate (Gn 1;Mn 1) = (Gn:gr2(n 1) ;Mn:yr2(n 1)).
• Generate (G0n 1;M0n 1) = (Gn:gr2(n 1) 1 ;M0n:yr2(n 1) 1). (Gn;Mn) and (G0n;M0n) are
votes for voter i sent from the previous mix centre.
• Centre n  1 places the votes in this order if π(i;n 1)1 = 0, and reversed otherwise. He
proves that the pair is a combination of 1- and 0-votes.
4. The centre reveals how he placed the votes by decommitting π(i;n 1).
5. Steps 3 and 4 are repeated for mix n  2, and on to the êrst mix centre.
6. The voter, who can compute which vote is a 1-vote and which is a 0-vote, submits the
vote he wishes to make to the êrst centre, which routes it back to the last one (counting
centre) through a universally veriêable mix channel
7. After the last centre reveals the permuted votes, anyone can compute the number of votes
m0 and m1
(Sako and Kilian, 1995, pp. 400–01)
Despite the protocol’s achievements, it does have problems. In the form presented here, it supports
only two-way voting, and requires a considerable amount of work from the voter. Further, as
noted by Michels and Horster (1996), a coercer must not collude with any mix, or else the tally is
at risk of being incorrect. One might further bring the scalability of the protocol into question,
and also its applicability to remote voting, given the strong requirement of an untappable channel.
2.2.2.2 Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson: Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections
The work of Juels et al. (2005), known as the ‘JCJ’ protocol, is widely regarded as being seminal
in the êeld of remote electronic voting, and has spawned a popular implementation, Civitas
(Clarkson et al., 2008). Their scheme requires only an anonymous channel, and uses mix networks
to permute votes and voter credentials, ensuring voter anonymity. Juels et al. are the êrst to
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provide a stronger model of real-world attacks, which must be considered in any remote voting
protocol:
• Randomisation A coercer tells a voter to submit random ballot material. Thus, although
neither voter nor attacker learns the vote, the choice of the voter is nulliêed. The authors
note that the protocol due to Hirt and Sako (2000) is susceptible to this attack.
• Forced Abstention The attacker forces the voter to refrain from voting
• Simulation The attacker forces the voter to divulge her private key after registration but
before voting. Thus, the attacker can simulate the voter’s actions
Preliminaries When the voter Vi casts her ballot, she identiêes herself with a digital signature,
or some interactive authentication protocol. At this time, the voter incorporates a concealed
credential, an encryption of a secret , provided to her by a registrar. The tallying authority
T performs a blind comparison between these credentials, and a list L of encrypted credentials
which are published by a registrar R, leading to veriêcation without revealing the identity of the
voter. This method means that a coerced voter can give the attacker a fake credential ~, without
demonstrating that the credential is invalid.
The list of participants begins with a set of RegistrarsR = fR1;R2; : : : ;RnRg who issue keys
and credentials. Further, a set of Talliers T = fT1;T2; : : :TnTg who process and count votes, and
a set of voters V = fV1;V2; : : :VnVg where i is an identiêer for voter Vi. A bulletin board BB
is assumed as explained before, which voters can read only once the voting process is complete.
The authors deêne a candidate slate C to be an ordered set fc1; c2; : : : ; cnCg, each of which is a
potential voter choice. A candidate is identiêed by an index j. A vector X, such that xj is the
number of votes for j, is the tally.
The authors’ protocol makes use of threshold cryptography (as described in Section 3.1.1)
and a Plaintext Equivalence Test tool PET, which allows comparison of two distinct ciphertexts
to determine the equality of their plaintexts, without revealing those decryptions. Finally, the
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system uses a standard re-encryption mix network, and non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK)
proof technique. The protocol follows êve stages.
Protocol Setup Keypairs are generated for the registrar and tallier, the public parts of which are
distributed.
Registration Having proved eligibility to vote, Vi receives from R a random value i 2U G,
which represents the voter’s credential (G is an algebraic group described in more depth by the
authors). This might be generated in a distributed manner between several registrars. R then adds
Si = EPKT [i], where E represents a polynomial-time ElGamal encryption (and D the reverse) to
a voter roll, L. L is maintained on the bulletin board and signed by R.
Slate Publication R publishes a candidate slate C containing unique identiêers for all the candi-
dates, with an election identiêer .
Voting To vote, a voter casts a ballot for cj containing two ciphertexts—one on her choice cj, and
one on the credential i. The intricacies of this vote are left to the paper. The voter includes an
NIZK proof of knowledge for cj and i, amongst other data.
Tallying To tally the ballots in BB, T :
1. Checks the proofs of correctness for each ballot. Let A1 and B1 denote the list of ciphertexts
on candidates and credentials respectively.
2. Performs PETs on all ciphertexts in B1, removing ballots with the same value—this prevents
double-voting. Let A01;B01 respectively denote the resulting ciphertexts.
3. Applies a mix network to A01;B01 using the same permutation scheme for both, giving
A2;B2.
4. Applies the mix network to L, the voter roll, then compares each value of B2 to the ci-
phertexts of L using PET. A3 is the resulting vector of votes which were made by valid
voters.
5. Publishes the decryptions of all ciphertexts of A3, i.e., the ênal tally.
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(Juels et al., 2005, p. 71–2)
It should be noted that a voter is able to deceive a coercer by merely providing an incorrect
i value at the time of voting. In this manner, the voter is conêdent her vote won’t be counted,
but the coercer may be convinced otherwise. She can then vote at another time correctly. Note,
however, that JCJ (and Civitas, discussed below) cannot protect from a coercer who stands over
the shoulder of the voter to observe her behaviour, as she must execute a protocol which generates
fake credentials. This is something which we aim to address in our work.
The authors themselves note that the scheme is impractical for large-scale elections, as it has
an overhead for tallying authorities which is quadratic in the number of voters (this is mainly
due to the ineﬃciency of the PET). The PET (Jakobsson and Juels, 2000) is, in fact, the main
cause for criticism of the JCJ protocol: it involves several rounds of pairwise blind comparisons
between all ballots and all credentials, making the tallying portion of the protocol particularly
ineﬃcient, and questioning the practicality of the protocol on a large scale. Smith (2005) later
proposed alterations which improve eﬃciency, but introduce undesirable properties (such as ballot
collisions) and a security ëaw, as discussed by Weber et al. (2007), who suggested modiêcations
which are now also considered broken, as an attacker is able to determine whether a vote with
a known credential is counted or not. Research into removing the quadratic complexity (with
respect to the number of votes) of the scheme is ongoing (Clark and Hengartner, 2011; Spycher
et al., 2011).
2.2.2.3 Civitas
Civitas (Clarkson et al., 2008) is a real-world implementation of JCJ, discussed above. The scheme
is a direct implementation of the scheme, with a few exceptions: Civitas distributes registration
trust between several tellers, allowing production of credential shares; it uses multiple “ballot
boxes” rather than bulletin boards, and importantly, it gives concrete consideration to the scala-
bility of the scheme. Like JCJ, Civitas has a number of trust requirements, some of which aﬀect
the real-world practicality of the scheme.
Foremost, users must trust their voting clients. As we discuss in Chapter 5, this is a strong
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assumption, and not always a wise one: viruses could easily aﬀect a user’s vote without their
knowledge. The “ballot boxes” must be—at least in part—trustworthy, in that they return all
votes to the tabulation tellers.
Unfortunately, Civitas does not change the way in which credentials and votes are tallied
using PETs, meaning the scheme is as ineﬃcient as that which preceded it. The authors note
that, even with division of the electoral into smaller, more manageable voting wards, tabulation
and duplicate credential/vote elimination is still expensive (Clarkson et al., 2008, p. 362).
2.2.2.4 Helios
Helios (Adida, 2008) is a remote election scheme based on the premise that some elections “do
not suﬀer from nearly the same coercion risk as high-stakes government elections” (Adida, 2008,
p. 335). As such, it is a scheme designed for low-coercion environments, which focuses more
strongly on election integrity than on coercion-resistance. The protocol is based on the earlier
Simple Veriêable Elections by Benaloh (2006) (itself based on the Sako-Kilian mixnet, discussed
above), which we will discuss êrst.
Benaloh’s work begins with the idea that complex cryptographic voting protocols are often far
too diﬃcult for non-specialists to understand, and hence deliberately abstracts away cryptography
from the protocol he suggests. His work uses threshold encryption (speciêcally of the ElGamal
variety) to ensure voter privacy, as does much work since. Benaloh’s work continues with a
discussion of an interactive proof method used in ballot tallying in his protocol, by which any
observer can verify that the election was conducted correctly. The aim is to prove that two sets
of encrypted ballots consist of the same votes (i.e., one may be a reencryption of the other). We
begin with a set B of encrypted ballots, with the aim of ‘shuﬄing’ these ballots blindly (Benaloh,
2006, p. 3):
1. Each ballot Bi 2 B is re-encrypted randomly to form B0i
2. The set of re-encrypted ballots fB01;B02; : : : ;B0mg is randomly permuted to give B0
3. A collection of n additional sets of ballots B1;B2; : : : ;Bn is generated in the same manner
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4. A set of n challenge bits c1; c2; : : : ; cn is generated
5. For each i where ci = 0, Bi is shown to be equivalent to B by revealing the re-encryption
and permutation data. For each i where ci = 1, Bi is shown to be equivalent to the original
re-encrypted set B0 by composing the re-encryption and permutation data used to create
Bi with that used to create B0, and revealing the composition
This interactive proof method removes the possibility of proving equivalence of any Bi to both B
and B0. The scheme can be made non-interactive using a standard Fiat-Shamir heuristic (Fiat and
Shamir, 1986). Now, with the original ballot set stripped of identifying information, any party
can generate their own shuﬄe, which is accompanied by a proof that the result set is equivalent.
The ênal, encrypted shuﬄing can be decrypted by a quorum, allowing tallying.
Casting an actual vote is discussed at a rather high level. Benaloh discusses an in-person voting
scheme only, in which the vote-creation device produces an encrypted ballot (in the form of a
magnetic card, with the encrypted vote also printed on the front) for the voter’s choice. The
voter then signs in and swipes the magnetic card through a reader which stores his encrypted vote
with her name. The magnetic card is then used as the voter’s receipt, with which she can later
verify his vote was cast (but cannot prove how she voted). Benaloh goes on to discuss various
auditing options, including the option to immediately decrypt any ballot before casting.
Of course, this scheme is open to problems. Foremost, listing of the voter’s identity with an
encrypted vote allows a coercer to see that a voter has voted, meaning forced-abstention attacks
are possible. Further, as noted in later work by Benaloh (2007), many other coercion attacks are
possible: a voter could be given an encrypted ballot in advance; chain voting is possible1; a single
vote-buyer could generate several encrypted ballots and remove them for later coercion of vote-
sellers. Benaloh provides a number of solutions to this problem—for a voting-booth scenario—in
his 2007 work.
1Chain voting is where a vote-buyer obtains a blank ballot, completes (but doesn’t submit) it, and leaves the
polling station. He gives this to a vote-seller, with some form of remuneration, and requests that it is cast—he can
verify this later. The vote-seller then returns later with another blank ballot for the buyer, allowing continuation of
the chain.
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Helios (Adida, 2008; Adida et al., 2009) is related to the protocol discussed above, êrst in that
a voter can produce ballots before authenticating herself in any way, and is only identiêed at the
point of voting. Note that this means that anyone is able to test the validity of the ballot creation
protocol. As Helios is a remote voting protocol, ballot production is in the form of a hashed
ciphertext, which can be audited by the voter, who can acquire the plaintext and randomness
used in the encryption and hash. She can continue to generate and verify fresh ballots, or seal a
ballot by discarding the randomness and plaintext. Only then does she authenticate and submit
her vote. Note that the ballot is not signed before casting, and that the voter can see the hash
of her vote before it is sealed. Both of these issues can give rise to coercion in more at-risk
environments; Helios deliberately avoids considering this problem.
Helios, like Benaloh, assumes that encrypted cast votes are listed next to their voter’s name on
a bulletin board. Some proportion of voters and auditors must check the correctness of the board
(though, as noted by Neﬀ (2003), very little auditing is actually required to elicit high conêdence
in election results). Helios shuﬄes all encrypted ballots and proves shuﬄing after the election
closes, as with Benaloh’s protocol. Finally, it decrypts each ballot, provides a decryption proof for
each, and tallies the election. It seems apparent that this method of decryption, proof and tallying
would be ineﬀective for a large election (but perhaps these are not considered by Helios, for the
same reasons discussed above).
Adida’s closing comments reëect Helios’ stance that coercion resistance is often “futile from
the start”, namely because with any voting scheme (remote or otherwise), the voter gains little
assurance of the software running on the election server, or client. As noted by Adida, a possible
solution to this lies in hardware-rooted attestation (trusted computing). Note that as they stand,
neither Helios nor the protocol on which it was based are receipt-free.
2.2.3 Homomorphic Encryption-Based Protocols
Homomorphic encryption schemes are extremely common in electronic voting protocols, for a
simple reason: they allow eﬃcient re-encryption and threshold decryption, and permit tallying
of an election without the decryption of any single vote. Homomorphic encryption is also
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commonly used as a simpler method to ensure universal veriêability of the tally. We discuss the
ElGamal threshold encryption scheme, as well as the consequences of its homomorphic nature,
more in Section 3.1.1, and so only summarise it here.
Given a generator g for an appropriate cyclic group G of order q (where p; q are suitably large
primes and q divides (p   1)), we select a private key s at random, a public key h = gs, and a
random  2R f0; : : : ; q  1g. An encryption of a message m is then constructed as
(x; y) = (g; h  m) = (g; gs  m)
Note that the holder of s (or a quorum who share it) is the only person who can decrypt this
value without the calculation of a discrete logarithm. Now, if we take two ciphertexts
(x0; y0) = (g
; gsm0) (x1; y1) = (g
; gsm1)
the product of those ciphertexts, viz. (X;Y) =
1Y
i=0
(xi; yi), is equal to
(X;Y) = (g  g; gsm0  gsm1)
= (g+; gs(+)(m1  m2))
i.e., the product of the encryption of m1 and the encryption of m2 is the encryption of m1m2. It
is for this reason that ElGamal is known as a multiplicative homomorphic cryptosystem. If we carefully
design the format of m, we can create a protocol which allows votes to be tallied without revealing
any single vote: for example, choose m = gMi 1 . Then if i is the index of the candidate being
selected, an encrypted vote for candidate 2 would be represented as (x; y) = (g; h  gM1). When
multiplied together, two votes for candidate 2 would equal (x; y) = (g; h g2M1). In this manner,
the tally is built up as more votes are multiplied.
Note that many protocols which use homomorphic encryption still assume the availability of
some anonymous channel (such as that provided by a mix). The reason for separation here is that
the manner in which votes are accrued and tallied is diﬀerent.
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2.2.3.1 Benaloh and Tuinstra: Receipt Free Secret Ballot Elections
Benaloh and Tuinstra (1994) were among the êrst to use homomorphic encryption in an election
protocol. They were also the êrst to develop and implement the notion of receipt-freeness. Their
paper discusses an important point—voting booths have the interesting property that they require
a voter’s vote to stay secret—meaning that it is impossible for a voter to be coerced. They go
on to discuss that many existing protocols at the time failed because they allowed a voter to take
a receipt saying how they voted. While desirable for the voter, this leads to the elimination of
the ability of the voter to deceive someone else about his vote. Hence the authors introduce the
property of receipt-freeness (Benaloh and Tuinstra, 1994, p. 544): a voter is able to vote without
fear of recrimination, as no receipt or other proof of how they voted is given back to them. It
should be noted that the presence of a êxed voting booth, as the authors suggest, could be seen
to somewhat trivialise the problem of uncoercibility—after all, if a voter is forced to vote from a
set location where they can be monitored, then it is hard for them to be coerced. However, the
authors dismiss this:
Even if we assume the presence of voting booths, the task of conducting an election in
which privacy is maintained, coercion is impossible, and yet the tally is publicly veri-
êable is diﬃcult. [Current paper-based voting systems] oﬀer no mechanism whereby
voters can develop true conêdence in the accuracy of the tally (Benaloh and Tuinstra,
1994, p. 545)
Despite the fact that this paper is almost 20 years old, this point is still accurate—in the UK, voters
have no way whatsoever of guaranteeing that their vote is actually counted. Hence Benaloh and
Tuinstra suggest that the following three properties should be satisêed:
• Privacy No participant other than a voter should be able to determine the value of the
vote cast by that voter
• Uncoercibility No voter should be able to convince any other participant of the value of
its vote
• Correctness Every participant should be convinced that the election tally accurately rep-
resents the “sum” of the votes cast
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Model Benaloh and Tuinstra introduce a set of voters, where each voter has two processes, V0
and V1 (in this respect, the protocol is similar to earlier work (Benaloh and Yung, 1986)). The
tally t of the election is the number of voters who ran the V1 protocol. The tally is correct if
tL  t  tH where tL is the number of V1 executions and tH is the total number of voters, less
those who ran V0 (Benaloh and Tuinstra, 1994). The authors assume the existence of private and
public channels, and a random number beacon.
A voting system is deêned as correct by Benaloh and Tuinstra if, with m voters, “specially
designated output common to all participants who follow correct protocols gives a common
correct tally” with probability at least 1  m2N for some security parameter N. Further, the system
is private if no dishonest protocols can permit any participant to distinguish between voters running
V0 and V1, with probability at least 12 +
1
2N (Benaloh and Tuinstra, 1994).
Protocol The authors’ protocol uses only one tallying authority, which has the ability to decrypt
all votes. A ballot is an ordered pair, in which a random order encrypted 0 and 1 are stored, created
by the voting authority. A beacon is used to prove that this ballot is legitimate, as described in
Benaloh and Yung’s earlier protocol (1986, discussed above); the interactive proof provides a small
amount of information regarding the random ordering of 0 and 1 in the ballot, allowing the voter
to choose which half of the ballot to use for the vote.
We note the introduction of two encryption primitives: if z1 is an encryption of x1, and
z2 of x2, then there are two functions 
 and , where z1 
 z2 is an encryption of (x1 + x2),
and z1  z2 is an encryption of (x1   x2). These are properties of homomorphic encryption as
mentioned earlier (Benaloh and Tuinstra, 1994). The protocol follows seven steps, involving a
voting authority, voter and randomness beacon:
1. Authority Encrypt N+ 1 (security parameter N) pairs (xi; yi) where 0  i  N, such that
each xi 2 E(0) and each yi 2 E(1) where E is a polynomial-time public key encryption
function. For each i, let i = minfxi; yig and i = maxfxi; yig. Reveal the pairs (i; i).
2. Voter Enter the voting booth
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3. Authority For each i in 0  i  N, let ci be the decryption D(i) of i. Transmit, over a
private channel, the ci value to the Voter
4. Beacon Generate N bits bi for 1  i  N; send them over a public channel
5. Voter Leave voting booth
6. Authority For all i such that bi = 0, open (i; i) by revealing the decryptions D of each,
together with a certiêcate pair (D0(i);D0(i)). For all i where bi = 1, connect (0; 0) to
(1; 1) by revealing either D0(i  0) and D0(i  0) if D(i) = D(0), or the pair
D0(i  0);D0(i  0) if D(i) = D(0) (i.e., if D(i  0) = 0)
7. Voter To cast a 0-vote, let v = 0 if c0 = 0, else let v = 0. To cast a 1-vote, let v = 0 if
c0 = 0, else let v = 0. Send v over a public channel. The result of the election is the tally
of V0 versus V1 executions.
It should be noted that this protocol actually only requires one interaction from the voter, in the
form of transmission of one bit. The authors note that as no third party can distinguish a 0-vote
from a 1-vote, uncoercibility is obtained. Their proof is quite long, so is omitted here for brevity.
Benaloh and Tuinstra discuss a couple of problems with their protocol, but others seem to
arise. Firstly, a dishonest authority could disrupt the election. This could be avoided by using
several authorities, which would all have to collude to disrupt the election and determine how any
voter voted. However, a single failure would cause the whole protocol to fail. The other obvious
problem is that, in the version of the protocol given here, the authority gains full knowledge of
how every voter voted. This is, of course, unsatisfactory. This is avoided using several authorities.
There is a further problem that there is no provision whatsoever for a 1-out-of-L general
election—i.e., selecting from a number of candidates. Further, the authority could, in the voting
booth, “fail to oﬀer a voter the information needed to complete the interaction” (Benaloh and
Tuinstra, 1994, p. 550), while claiming that it had. A possible solution, the authors note, is to
provide two receipts, one fake, for the voting process.
Of course, the most serious problem is that the protocol does nothing to protect against
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coercion by a party having some control over the voting authorities—further, if we do not assume
a voting booth, coercion is simple. As the authors note:
…a physical separation of the voter from possible coercive agents is fundamental to
any uncoercible election protocol (Benaloh and Tuinstra, 1994)
This quote can perhaps be misinterpreted. Though it seems to be correct that the voter and
coercer should at some point be separate, this need not be for the entire election, and may only
need to be during registration and during the casting of a single vote. This is the stance we adopt
later.
Hirt and Sako (2000) note that Benaloh and Tuinstra’s protocol does not actually provide
receipt-freeness—the voter is able, should they wish to, to generate a receipt for themselves, as a
result of the properties of the mechanism used for multi-authority voting (the vote is distributed
using secret-sharing). The reader is directed to the authors’ paper (Hirt and Sako, 2000, p. 548)
for a more in-depth explanation.
2.2.3.2 Cramer et al.: Multi-Authority Secret Ballot Elections
The work of Cramer et al. (1996) proposes a homomorphic scheme based on the principles of
previous work by Benaloh and Yung, but using the discrete logarithm assumption. The pro-
tocol begins with a homomorphic encryption scheme—an extension of the work of Pedersen
(1992)—that provides a proof of validity. The scheme is similar to a standard ElGamal encryp-
tion scheme. Encryption of a vote v 2 Zq proceeds with a random  2R Zq by computing
B = ghv, for random, independent values of g; h. This B is later opened by revealing v and .
Note that for any two encryptions B1;B2 of values v1; v2, B1B2 is an encryption of v1+v2, making
the system homomorphic. The authors detail a zero-knowledge proof of validity for any ballot b
(where v 2 f1; 1g): this proof protocol is detailed in Figure 2.1.
Given the proof protocol, Cramer et al. (1996) detail the election protocol for a two-candidate
election. We begin with n authorities A1; : : : ;An, and m voters V1; : : : ;Vm, where a quorum of
t < n authorities is required to reveal any single vote. Each voter then prepares a masked vote bi as
follows:
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Figure 2.1 Encryption and Proof of Validity for a ballot b in Cramer et al. (1996)
Verifier
b, a1, a2
c
c ∈R Zq
d1, d2, r1, r2
d1 + d2
?
= c
gr1
?
= a1(bh)
d1
gr2
?
= a2(b/h)
d2
Voter
v = −1v = 1
b := gαh
a1 := g
r1 (bh)−d1
α, r1, d1, w2 ∈R Zq
b := gα/h
a1 := g
w1
a2 := g
w2
d2 := c− d1
r2 := w2 + αd2
a2 := g
r2 (b/h)−d2
d1 := c− d2
r1 := w1 + αd1
α, r2, d2, w1 ∈R Zq
1. The voter selects bi 2 f1; 1g and calculates Bi = gihbi for some random i, and computes
the proof as detailed in Figure 2.1. The voter then calculates
Gi(x) = i + i1x+ : : :+ i;t 1xt 1
Hi(x) = bi + i1x+ : : :+ i;t 1xt 1
where il; il; l  t 2R Zq. The voter commits to these by calculating Bil = gilhil .
2. The voter posts Bi, its proof of validity and all of the commitments to the bulletin board.
All participants verify the correctness of Bi.
3. The voter sends each authority’s share (aij; bij) = (Gi(j);Hi(j)) to each authority Aj using a
private channel (the authors do not suggest whether the channel should be untappable).
4. Aj checks that his share is valid by checking that
gaijhbij = Bi
t 1Y
l=1
Bj
l
il:
5. To cast a vote, Vi posts si 2 f1; 1g to the bulletin board, such that vi = sibi gives the
desired vote.
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Tallying of the election then involves all authorities participating:
1. Each Aj posts Sj =
mX
i=1
aijsj and Tj =
mX
i=1
bijsi.
2. Each tallier checks each authority’s (Sj;Tj) by checking that
gSjhTj =
mY
i=1
 
Bi
t 1Y
l=1
Bj
l
il
!si
and then from any t pairs (j;Tj) where (Sj;Tj) are correct, every tallier can compute the
tally as
T =
X
j2A
Tj
Y
l2Anfjg
l
l  j ;
where A is any quorum set of t.
Note that the election scheme is compatible only with a two-way election. The authors suggest
an extension to multiway elections, in which each voter simply produces several votes by running
several instances of the protocol above in parallel (which is clearly not practical), or in which the
ballot form is altered. It seems apparent that this scheme involves a considerable amount of work
for the voter, even in the case of two-way elections—nevertheless, it is important as a grounding
for future work by Cramer et al..
2.2.3.3 Cramer, Gennaro and Schoenmakers
The ‘CGS’ voting protocol Cramer et al. (1997) is an extension of earlier work (Cramer et al.,
1996) for which the voter’s work is linear with respect to a security parameter k. The work is
more eﬃcient for each participant by a factor of n (where n is the number of tallying authorities).
As opposed to the scheme discussed above, in the CGS protocol, the voter need only submit
a single ElGamal encryption of their ballot, plus a proof of its validity. The protocol, as usual,
assumes the availability of a standard bulletin board (broadcast channel with memory), and a
threshold ElGamal cryptosystem which uses Lagrange coeﬃcients to reconstruct a secret, as in
many protocols.
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The paper notes that, since standard ElGamal is a multiplicative homomorphic encryption
scheme, the product of any two ciphertexts c1c2 is actually the encryption of the product of their
plaintexts, m1m2. In order to obtain an additive homomorphism (i.e., that the product of the
ciphertexts is the encryption of m1 + m2), the authors alter their encryption operation so that a
message m is now encrypted as hGm (where G is a known generator of the group Gq used in
the scheme), meaning that a product of ciphertexts would indeed be the encryption of m1 + m2.
The downside of this change (which is similar to one we use in our work) is that a single discrete
log calculation is required for decryption of the message, which is considered a hard operation.
For small messages, however, the computation can be done eﬃciently, as noted by Cramer et al.
(1997, p. 10).
The authors go in to introduce a proof of validity: namely, a proof that shows that any ciphertext
is an encryption of either m0 or m1—where these are the two possible candidate selections for a
ballot—without revealing which message is encrypted. If an encryption of a message is taken to
be
(x; y) = (g; hm) m 2 fm0;m1g
Then to show that (x; y) is a valid ballot, the prover must provide a witness-indistinguishable
proof of knowledge of the relation given by
logg x = logh(y=m0) _ logg x = logh(y=m1)
For a two-candidate election, the proof, and ballot, are formed in an interactive manner as demon-
strated in Figure 2.2 (note that the method is similar to that of Cramer et al. (1996)). Note that
this proof can be made non-interactive using the standard Fiat-Shamir heuristic: we extend the
proof to a k candidate election in Section 3.1.3, and use it in our work in Chapters 4 and 5. In
the protocol in Figure 2.2, for a êxed generator G, message m1 is represented as G, and m0 as 1G .
A ballot is then (x; y) = (g; hGb) for some b 2R f1; 1g:
Given the protocol above, non-interactivity can be obtained by hashing a combination of the
êrst message to the Veriêer and some unique information (viz. the voter’s identity) to give the
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Figure 2.2 The CGS Proof of Validity for a two-party election ballot (x; y) (Cramer et al., 1997,
p. 9)
Voter
v = −1v = 1
α,w, r1, d1 ∈R Zq
x := gα; y := hαG
a1 := g
r1xd1
α,w, r2, d2 ∈R Zq
x := gα; y := hα/G
b1 := h
r1 (yG)d1
a1 := g
w; b1 := h
w
a2 := g
r2xd2
Verifier
c
c ∈R Zq
d1, d2, r1, r2
x, y, a1, b1, a2, d2
a2 := g
w; b2 := h
w
d2 := c− d1
r2 := w − αd2
b2 := h
r2 (y/G)d2
d1 = c− d2
r1 := w − αd1
d1 + d2
?
= c
a1
?
= gr1xd1
b1
?
= hr1 (yG)d1
a2
?
= gr2xd2
b2
?
= hr2 (y/G)d2
challenge c. A voter casts the ballot by submitting the ballot (x; y), the proof above, and a value
e 2 f1; 1g, such that v = be gives the required vote.
After voting is complete, each proof of validity is checked, and the authorities calculate the
product
(X;Y) =
 
lY
i=1
xi;
lY
i=1
yi
!
from all ballots (xi; yi). The authorities jointly decrypt the product in the standard manner, giving
W = GT as the result, where T is equal to the diﬀerence between yes and no votes. The value
of T can be determined using O(l) modular multiplications.
Note that the protocol is applicable only to a two-party scenario: however, the authors extend
it to a k-way election by suggesting the selection of several generators Gi, one for each candidate,
instead of only using one. This leaves a ênal tally W = GT11 : : :GTKK , where the Tis are the ênal
tally. The authors note that the computation of the necessary discrete log is still “feasible for
reasonable values of l and K” (Cramer et al., 1997, p. 11)
This protocol has some particularly appealing features, and lends itself well to adaptation. We
use some of those features in our own work, and note that the CGS scheme has been used for
the basis of many protocols—one of which is due to Hirt and Sako (2000). It should be noted
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that, as mentioned by Hirt and Sako, CGS is not a receipt-free protocol, but can be made receipt
free with small modiêcations.
2.2.3.4 Hirt and Sako: Eﬃcient Receipt-Free Voting
The scheme due to Hirt and Sako (2000) is strongly rooted in the work of Cramer et al. (1997).
Indeed, the authors propose a 1-out-of-L (electoral candidates) voting scheme based on the CGS
protocol. We begin again with a standard threshold ElGamal cryptosystem, modiêed such that a
some  such that G = hi :  6= g is used to form an encrypted vote v 2 V as (x; y) = (g; hv)
(Hirt and Sako, 2000, p. 554). The authors note that for L party elections, choosing the form of
v is a challenge, drawing on the work of Cramer et al. (1996) to set V = f1;M;M2; : : : ;ML 1g
where M is the maximum number of voters. Tallying again involves the computation of the
discrete log of T, having complexity O(
p
ML 1) (Cramer et al., 1997).
The paper is one of the êrst, in our research, to use ElGamal reencryption to ensure ballot
secrecy: namely, given a ciphertext (x; y), we can obtain a reencryption of the same plaintext (xf; yf)
by selecting a value  2R Zq and forming (xg; yh), where  is then a witness of the reencryption.
Given this action, the paper also introduces two techniques: the 1-out-of-L reencryption proof, which
proves that the reencryption of an encrypted vote e is contained in the list e1; : : : ; eL, and the
designated veriêer reencryption proof, which proves in a witness indistinguishable manner that an
encrypted vote e0 is a reencryption of another vote e.
1-out-of-L Re-encryption Proofs For a given vote (x; y), the authors wish to prove that there
is a reencryption (xf; yf) of the vote in the list of all reencrypted votes (x1; y1); : : : ; (xL; yL). The
proof proceeds as follows:
1. The prover selects d1; : : : ; dL and r1; : : : ; rL at random, and calculates
ai =
xi
x
di  gri bi = yiy
di
 hri for i = 1; : : : ;L
then sends these values to the veriêer. These commit the prover to di; ri for all i above, but
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not for i = f: af; bf commit the prover to w = df + rf, meaning that the prover can still
change df and rf after.
2. The veriêer sends a challenge c 2R Zq to the prover, who modiêes df such that c = d1 +
: : : + dL, modiêes rf such that w = df + r + f and sends all di; ri (for 1  i  L) to the
veriêer.
3. The veriêer now merely tests whether
c = d1 + : : :+ dL
ai =
xi
x
di  gri for all i
bi =

yi
y
di
 hri for all i
Note that we can again use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to convert the proof into a non-interactive
one, where c is a hash of all a and b values with x, y and all xi; yi values.
Designated Veriêer Re-encryption Proofs A designated veriêer re-encryption proof is a tech-
nique to prove, only to a designated veriêer, that some reencryption (xf; yf) is a reencryption of
a speciêc ciphertext (x; y). The protocol uses the veriêer’s public key in proof construction (and
thus secret key in veriêcation), and is given in both interactive and non-interactive forms. As we
use, and discuss, DVRPs in depth in Section 3.1.4, we do not cover them further here, but refer
the reader to this section.
Protocol The protocol detailed in Hirt and Sako (2000) is rather high-level, but is similar in
spirit to the CGS protocol. It assumes the existence of private, one-way untappable channels
between authorities and voters (a particularly strong assumption, given the way in which this
protocol uses those channels during voting). As long as a quorum of t < n authorities remain
honest throughout the protocol, it remains fair and private, and the protocol is receipt-free. Note
that the paper assumes that the authorities are assumed not to collude with a coercer, unless the
voter knows at least one honest authority.
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The protocol begins with each possible vote being encrypted deterministically, with the ci-
phertexts being publicly known. The êrst authority shuﬄes the list by reencrypting its ciphertexts
and permuting it, then submits it to the next authority, who does the same, and so on. Each
authority provides (to the voter, via an untappable channel) a proof of how the list was reen-
crypted and permuted and (to the public) a proof of how the list was permuted only. Namely,
the authority provides the voter with a DVRP for each of the reencrypted vote choices v in V ,
and makes public a 1-out-of-L proof of re-encryption for every reencrypted vote choice.
Hence, at the end of the shuﬄing, the voter will be able to relate the list’s original order to
its current one, and thus pick the encryption representing her desired vote. Note that the private
nature of the required untappable channel (even with respect to an in-person observer) means that
no-one but the voter knows which ciphertext relates to which candidate, as the voter receives
the speciêc permutation and re-encryption proofs used for her ballot. The voter then simply
announces which of the encrypted votes ei she wishes to cast.
The chosen encrypted vote is, presumably, added to the public bulletin board. Votes are added
homomorphically in the style shown above to give the ênal tally. The paper does not suggest
whether a random reencryption and permutation of each vote choice is done for each voter, or
whether each voter receives the same permutation and re-encrypted set of votes. In the latter
case, a security problem clearly exists; in the former, this seems like a remarkably expensive way
in which to generate votes. The assumption of an untappable channel during voting also someone
negates the possibility of the protocol being applicable to remote voting.
In later work, Hirt (2001) developed a related protocol which used a trusted “third-party
randomiser” to minimise the shuﬄing work done by the authorities. Lee and Kim (2002) and
Lee et al. (2004) extend this work, replacing the randomising party with a “Tamper-Resistant
Randomiser” (smart card). Though oﬀering an attractive solution, all of these ideas introduce
a further layer of required trust, and those which use smart cards introduce a further layer of
expense (particularly in the case of remote e-voting). Any attempt to drive the implementation
of electronic voting should not create disincentives to implementation in this way.
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2.2.3.5 ‘Paillier’ Election Protocols
Those protocols using homomorphic encryption discussed so far exclusively use ElGamal en-
cryption. However, alternative encryption systems, such as that of Paillier (1999) should also be
considered. The Paillier cryptosystem oﬀers a small advantage in eﬃciency, and has been adapted
to a threshold version (Fouque et al., 2000). We note, however, that Paillier encryption-based
schemes can often be less eﬃcient than ElGamal-based schemes, as a larger security parameter is
required for the same level of security (Hirt, 2010).
The Paillier cryptosystem begins with n = pq, a standard RSA modulus of two large prime
numbers. Next, g is an integer of an order a multiple of n mod n2. The public key is (n; g) and
the secret key is (n), where (n) = lcm((p   1)(q   1)). Encryption of a message m 2 Zn
involves random selection of some x 2 Zn , and calculation of c = gmxn mod n2. Decryption is
via the equation m = L(c
(n) mod n2)
L(g(n) mod n2 mod n, where L, given the values fu < n2ju = 1 mod ng,
computes L(u) = u 1n (Paillier, 1999). Using threshold decryption requires the use of a distributed
key generation algorithm among authorities to create a single public key, and shares of the private
key. Each server runs a partial decryption of any ciphertext, generating a proof of the decryption,
then forwards these shares to an entity which combines them (a concise version of the combination
algorithm is given by Baudron et al. (2001)).
As we do not use the Paillier cryptosystem in our work, we detail only one exemplar protocol:
that of Baudron et al. (2001). The protocol lists a number of entities: voters, local authorities (who
collect a subset of all ballots, for a single local area), regional authorities (who receive all local
authority results for a region), the national authority (who collects regional results), and a trusted
time stamp, guaranteeing when a voter has voted. Again, a bulletin board is used, and the scheme
uses a number of proofs of knowledge: that given an encrypted message c = gmxn, the prover
convinces a veriêer that he knows m; that the contents of an encryption can be proven to lie
within a set of messages (i.e., a proof of validity); and that two encryptions can be proven to have
the same plaintext (a PET).
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Protocol The protocol begins with each authority publishing, on its own bulletin board, its pub-
lic keys. The national authority uses a key pk, the regional authority pki, and the local authority
pki;j (envisage a tree structure). If ` is the number of voters, the authors deêne M = 2dlog2 `e.
A voter begins by selecting the three public keys of the national, regional and local authorities
appropriate to him. He uses each public key to encrypt a value Mm, with m denoting his vote
(m 2 f1; : : : ; kg for k candidates), giving three ciphertexts cn; cr; cl. He generates proofs that each
ciphertext contains a valid vote, then creates a PET which proves that each of the ciphertexts
encrypt the same vote.
Tallying êrst involves the local authorities verifying all of the proofs, which have been posted
to the bulletin board together with the voters’ names and votes and signed by the time-stamp
server. The local authorities then compute the product of the correct votes, and threshold-
decrypt the tally for their own sub-tallies. These local tallies are published to the regional bulletin
boards, along with the product of the elements on the local boards. The regional authorities are
then able to calculate their own tallies (given the ciphertexts generated for them), and compare
these with the local tally results, and the same for the national authority.
The protocol has several assumptions which must be satisêed. Foremost, in order to satisfy
receipt-freeness and coercion resistance, the authors require a physical tamper-resistant device to
hide the random data used during voting, or a secret, untappable channel between every voter
and a ‘randomiser’ (Pointcheval, 2000).
Though the use of several levels of authority is an elegant way to reduce complexity, it seems
that the redundancy created by each level checking the previous one’s work somewhat mitigates
any advantage. The protocol relies on a time-stamp server to prevent fairness being broken (i.e.,
to mitigate the issue that local authorities release partial tallies before the ênal tally is counted),
and requires every voter to generate three votes, and three proofs (one of which is a PET, which
is very expensive, as discussed in earlier sections).
Many other homomorphic encryption schemes exist in the literature (Kiayias and Yung, 2002,
2004; Schoenmakers, 1999; Damgård et al., 2010, for example); for brevity we do not address
these further. The advantages of using a homomorphic cryptosystem are self-evident: computing
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a product of all ballots is eﬃcient and quick, and can be done by any observer of the bulletin
board. Though (when using a modiêed form of ElGamal) tallying requires a discrete logarithm
calculation, for small numbers of ballots this can be done quite eﬃciently (the baby-step-giant-
step algorithm due to Shanks (1971) is an exemplar method). In our work, we use homomorphic
encryption (in the form of the modiêed ElGamal scheme presented earlier) to form and tally
ballots.
2.2.4 Paper-Based Protocols
The ênal class of e-voting protocol that we will discuss is paper-based protocols. These protocols,
typiêed by prêt-à-voter, which we discuss êrst, generally involve the voter visiting a polling station
and marking their ballot in some way on paper, submitting this, and electronically verifying that
the ballot has been cast at a later time. One of the advantages of paper-based protocols is that
they generally produce a paper ‘receipt’ with which the user (but no observer) can verify their
vote later. This is proposed as an improvement on the current scheme used in many countries,
where voters simply visit a polling station, cast a vote, and receive no receipt or means to verify
that their vote was counted. Even with DRE systems currently in place, the voter “can only trust
in the assurances of the manufacturers…that their vote will be [counted]” (Chaum et al., 2005).
Chaum (2004) êrst proposed a cryptographic paper voting protocol in which voters use a
DRE machine, as in many existing electoral systems. In his scheme, however, the candidate
selected by the voter also appears on a separate “printer” screen. Upon conêrming a selection,
the voter is allowed to select one of two rolls of paper from the printer, which acts as a receipt.
The pattern printed on the paper is akin to an “unreadable and seemingly random pattern of tiny
squares” (Chaum, 2004), not readable on its own, but able to create a readable image showing
the voter’s selection when superimposed upon the other, machine-retained receipt. This style of
information encoding is known as visual cryptography (Naor and Shamir, 1995), a notion that has
been built upon in later protocols (Chaum et al., 2007).
The voting machine keeps a copy of the receipt electronically, and then sends it to the election
website some time later, deleting the half of the receipt left in the machine. In order to later check
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that a vote was cast, one would enter the receipt’s serial number on the website, checking that the
receipt matches that being held by the voter. The reader is referred to Chaum’s work for further
information on tallying, as the techniques used (save for vote shuﬄing using mixes) are outside
of the scope of this thesis.
2.2.4.1 Prêt-à-Voter
Prêt-à-Voter (Chaum et al., 2005) is a seminal protocol in the êeld of paper-based electronic
voting protocols. The scheme uses a more regular representation of a vote than that of Chaum
(above), with ballot papers that are printed in advance, and separable down the middle of the
sheet. One clear advantage of this sort of scheme is that it is familiar to voters, and relatively
simple to understand.
Setup and Voting We begin with a representation of the ballot form. Several ballot talliers are
each allocated two keypairs, whose public parts are certiêed. The left half of a ballot form lists
candidates, and the right half has boxes into which the voter makes her selection:
Figure 2.3 Ballot format in Prêt-à-Voter
Bob
Rosie
Frank
Gemma
8x5b9R
The order in which the candidates are listed is not êxed: in fact, it is diﬀerent on every ballot,
and the permutation used is encrypted (multiple times) in the value 8x5b9R shown in the êgure.
By way of an example, the authors discuss a simple election in which, rather than a random
permutation, names are listed according to a cyclic shift of an initial order: if we assume that the
original order is “Gemma, Bob, Rosie, Frank”, then a shift of 1 gives the ordering “Bob, Rosie,
Frank, Gemma”, as above. The value (or onion) 8x5b9R is then simply an encryption of ‘1’ (note
that in practice, the ordering is indeed a random permutation). The voter makes her selection
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in the standard way, and then detaches the left half, which is destroyed. The right half reveals no
information to any observer:
Figure 2.4 A separated, completed ballot in Prêt-à-Voter
7
8x5b9R
This receipt is fed into a voting terminal, which sends the selected value (3 in this case,
if we begin at 0) and the onion to the talliers, and returns it to the voter as a receipt. The
talliers progressively decrypt the onion to eventually give the required shift from the original
ordering (which even the voting terminal cannot know), allowing the original shift, 1, and the
determination of the voter’s vote for Gemma.
The Ballot Form We return to the way in which the ballot form (speciêcally, the onion) is
generated. The authors begin by stating that the electoral authority generates a unique random
seed sequence of 2k values (for k talliers), g0; g1; g2 : : : g2k 1. A hash is then applied to each of the
germs gi, with the result being modulo v, for v candidates, giving di : i = 0; 1; : : : ; 2k   1. The
oﬀset for any ballot form is then
 =
2k 1X
i=0
di mod v:
It was mentioned earlier that each tallier has two keypairs. This is because each tallier performs
two decryption mixes, one for each key. The onion is then formed of a nested encryption of
each germ under each tallier’s public keys, where tallier i has public keys pk2i and pk2i+1:
Onion = D2k = fg2k 1; fg2k 2; f: : : ; fg1; fg0;D0gpk0gpk1 : : :gpk2k 3gpk2k 2gpk2k 1
The talliers progressively decrypt the onion, beginning with the outermost two layers being
removed by the êrst tallier. On the bulletin board, the êrst column shows the receipt as cast by
the voter (allowing the voter to verify their vote has been cast). Tallier k  1 stores the position
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of the cast vote as r, and then manipulates (ri;Di) for all i, where Di is an ith level onion. The
value r2k is the position at which the voter original placed her mark (0-3, in the êgures above).
Talliers progressively accept a list of (r;D) values from the previous tallier, decrypting and
shuﬄing twice and then passing along the new (r;D) list to the next tallier. So, for each (r2i;D2i)
pair in the input, tallier i  1:
1. decrypts the êrst layer using his êrst secret key sk2i 1, giving germ g2i 1 and onion D2i 1
2. hashes the germ, and takes the result mod v to give d2i 1 = hash(g2i 1) mod v
3. calculates r2i 1 = r2i   d2i 1 mod v
4. forms (r2i 1;D2i 1)
The tallier now shuﬄes the list and posts the result to its middle column on the bulletin board.
The tallier repeats the process using his other private key sk2i 2, shuﬄes again and sends this new
list to the next tallier, who repeats the whole process again.
When all talliers have done this, the ênal output will be pairs (r0;D0) as in the Onion value
above, giving the ênal votes in the original ordering. The actions of a single tallier are represented
in Figure 2.5, and a single vote’s progress through all talliers’ mixes is shown in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.5 A Single Tallier in Prêt-à-Voter (Chaum et al., 2005)
Telleri+1 Telleri Telleri−1
A useful property of the original Prêt-à-Voter scheme is that it is open to auditing by any
interested party. Auditors are able to sample a random subset of all printed ballots to ensure that
the onions are correctly formed, and, as detailed in the paper, concerned voters could in fact
create ‘dummy ballots’, in which the voter’s vote is sent to the talliers, the onion is decrypted,
and the vote is returned to her for veriêcation (of course, the vote is voided). This provides the
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Figure 2.6 A Vote’s Full Progression in Prêt-à-Voter (Chaum et al., 2005)
Teller2 Teller1 Teller0
Charles
Frank
Alice
Bob
X
Alice
Bob
Charles
Frank
X
n
voter with assurance that her actual vote will be counted. Should the voter not wish to cast an
actual vote, she could also simply have the ballot machine send oﬀ the onion, and return the shift
value. As the authors note, however, all of the voter-auditing options are subject to attacks, if the
ballot-printing authority colludes with any of the talliers.
It is also possible to audit the actions of each tallier, asking each tallier to reveal either the
outgoing or incoming link for each of the (r;D) pairs in his list (random partial checking). We
refer the reader to the original paper (Chaum et al., 2005) for more details here.
It should be noted that the protocol, though elegant and appealing (especially to to non-
technical voters) has some issues. Some method must be used to ensure that voters who are
permitted ‘dummy votes’ are not able to cast more than one ballot for real, and to ensure that chain
voting is less of a risk. Some forced manner in which to destroy the left-hand-side of the ballot is
essential (the authors address this in future work). The fact that the scheme uses a decryption mix
network is also a point of failure: although privacy of the voter is assured if even one of the mixes
is honest, failure of any mix means that no ballots encrypted whose onions are partially encrypted
with its keys will be decryptable. We must also trust that the authority responsible for ballot
creation can be trusted entirely. The authors claim that the protocol is “readily [adaptable] to
remote voting” by distributing ballot forms by post. Naturally, in environments where coercion
is a risk, this is not the case.
2.2.4.2 Prêt-à-Voter: Re-encryption Mixes
A later version of Prêt-à-Voter (Ryan and Schneider, 2006) introduces a number of êxes to the
issues present in the original protocol. It uses ElGamal encryption rather than RSA, allowing the
use of re-encryption mixes, rather than decryption mixes. The êrst êx to the original protocol
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is that ballot forms are now generated by a set of l clerks, where each contributes to the seed,
and all would need to collude to obtain the ordering of the candidates. We begin with a set of
decryption talliers, holding shares of the private counterpart of a standard ElGamal public key
(p; ; T) (the notation used in the paper; (q; g; h) in standard notation, with G = hgi known).
These talliers, like those in the original scheme, decrypt the onion after voting. The authors also
deêne a set of Registrars with private key shares for the public key (p; ; R), where the public
key is used to construct each ballot.
Clerk C0 generates a batch of seeds s0i at random, and thence a batch of pairs of onions, by
encrypting each s0i such that an additive homomorphism is possible. For some  generator of the
appropriate group, then, C0 generates
(x
0
i ; 
x0i
R   s
0
i ); (y
0
i ; 
y0i
T   s
0
i );
for random values x0i ; y0i . Each of the remaining clerks now re-encrypts each pair, permutes the
list and transmits it to the next clerk. This gives two ênal onions, the registrar and tallier onions,
where the si values in both should match. Note that only a collusion of all clerks could lead to
the original seed values being revealed (but a threshold of registrars could cooperate to obtain the
seed).
Ballot Creation The ballot itself can now be stored digitally, in an encrypted manner. Voters
now receive a ballot of the form:
Figure 2.7 Empty Ballots in Prêt-à-Voter with Re-Encryption
onionL onionR
A device in the voting booth reads the êrst onion, onionL, and decrypts it (this may be done
in a non-distributed manner, by storing the key in the machine, or in a threshold set of registrars).
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The seed s is obtained from the onion, and it is used to derive the permutation of candidates to
print on the left hand side of the ballot:
Figure 2.8 Ballot Ready for completion in Prêt-à-Voter with Re-Encryption
Rosie
Gemma 7
Frank
Bob
onionL onionR
Now, providing the booth device does not see the right-hand onion, it will not be able to link
the candidate list with the Tallier onion, which will be on the voter’s receipt. Voting proceeds
as before: the voter selects a candidate (Gemma, here); the left-hand strip is destroyed, and the
voter casts their vote with an oﬃcial observing, at a diﬀerent machine. Again, the vote is stored
as (r; onionR)—where this time the onion is equal to (y; yT   si). The authors note that it
would also be feasible to generate another receipt, retained by electoral oﬃcials, to later check
should problems arise (cf. the VVPAT system proposed by Mercuri (2002)).
Once votes are submitted (i.e., pairs (r;D)), an immediate issue is how to re-encrypt the pairs
whilst providing privacy to the voter. As noted by Ryan and Schneider, re-encrypting only the
onion is not suﬃcient. Hence, for a simple cyclic shift of ballot indexes, the authors suggest
‘absorbing’ r into the onion, viz. (y; T   r si): i.e., an encryption of the term r   si. Now,
the r value is encoded into the onion, and so the onion can be re-encrypted alone by a standard
re-encryption mix network. Once mixing is complete, a threshold of decryption talliers is then
able to extract the plaintext values from the onion, giving several terms  r si mod p. The authors
note that despite the apparent intractability of calculation of the discrete log of each of these terms,
the manner in which they select the s values (from a binomial distribution) makes search of Zp
very eﬃcient.
The way in which ballot forms are printed on demand, of course, removes the ability to
audit them before the election (or, indeed, after). One solution is a two-sided ballot (Ryan
and Schneider, 2006, p. 323), which, for brevity, we do not discuss here. The random partial
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checking approach suggested for original Prêt-à-Voter is still appropriate, however, where the
re-encryption seed is revealed by each mix.
Again, the issue of remote voting with Prêt-à-Voter is a complex one with respect to coercion.
One of the authors’ suggestions is akin to that of the credentials used in the JCJ protocol (Juels
et al., 2005): a voter simply casts a credential (invalid if coerced) with his vote, where the validity
of a credential is not apparent to an in-person observer. How voters receive these credentials is not
discussed; nevertheless, this idea is similar to one which we use in our own work.
2.2.4.3 Derivatives of Prêt-à-Voter
Many extensions of the two Prêt-à-Voter protocols discussed above have been developed, and
are still being developed today. In Ryan (2007), a version of Prêt-à-Voter is developed which
presents a human-readable paper trail to the voter, marked with a ballot identiêer number which
is unlinked to the ballot. The scheme seems attractive, but, as noted by the paper, is subject to
the same potential issues as all VVPAT-based schemes: coercion is more likely, and corruptions
(possibly deliberate) of the paper audit count could lead to the digital count being questioned
(even when correct). It seems that work required to mitigate these problems, as well as to set up
the VVPAT in the êrst place, makes the scheme rather unrealistic.
Scratch & Vote (Adida and Rivest, 2006) uses Paillier encryption with Prêt-à-Voter-style
ballots. Each ballot form is augmented with a 2D barcode containing an encryption of the
candidate ordering, and “scratchable” surface protecting a plaintext ordering of the candidates
on the ballot: in order to audit a ballot, the voter scratches the surface and veriêes its contents
publicly against the barcode value, voiding the ballot in the process. To cast a ballot, the scratch-
strip is removed unscratched by an electoral oﬃcer, rendering the remaining ballot unlinkable to
any candidate.
Prêt-à-Voter schemes have also been developed which support write-in ballots (Schneider
et al., 2011)—long a problem for coercion-resistant elections, single transferable vote elections
(Xia et al., 2007), and code voting (Ryan and Teague, 2009). This last version of the protocol
involves sending a physical sheet of ‘codes’ to each voter (by postal mail, for example), where
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each candidate has a random ‘voting code’, and the letter has a single ‘acknowledgement code’.
The voter then logs onto a website to cast his ballot, providing the ballot ID number from the
letter with the appropriate voting code. The voting server then interacts with a quorum of
trustees in order to return the acknowledgement code, which is veriêed against that on the letter.
Note that this scheme is receipt-free, but also prevents the voter from seeing exactly how her
vote was recorded (as opposed to traditional code voting, where every candidate has a speciêc
acknowledgement code). Of course, the scheme can also not defend against an over-the-shoulder
observer, except if the voter has the opportunity to vote once unobserved. The idea of ‘securely’
transmitting the code sheet to the voter, whilst also preventing the voter receiving multiple fake
code sheets from an adversary (a postal oﬃce worker who deliberately intercepts her mail, say) is
also questionable.
2.2.4.4 ThreeBallot
ThreeBallot (Rivest and Smith, 2007), and its closely related relatives VAV and Twin, were de-
signed to provide the security guarantees of traditional cryptographic voting, but without cryp-
tography. We will discuss ThreeBallot here.
The protocol, like Prêt-à-Voter and Punchscan (see Section 2.2.4.5), is from a class known as
“End-to-End (E2E) Veriêable” protocols, which produce cryptographically secured ballots, ballot
receipts, and auditability at every stage of the election, such that the results can be independently
veriêed. Though ThreeBallot uses no cryptography, it is typically classed as E2E because of the
properties it oﬀers.
The protocol begins with a voter receiving a ‘multi-ballot’: three paper ballots on separate
sheets (a voter might select these ballots from a bin full of empty ones). An example is given in
Figure 2.9.
Each ballot is identical, but each has a unique (machine-readable) ballot ID on the bottom.
To vote for a candidate, the voter êlls in any two (but only two) of the ‘bubbles’ next to that
candidate. To vote against a candidate, the voter êlls in only one bubble for that candidate. If any
candidate has zero or three bubbles êlled in, the ballot is void. Note that the scheme (based on
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Figure 2.9 A ThreeBallot multi-ballot (Rivest and Smith, 2007).
Ballot
69ab3d&r)
Gemma
Rosie
Frank
Bob
Ballot
Gemma
Rosie
Frank
Bob
Ballot
Gemma
Rosie
Frank
Bob
ab5+#q3£r_ 12h$fa~}−
approval voting) allows approval of more than one candidate. In Figure 2.10, we vote only for
Gemma.
Figure 2.10 A completed ThreeBallot multi-ballot, voting for Gemma.
Ballot
Gemma
Rosie
Frank
Bob
Ballot
Gemma
Rosie
Frank
Bob
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Ballot
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Frank
Bob
The voter then submits her ballots to a ‘checker’ which validates her submissions, and allows
her to select one of the ballots as a receipt. This ballot is reprinted onto diﬀerent paper, and this
copy is returned to the voter. All three ballots are dropped into a ballot box. It is at this point
that a number of assumptions are made: the voter must “secretly and arbitrarily” select a ballot
for a receipt, the machine must not remember which she chooses, and the voter must sign her
name to indicate having voted (until which point, the vote must not be cast).
At the close of the election all ballots are posted on a bulletin board, and can be publicly
veriêed. The voter can check for her receipt ballot in the list. The tally is such that each
candidate’s total is increased by the number of voters (i.e., even candidates with 0 votes have a
tally of n for n voters).
At êrst glance, ThreeBallot appears to be an attractive protocol. Unfortunately, it is subject to
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several problems and attacks: from a usability perspective its demands upon the user are considered
far too extensive (consider an election with more than 50 candidates, where the rules on how
to vote apply!), and the system is entirely dependent on the reliability and trustworthiness of the
‘checker’ machine. Further, the protocol is subject to a number of security attacks. First, since
the ballot ID is used to identify each ballot, the protocol implies that each voter only remembers
the ID on the receipt she retains. This is a naïve assumption. More worrying is an attack in
which an adversary with access to the ballot box can alter the outcome of the election in his
favour—without detection—by buying receipts from voters with a êlled bubble only for him,
and altering ballots with single marks for other candidates to have single marks for him (Appel,
2006). These problems all cast something of a negative light on ThreeBallot, which is now seen
as a non-practical protocol for large-scale elections.
2.2.4.5 Punchscan
The Punchscan system (Fisher et al., 2006; Popoveniuc and Hosp, 2010), originated by Chaum,
is a paper-based voting system which claims not to rely on complex machinery of the sort used
by Prêt-à-Voter and ThreeBallot. An exemplar Punchscan ballot is shown in Figure 2.11.
Figure 2.11 Completed ballot, voting for Gemma, in Punchscan
Select a candidate:
1084
A Gemma
B Frank
B A
In the êgure, the ballot consists of two pieces of paper. The top layer lists the candidate names
and which letters they relate to, with the letters being randomly chosen. The bottom layer has
the same letters, in random order, visible through holes in the top layer. To make a selection, a
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voter makes a mark using a ‘bingo’-style ink dauber, such that the diameter of the ink blot is larger
than that of the hole, leaving ink on both sheets. One layer (committed to before the election) is
destroyed; the other is submitted and scanned as the vote, and is returned to the voter as a receipt.
The scanned ballot is uploaded to a website which the voter can visit. Note that neither layer
reveals the vote on its own.
To tally the vote, the system uses a Punchboard to determine the order of the candidates on the
ballot. The Punchboard is a set of three tables, the permute, decrypt and result tables. The permute
table stores the identity of the ballot, the ordering of the top and bottom layers, commitments to
these, and the mark that was made by the voter. In the decrypt table, the mark made on the ballot
is translated into the actual vote, according to any diﬀerences in ordering between the top and
bottom layers. Rows from the permute table are mixed (permuted) before entering the decrypt
table, and permuted again afterwards, making the whole process rather like the action of a mix
network. The result table simply stores the ênal vote from each row.
Note that if the Punchboard were to be released to the public, any vote could be linked back
to its voter; however, if the board were kept secret, votes could be altered by an adversary in the
decrypt table (Fisher et al., 2006). As a compromise, the full board, encrypted, is released, and
parts of it are audited at random, to make signiêcant changes noticeable.
The Punchboard is audited before the election, by selecting half of the ballots listed on it
and decrypting (spoiling) the ballot information on those rows. This information is made public,
making the integrity of the Punchboard universally veriêable (with high probability). When
the election is complete, auditors select and decrypt either the left or right half of the decrypt
table, revealing either transformations from original ballots to their intermediate decryptions, or
transformations from the intermediate to the end vote (thus not revealing any one path from
encrypted ballot to vote).
The authors note a number of trust requirements: foremost, the device used to print the
ballots must be trusted to do so according to the permute table. The software present in the
device used to process votes at each polling station must run trusted software. Popoveniuc and
Hosp (2010) provide a number of security proofs for the manner in which the auditability of
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Punchscan makes its integrity unquestionable, and the manner in which it satisêes voter privacy
(anonymity). The protocol is clearly receipt-free (and E2E veriêable), and despite small issues
with its usability in deployment (Essex et al., 2007), the system seems promising. Again, one
must question how we would apply remote voting to Punchscan, and further whether revocable
anonymity could work in any remote implementation.
2.2.4.6 Scantegrity I and II
Scantegrity (Chaum et al., 2008b) were originally designed as enhancements for standard optical
scan voting systems (with the idea that voters do not change their method of voting), minimising
any increase in cost at polling stations already using optical scan. Scantegrity is in fact much
like Punchscan, on which it is based: the main diﬀerence is that the ballot sheet itself does not
change, with the exception of a bar-coded serial number being printed on a perforated corner of
the ballot (‘chit’), which the voter uses together with the letter relating to her selected candidate
in order to verify her vote. The way in which dispute resolution relies on the trustworthiness of
the polling station oﬃcer to not link a voter to a vote is, however, questionable, and an attacker
can force the voter to produce a pre-speciêed receipt.
The protocol was quickly superseded by Scantegrity II (Chaum et al., 2008a), which is what
we will discuss here. The protocol does not rely on paper chits, or on election oﬃcials in the case
of dispute resolution. It requires no extra polling station equipment, apart from a small change to
how ballots are printed. However, the system unconventionally introduces invisible ink and decoder
pens to the voting process. Ballots are designed as shown in Figure 2.12a.
A ballot with a detachable base, each part tagged with the same identity number, are prepared.
Each candidate’s bubble has a unique random sequence of characters (a conêrmation code) written
inside it in invisible ink: hence, when the voter êrst sees the ballot, none of the codes are visible.
The voter marks her choice using a special ‘decoder’ pen, which makes the conêrmation code
visible—see Figure 2.12b. An optical scanner detects the dark mark made by the pen, but does
not interpret the conêrmation code. If the voter wishes to later verify that her vote was counted, she
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Figure 2.12 Scantegrity II ballots
Frank
Rosie
Gemma
1694
1694
(a) Blank Scantegrity ballot, printed with
invisible ink
Frank
Rosie
Gemma
1694
1694
af4
af4
(b) Completed ballot with receipt de-
tached
writes the conêrmation code on the bottom portion (her receipt), taking it with her. Note that
the conêrmation codes for candidates not selected must remain secret.
Before the election, a quorum of authorities share a seed for a random number generator,
then generating enough pseudorandom conêrmation codes for all candidates on all ballot papers.
These values are entered into a table P, in the order generated by the random number generator.
P contains a row for every ballot, linking conêrmation codes to candidates for each ballot by
its ID number, and hence is kept secret throughout. Another table, Q, contains each ballot’s
conêrmation codes in rows (one row per ballot), with the order of those codes permuted, and their
candidate links removed. The values in Q are committed to, and those commitments published.
A table R contains a row for every conêrmation code from Q, with a ëag to denote whether
a vote is present for that row, and link between the row and column in table Q (viz “row 2,
column 1”), and a row and column in table S. This ênal table simply contains a column for every
candidate, where every cell is a ëag, set to true if a vote is present. Commitments to Q and R
are published, and the full table S is published.
The voter is able to select two ballots when voting, deliberately voiding one for use as an
audit ballot. The ballot used for voting has its receipt stamped by an election oﬃcial, and the
audit ballot receipt is stamped as voided. After voting is complete, values are entered into R
according to the opened values in Q. Election oﬃcials, like in Punchscan, audit the process by
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either opening the Q-pointer, or the S-pointer, in R, for every row of the table, at random. For
spoiled ballots, oﬃcials open both of these pointers, as well as the commitments. The standard
assumptions about a small number of audited ballots leading to high election integrity guarantees
apply here: we refer the reader to Chaum et al. (2008a) for more details, and diagrams of the
tallying process.
Scantegrity and Scantegrity II are more examples of interesting paper-based, E2E systems
which seem very promising for ‘polling station’, in-person elections. Again, however, Scantegrity
II seems to make some rather strong assumptions: foremost, to us, is the notion of “invisible ink”.
It seems hard to believe that a reliable system for printing ink which could both not be seen at
all by the naked eye, and also become immediately visible when drawn over with certain inks,
could be developed. Indeed, as the authors note, any such ink would change the reëectivity of
the surface on which it was used. The use of such technology naturally makes systems such as
this inappropriate for remote voting, but the techniques used to achieve veriêability are relevant
nonetheless.
2.2.5 What is Wrong with e-Voting?
Given the breadth of work which has now been covered, we consider an obvious question: with
so many electronic voting protocols and systems, what is wrong with electronic voting? Take-up
has been extremely poor, with many countries deciding against an implementation of electronic
voting in the near future, and some organisations in the UK staunchly opposed to it (Open Rights
Group, 2007).
Randell and Ryan (2005) suggest that the ultimate goal of electronic voting is to “develop an
e-voting scheme that is both secure and suﬃciently understandable to gain as high a level of public
trust as is achieved by a number of existing manual voting schemes, such as that in current use in
the UK” (Randell and Ryan, 2005). This is a very important point—as has already been discussed,
no voting system will be successful unless it is trustworthy and trustable by the general public. As
Cranor suggests, “simultaneously achieving security and privacy in electronic polls is a problem
that must be solved if the Internet is to be used for serious large-scale…elections”(Cranor, 1996).
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To some extent, these problems have been solved, but not while satisfying other problems in
electronic voting, such as the balance between remote elections and coercion resistance.
2.2.5.1 Current Problems
As Jorba et al. (2003) discuss, “The wealth of problems in current electronic voting systems has
led to a shake in public conêdence in electronic voting in general” (Jorba et al., 2003). The
authors refer to the êasco surrounding the aforementioned US Presidential elections, but one can
clearly see that problems surround both paper and electronic voting. Postal voting in the UK is
wide open to fraud or coercion, and it is desirable to trace those who deliberately break the law
in these situations—revocable anonymity is an ideal solution.
Unfortunately, attempts at large-scale electronic voting have thus far been prone to failure.
The most serious example is that of the US Presidential elections in Florida, in 2000. The
equipment concerned was found to be faulty, ballots were often confusing; there were mistakes
in the actual recording of votes, and problems with missing ballots. All of these failures apparently
led to up to 6 million votes being lost (Jorba et al., 2003). As Chaum et al. (2005) note when
discussing the American DRE system, “With…[the] DRE,…the voter at best gets some form of
acknowledgement of the way they cast their vote. After that, they can only hope that their vote
will be accurately included in the ênal tally” (Chaum et al., 2005). It is hardly surprising that the
public have lost trust in such systems.
The problems with the US elections in 2000 are further described by Mercuri (2002). She
notes that currently, the public will be unwilling to adopt a system unless it is suﬃciently close to
what was available before. Speciêcally, she suggests a human-readable paper trail (VVPAT) with
every vote, noting that there must be “a way to backtrack vote totals from actual ballots that came
from…legitimate voters”(Mercuri, 2002, p. 46). Protocols such as that of Ryan (2007) provide
some form of paper trail. We question the relevance of a paper trail to remote, Internet-based
voting protocols, however: indeed, Paul and Tanenbaum (2009) suggest that a return to using
paper ballots is arguably “a return to the problems that prompted the use of electronic machines”
in the êrst place. Although paper ballots have a deênite place in modern elections, we believe
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that a system allowing users to vote over the Internet is critical to higher turnout. We posit that,
as suggested by Bochsler (2010), though remote, Internet voting may not dramatically increase
turnout by disaﬀected voters immediately, it will increase participation by those voters that are
engaged, but merely unwilling to participate by traditional means. This done, with time, we feel
that turnout using a remote election system would substantially increase.
Volkamer and Krimmer (2006) note that, due to the large number of security requirements of
Internet (electronic) voting which have yet to be satisêed, a large-scale application of electronic
voting is still a long way away (Volkamer and Krimmer, 2006). Indeed, Weber et al. (2007)
and Liaw (2004) state that before any successful electronic election system can be implemented,
a plethora of problems, including vote selling and coercion, have to be addressed. Until these
problems are solved, along with satisfaction of the trustworthiness requirement for public use,
electronic voting will not be successful. It seems somewhat odd, on this note, that several systems
have been designed which appear to satisfy the requirements of electronic voting, but none have
been used on a large scale. This is perhaps due to a combination of complacency in the current
paper systems, unwillingness to adopt a new scheme considering the cost associated with it, and
a lack of conêdence in cryptographic security.
If governments are to adopt any remote election system, perhaps the most prevalent problem
is the complexity of existing protocols. Many of those protocols discussed above have a high
level of complexity to the user. That complexity is perhaps necessary in order to satisfy the
demanding security requirements that voters have, and it can possibly be mitigated by front end
software which “hides” much of the cryptography. Whether this in itself is acceptable to the
security community is an important point, but the satisfaction of the end user is more important:
many end-users are likely to be satisêed with a solution which appears user-friendly and oﬀers
a guarantee of their vote being counted. In fact, it is the satisfaction of the user which is most
pivotal to the success of electronic voting:
Many individuals expressed concerns over the security and privacy of e-voting and
felt that substantial reassurance would need to be oﬀered by the government prior to
implementation. Establishing and maintaining public conêdence in the security and
privacy of the electoral system appears to fundamental [sic] in achieving legitimacy
for e-voting (Local Government Association, 2002, p. 5)
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Some users, naturally, will require a stronger guarantee that their privacy is ensured, and their
vote is counted as cast:
It is not diﬃcult to imagine a simple, stand-alone device which oﬀers a rich user
interface but has no responsibilities beyond providing the voter with an encrypted
ballot…how then are voters to gain conêdence that these devices are accurately cre-
ating encrypted ballots which reëect their intentions? (Benaloh, 2006, p. 2)
Until we can satisfy the stringent requirements of the most cautious end users, electronic voting
is likely to remain unsuccessful.
2.3 Anonymity and Revocable Anonymity
Part of the aim of this thesis is to consider the application of revocable anonymity to electronic
voting. This is a notion which has not been considered before, despite receiving considerable
attention in other computer security êelds. In this section, we will brieëy consider what is meant
by ‘anonymity’ and revocable anonymity, particularly with regard to electronic voting, and how
these requirements might be realised, considering their implementations in related êelds.
From the perspective of digital transactions, anonymity can be deêned as the ability to hide
a user’s identity, under all circumstances, for any transactions. Pointcheval (2000) splits anonymity
into two parts:
• Unlinkability: It should not be possible to link two transactions made by the same user
• Untraceability: It should not be possible to match any transaction to a given user
It should be noted, of course, that a protocol providing untraceability alone is not suﬃcient. If
a user’s transactions are linkable, then it is possible to trace them. Pointcheval goes on to split
anonymity into strong and weak, where it is, respectively:
• Not possible to guess a link between a transaction and customer (except with negligible
probability), or
• Possible to guess or know such a link, but not to prove it (except with negligible probability)
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Pointcheval (2000, p. 6)
Further, Guan et al. (2002) discuss anonymity as being categorised by who is anonymised: sender
anonymity protects the identity of the sender (which is what one would prefer for electronic vot-
ing); receiver anonymity protects the receiver, and mutual anonymity protects both. This distinc-
tion is important when considering any system providing anonymity. Naturally, in an electronic
voting protocol, we are interested only in sender anonymity.
Anonymity is essential in many digital protocols. Marx (1999) discusses several reasons for
providing anonymity in a generic sense, many of which can be applied to electronic voting:
1. To facilitate the ëow of information—for example, anonymity crime report lines
2. To obtain personal data for research—for those that would not usually give such information
away
3. To encourage attention to the content of a message—i.e., to encourage a counter to look
at the vote, rather than the voter
4. To obtain a resource or encourage action involving illegality—this is a negative issue, but
nevertheless, as von Solms and Naccache (1992) conêrm, a valid reason for anonymity
5. To protect strategic economic interests
6. To protect one’s time, space, and person—e.g., having an ex-directory telephone number
7. To aid judgements based on speciêed criteria—e.g., permitting the vote of an ex-criminal
in an unbiased manner
8. To protect reputation
9. To avoid persecution based on one’s actions
10. ‘Traditional expectations’—the author suggests the invention of the caller ID system in the
US, but this can be applied to voting. Voters generally expect their vote to be anonymous.
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Marx (1999, p. 102)
It is apparent that having a system which is completely anonymous is often dangerous. In the
case of electronic commerce, this could lead to the ‘perfect crime’, in which an adversary can
blackmail a user to make a transaction, without fear of recrimination (von Solms and Naccache,
1992). However, in other êelds, a completely anonymous system is also a dangerous thing. In
distributed computing, one might use anonymity to prevent other users (possibly competitors)
from knowing anything about a job submitted to a computing grid: as Ciaraldi et al. (2000) note,
the lack of identiêability in a distributed transaction can mean that “neither the distributor of
a computation nor the client in a computation can know with assurance with whom they are
communicating”(Ciaraldi et al., 2000, p. 195). They go on to note that knowing a distributor’s
identity is often crucial to assure the safety of a distributed process. Further, knowing the identity
of a client may be crucial, because of the potential trustworthiness of the clients (Ciaraldi et al.,
2000).
In systems providing anonymous access to the Internet, full anonymity can again be a dan-
gerous thing:
On the one hand, users are concerned about their privacy, and desire to anonymously
access the network. On the other hand, some organizations are concerned about how
this anonymous access might be abused (Claessens et al., 2003)
…anonymity can facilitate socially unacceptable or even criminal activities because
of the diﬃculties in holding users accountable (Marx, 1999)
It is for these reasons that some sort of revocable anonymity, or partial identiêability, are proposed
for all digital protocols, and in this case, electronic voting. Again, Marx gives several reasons why
one might need identiêability:
1. Accountability—it must be possible to punish someone who commits a crime. If this
threat of punishment is not there, then those originally not likely to commit a crime may
be tempted to do so.
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2. To judge reputation—one might determine the validity of someone’s vote based on some
identifying characteristic about them1
3. To aid eﬃciency and improve service
4. To guarantee interactions that are distanced or mediated by time or space—in the case of
voting, one may wish to guarantee that one’s vote has been counted. This justiêes the use
of a receipt, but receipts unfortunately open a voting system to coercion. Hence a balance
has to be drawn.
(Marx, 1999)
It is clear that some balance needs to be drawn. It could be argued that all digital protocols could
beneêt from anonymity. However, those same protocols need some mechanism to trace and
punish those who commit a crime. In the case of electronic voting, one might wish to punish
a voter deliberately attempting to vote twice. To some degree, though, the reasons for revocable
anonymity in electronic voting almost do not matter: the British electoral system requires that a
voter can be linked to their ballot, and hence a solution which does this is required.
Having satisêed that revocable anonymity is useful, it can also be a bad thing. Davida et al.
(1997), discussing revocable anonymity in digital cash, notes that blackmailing is a possible problem.
Consider motoring: the steering wheel lock has reduced unattended car theft, but has increased
car-jacking, where the car is entered (and the driver removed) while it is being driven. Similarly,
if a system is available by which a voter can prove they have been blackmailed, the criminal may
have to kill the voter to prevent his being caught. This seems rather drastic for a protocol in
which the most a coercer can gain is a single vote per instance of blackmailing, but the example
is still valid.
Deêning the Degrees of Anonymity It is appropriate to consider the degree to which a user
of an electronic protocol remains anonymous. Shields and Levine (2000) deênes several levels of
anonymity between an attacker and user, based on the work of Reiter and Rubin (1999):
1. Provably Exposed: The attacker can prove that Alice is the initiator of a transaction
1Admittedly, this reason contrasts with reason 7 justifying anonymity!
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2. Exposed: The attacker is convinced that Alice is the initiator, but there is some possibility
that she is not.
3. Probable Innocence: Alice appears no more likely to be the initiator than to not be, but appears
to be more likely than all other entities
4. Beyond Suspicion: Alice appears to be no more likely to be the initiator than any other entity
5. Absolute Privacy: The attacker cannot determine the presence of any communication
(Shields and Levine, 2000, p. 35)
Clearly, when trying to enforce a secret ballot election, we need a protocol which either provides
beyond-suspicion-anonymity or absolute privacy for Alice. This requirement is tempered by the
issue that Alice may need to be linked back to her ballot: as a result, there must be some route by
which Alice can be unquestionably identiêed, but only by a trusted, authorised entity.
2.3.1 Approaches to Remote Anonymity
We now brieëy discuss approaches to the provision of (revocable) anonymity in various êelds
in computer security. We begin by addressing two general pieces of work, and then focus on
electronic commerce (as we discuss later, electronic voting can be seen as a type of electronic
commerce).
2.3.1.1 Self-Scrambling Anonymizers
Pointcheval (2000) introduces two concepts in his paper, anonymity providers and revocation centers,
which are analogous to trusted third parties. Anonymity providers “certify re-encrypted data after
having been convinced of the validity of the content, but without knowing anything about the
latter” (Pointcheval, 2000). In the êeld of digital cash—which we discuss in Section 2.3.1.3—this
might guarantee that a coin is that of a certiêed legal user. The identity of this user is protected
until revoked by a revocation center. Pointcheval raises the important point that anonymity
providers could charge for their service; clearly, in electronic voting this would not be appropriate,
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but in many communications, users may not want to pay for anonymity, as they feel it isn’t
necessary.
Pointcheval’s paper, which is written with a view to digital cash, discusses the problem of
double spending, which originated as a result of blind signatures:
…a crucial problem came from over-spending, which refers to the situation in which
a user spends the same coin two or more times. An inherent quality of digital data
is that perfect copies are easy to make; therefore such fraud cannot be avoided, but
just detected in the best case. Then…detection is done later. However, what may
be done if the coin in completely anonymous? (Pointcheval, 2000, pp. 1–2)
This is a very important point, which is analogous to the situation in electronic voting. A voter
could in theory vote twice, if they have been given some digital token with which to do so.
Hence it is necessary to revoke their anonymity. Pointcheval discusses a later work of Chaum
et al. (1990), which uses cut-and-choose: the user’s identity is stored in the coin in such a way that
spending the coin twice automatically reveals the identity of the user. Such a solution could be
used in electronic voting; however it should be noted that this is an ineﬃcient idea.
Pointcheval’s scheme uses the idea of designated veriêer undeniable signatures, including an un-
deniable proof scheme as follows:
• A key generation algorithm K which outputs random secret and private keys
• A proof algorithm P(sk;m) which, on an input m, outputs an ‘undeniable’ signature s on
m. This proof does not on its own convince anyone; one has to interact with the owner of
sk.
• A conêrmation algorithmConﬁrmation(sk; pk;m; s), between the signer and veriêer, where
the signer proves validity of the pair (m; s) to the veriêer
• A disavowal algorithm Disavowal(sk; pk;m; s) where the signer tries to prove that (m; s) is
not a valid pair
(Pointcheval, 2000, p. 4)
It should be noted that, except with negligible probability, it is not possible to succeed in both
Conﬁrmation and Disavowal.
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As mentioned, Pointcheval’s protocol is in the context of digital cash. It begins with with-
drawal; a revocably anonymous coin is a certiêed message which includes the user’s public key.
In this case, the coin may be the user’s public key pkAlice encrypted with the revocation center’s
public key: c = fpkAlice; rgRC, where r is a random value. The user then signs a message containing
this encryption, her public key and r:  = signAlice(pkAlice; r; c) and sends this to the bank.
Of course, the bank is now able to see everything about Alice, and hence veriêes that the
signature  is valid, then returns a certiêcate pair (Certc; c) to Alice. Alice then uses a self-scrambling
anonymizer to transform her ciphertext c into something diﬀerent, thereby protecting her identity.
She re-encrypts her coin c = fpkAlice; rgRC into c0 = fpkAlice; r + tgRC, which is possible via the
ElGamal encryption scheme used. Next, she provides an undeniable signature s, using c as a public
key associated with secret key (skAlice; r), stating the equivalence of c and c0.
This new c0, along with c, Certc and the signature proving equivalence are sent to the anonymity
provider, which is convinced that:
• c was converted to c0 by Alice
• c is equivalent to c0
• Alice won’t later be able to deny the relation between c and c0 (because of s)
The anonymity provider will then return a new certiêcate Certc0 , guaranteeing the authenticity
of the coin.
Alice then spends a coin simply by proving that she owns it, by providing a signature demon-
strating knowledge of the secret key (skAlice; r) (Pointcheval, 2000, pp. 6–9). As a property of
the way coins are formed, double-spending (or two attempts at anonymising the same coin) will
result in Alice’s public key being revealed by a simple decryption.
The reader is directed to the appropriate paper for a more in-depth discussion of how this
protocol works; it is summarised here for brevity. However, the idea is a good one—in voting, a
user could obtain a token allowing her to vote, and then transform it into one which prevents her
identity being disclosed (except by a revocation center, if she attempts to vote twice, for example).
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2.3.1.2 Pseudonymity
The êrst author to suggest the use of pseudonymity was Chaum (1985), whose digital payment
system suggested the use of several diﬀerent pseudonyms for each user, where a pseudonym is
simply some transformation of a user’s identity1. Importantly, as Lysyanskaya et al. (2000) note,
“each organization may know a user by a diﬀerent pseudonym, or nym. These nyms are unlinkable:
two organizations cannot combine their databases to build up a dossier on the user” (Lysyanskaya
et al., 2000, p. 242). Further, a user can demonstrate possession of a credential to an organisa-
tion without revealing anything about the credential to that party. The authors proceed to give
examples of several pseudonym systems, but note a common problem: “there it little to motivate
or prevent a user from sharing his pseudonyms or credentials with other users”(Lysyanskaya et al.,
2000), as in the example of an online magazine subscription.
Hence, Lysyanskaya et al. (2000) introduce the concept of all-or-nothing sharing. Each user
has a master public key; the user should desire to keep the corresponding secret key secret. For
example, the key may be registered with an authority as that user’s master signing key, so that
anyone having possession of the key would be able to forge signatures. Hence, the authors’
system has the property that if a Alice shares a credential with Bob, she automatically shares her
master secret key with him.
In the paper, the authors propose a certiêcation authority, which simply enables a user to
prove that his pseudonym corresponds to some master public key, whose owner can only share
the credential by sharing his master secret key. Firstly, a user registers with a CA, giving his master
public key and true identity, and demonstrating knowledge of the corresponding private key in
some way. The user’s nym with the CA is hence his public key. The CA returns a credential
stating that the user is valid.
A user with such a credential is then able to register with an organisation. He does this in a
secure interactive way. Both parties engage in a protocol NG, where both submit the public key
1Of course, in the simplest case, a pseudonym can be a completely diﬀerent value, whose correspondence with
a user’s identity is stored at some trusted third party.
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pkO of the organisation, and each respectively submit their public and private master keys1. The
protocol outputs a nym N for the user with organisation O.
When the user, U, later wishes to communicate with an O, he supplies a proof of knowledge
of (pkU; skU; SIUU;O), where SIUU;O is secret information supplied to the user when requesting a nym
via NG for O. In order for the user to gain a credential for U to interact with O, both undergo a
credential issue procedure, to which the user submits his nym N and public and secret keys, along
with the public key of the organisation and SIUU;O. The organisation inputs their public and secret
keys, and the secret information SIUN;O it received as part of the NG protocol. The user will
receive a credential CU;O for use with that organisation, and the organisation will receive some
private information relating to that credential.
2.3.1.3 Digital Cash and Electronic Commerce
We now discuss the approach taken in digital cash to revocable anonymity. We ênd this particu-
larly relevant, as we believe that electronic voting can be classiêed simply as a type of electronic
commerce. We clarify by way of an example. In electronic commerce, a user is issued a number
of coins (payment tokens). These coins either have intrinsic value, being êat currency, or eﬀect a
transfer of funds from one account to another when spent. Either way, they are usually encoded
in some way with the user’s identity. A user is allowed to spend a coin only once, where the
act of spending is backed by a fundamental principle of digital cash: your payment should be
untraceable to you, and multiple payments should be unlinkable to each other. However, if you
commit a crime with your digital cash, authorised entities should be able to trace you.
Electronic voting can be seen as a version of electronic commerce with stronger requirements.
Here, each user (voter) is given a single ‘coin’, which equates to that user’s right to vote. When
the user votes, they spend the ‘coin’, negating their right to vote again2. After this point, the
result of the transaction is that the voter’s vote is counted (rather like a service provided by the
spending of a coin in electronic commerce). Of course, there are many diﬀerences between
1The authors mention a ‘secure anonymous channel’—it is assumed that this is possible via a mix, or one of the
other mechanisms described earlier.
2We note that a user may be permitted to ‘double-spend’ here, with the caveat that only their last transaction
(vote) is counted.
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electronic commerce and voting, but many similarities too, which at least merit the discussion of
approaches to anonymity provision in digital cash.
Digital cash is a êeld that has not received a lot of attention in recent years: at the time of
its inception, it could essentially have been described as a solution to a problem that customers
didn’t realise existed: how to make secure, anonymous payments.
Users of physical cash are rightly happy with their method of payment—it is secure, anony-
mous, and ubiquitous. However, remote payment is generally done by credit card. Again cus-
tomers are happy with doing this, but perhaps without good reason. As Chaum et al. (1990)
discussed several years ago, digital payment by credit card remains an act of faith for many:
Each part is vulnerable to fraud by the others, and the [credit] cardholder in particular
has no protection against surveillance (Chaum et al., 1990, p. 319)
Despite the article being written nearly twenty years ago, this point remains valid. The very
nature of credit and debit cards allows all transactions to be traced, and it is very easy to defraud
a payee, using a fake or ‘cloned’ card. There are further problems:
Despite their widespread use and market penetration, [credit cards] have a number of
signiêcant limitations …, including lack of security, lack of anonymity, inability to
reach all audiences due to credit requirements, large overhead with respect to pay-
ments, and the related ineﬃciency in processing small payment amounts (Jakobsson
et al., 1999, p. 43)
In fact, the ênal problem mentioned above—the making of small payments, whether in person
or over the Internet—is one that has still not been satisfactorily solved: credit card transaction fees
mean that many businesses are unwilling to accept credit card payments under a certain threshold
value. RFID small-value payment systems like PayWaveTM1 and PayPassTM2 have mitigated these
issues to some degree.
Despite these problems, the public are still willing to use credit cards for electronic payment.
Thankfully, at least in Britain, in-roads have been made against these problems, through the
use of Chip and PIN (which has not been as successful as hoped against fraud, as discussed by
1http://www.visa.co.uk/en/products/contactless.aspx
2http://www.paypass.com/
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Anderson et al. (2005)) and the RFID systems mentioned above, for small amounts of money
(Card Technology Today, 2007). Nevertheless, neither of these ideas provide any anonymity
for the user, and arguably a legitimate user should have the right to make their transactions
untraceable:
From an ethical…perspective, giving someone the ability to conduct payments should
not go hand-in-hand with knowing their whereabouts, their spending patterns, and
their personal preferences (Jakobsson et al., 1999, p. 46)
This lack of anonymity is not only a problem from a personal perspective. When a customer
makes a payment, the merchant has full access to their card details. With these details, a dishonest
merchant could clone the customer’s card. This problem is clearly exacerbated by Internet pay-
ment, where not only the merchant, but anyone with the ability to intercept a poorly encrypted
payment protocol, has access to the user’s data.
Hence current methods of electronic payment require a high level of trust, between the cus-
tomer and merchant (bidirectionally), and between the bank and all parties. Of course, trust is
needed in any digital protocol, but providing anonymity to a customer at least gives them some
safeguard against fraud.
Early work by Chaum (1982) proposed the êrst ‘digital cash’ system, using blind signatures
to eﬀect unconditional anonymity for the spender. Whilst the protocol was better at providing
anonymity for Alice than anything currently used, it is actually too good at making Alice anony-
mous. In fact, once she has obtained a coin from the bank, there is no way for anyone to trace
her, on an application level. This is unacceptable—she is both subject to blackmail herself, and
able to perform fraud by double-spending coins, for example. We have already discussed how
total anonymity can lead to the ‘perfect crime’ (Pointcheval, 2000).
Jakobsson and Yung: Revokable Versatile Electronic Money The work of Jakobsson and
Yung (1996) seems particularly apt in its work on anonymity for the user. The authors rightly
suggest that it is not always appropriate to provide full anonymity, and it is further dangerous to
trust one entity with anonymising a user’s identity, thus meaning that two or more should be
used:
2.3. Anonymity and Revocable Anonymity 73
In order to allow funds to be traced, frozen and revoked, absolute anonymity has to
be excluded. But we do not wish tracing to be possible at the whims of the bank,
as transaction analysis can be used or sold for direct marketing…Therefore, we will
split the tracing function between the bank and a consumer rights organization, the
ombudsman (Jakobsson and Yung, 1996)
The ombudsman works in collaboration with the Bank to revoke anonymity, only when provided
with suﬃcient evidence to do so by a Judge. As a result, if a coin includes a user’s identity, it
must be encrypted and signed with both the ombudsman and bank keys. This dual signature
veriêcation scheme means that it is neither possible for any party to obtain a customer’s identity
without co-operation of both parties, nor is it possible for any single party to mint money.
Like most digital cash protocols, the Jakobsson and Yung protocol is split into three phases:
withdrawal, spending and deposit. Since the focus of this thesis is not on digital cash protocols, we do
not provide a full description of the protocol: instead, we refer the interested reader to diagrams
representing each phase of it, in Figures 2.13, 2.14 and 2.15.
For us, the relevant part of the protocol is in how Alice’s identity is protected, and how
her anonymity is revoked. As such, we brieëy summarise these aspects of the protocol. In the
withdrawal phase, where Alice’s coins are minted, she selects session keys—KB for communication
with the bank, Bank, and KO for the ombudsman, Ombudsman. She encrypts each session key
with its counterpart’s public key, and doubly encrypts her identity using the public key of the
bank, and session key with the ombudsman. All session keys, and the symmetric encryption of
the public part of the coin y and double-encryption of her identity, are sent to the bank.
The bank veriêes Alice’s identity, creates a session number and sends the ombudsman’s session
key, symmetric encryption of y and the double-encryption of Alice’s identity to the ombudsman,
who can derive his session key, the encryption of Alice’s identity under the bank’s public key, and
a signature on y. The process by which the coin is then joint-generated with the bank is irrelevant
for us. The key point is that, once the withdrawal is complete, the bank stores the transaction
number, Alice’s identity, and the double-encryption of her identity; the ombudsman stores the
transaction number, session key, y and Alice’s identity encrypted for the bank. To spend a coin,
Alice sends y with her blindly signed coin s (see Figure 2.13) to Bob. Given this information at
a later point, the ombudsman and bank can cooperate to obtain Alice’s identity (see Figure 2.15)
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(Jakobsson and Yung, 1996). This rudimentary method of requiring multiple layers of encryption,
and therefore the agreement of several parties, to protect Alice’s anonymity, is important to our
work.
Figure 2.13 Coin Withdrawal in Jakobsson and Yung (1996)
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Figure 2.14 Coin Spending in Jakobsson and Yung (1996)
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Kügler and Vogt: Auditable Tracing So far, we have made the case for revocable anonymity
in a variety of protocols, including electronic voting. One of the most pressing problems with
revocable anonymity, however, is the fair tracing problem: “no-one is able to control the legal usage
of tracing, leading to the possibility of illegal tracing” (Kügler and Vogt, 2002, p. 137). To some
degree, if we can trust that only a certain entity will have the key(s) required to revoke anonymity,
then we can be assured that privacy is protected. However, what if this is not the case? What if a
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Figure 2.15 Coin Deposit and Anonymity Revocation in Jakobsson and Yung (1996)
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voter’s anonymity is revoked with no clear reason, or by an unauthorised entity? Kügler and Vogt
(2003, 2001, 2002) present a protocol which does not prevent this “illegal tracing”, but instead
all anonymity revocation detectable by the traced person. They term this notion “optimistic fair
tracing”. The theory behind this idea is that the threat of being detected deanonymising users is
enough of a disincentive to rogue authorities to prevent it happening.
Here, we focus speciêcally on Kügler and Vogt (2003), a protocol designed for tracing revo-
cation in digital cash. Though the protocol itself is not directly usable by us, many of the ideas
presented in it are. Indeed, we discuss the idea of auditable anonymity revocation extensively in
Chapter 6.
The protocol is based around the notion that when a customer ‘withdraws funds’ from the
bank, essentially minting coins, she does so by encrypting her identity with some tracing key.
In many protocols, there is a single tracing key for all coins and customers. In this protocol, a
diﬀerent public tracing key is issued for every customer, where these keys have a limited validity
and must regularly be renewed. This allows two types of tracing:
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• Coin tracing, where the withdrawn coins of a customer are deanonymised, so the bank
recognises them when they are spent, and
• Owner tracing, where the coins deposited by a suspicious merchant are deanonymised,
identifying their withdrawer (for example, tracing someone who makes a purchase from a
known drug dealer).
Both of these are possible in the protocol, provided that the bank knows the private tracing key for
the customer, and merchant, respectively. Whether or not the bank does know this key depends
on the key generation parameter, a notion which will be deêned later. Once a tracing key has
expired, the bank reveals the parameter, enabling the customer or merchant to see if they were
traced.
When the bank creates a tracing key (of which the customer is given the public counterpart),
it creates a user certiêcate, which contains the user’s identity, public tracing key, activation and
expiration dates, transaction value limit and a symmetric encryption of the parameter used to
generate the tracing key. We hence have customer and merchant certiêcates, used to withdraw and
deposit coins respectively. Once certiêcates become invalid, the customer or merchant asks the
bank for the symmetric key used to encrypt the key generation parameter, and can request a
tracing certiêcate from the bank (a user certiêcate, signed by a judge, authorising tracing).
The bank issues coins during the generate phase, and accepts them for deposit in the accept phase
(we refer to Figure 2.16 for an example). The activation and expiration dates of any customer
certiêcate must be during the generate phase of a single coin’s generation. The audit date for
the customer certiêcate, is always a certain time period d (in Figure 2.16) after the end of the
accept phase for this coin’s generation. Likewise, the activation and expiration dates of a merchant
certiêcate must be within the accept phase of the coin’s generation. The audit date is always a
certain time period t after the merchant certiêcate expires.
In the diagram, coin tracing is undetectable for the time d, and owner tracing undetectable
for time t. Authorities can use these time frames to conduct criminal investigations.
Note that the protocol only permits a coin to be traced if the bank explicitly enabled coin trac-
ing before its withdrawal. This is something of a disadvantage: not only is revocable anonymity not
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Figure 2.16 Kügler and Vogt’s Auditable Anonymity Revocation Scheme.
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possible without a priori knowledge of who is to be traced, but auditing of this deanonymisation
isn’t possible either.
We now brieëy describe the setup part of the scheme (Kügler and Vogt, 2003, p. 273–6),
which implements a standard ElGamal encryption scheme using a cyclic group Gq, with three
pseudo-random generators g0; g1; g2. Given a secret key x 2 Zq and public keys y = gx; y1 =
gx1; y2 = gx2, the values G; g; g1; g2; y; y1; y2 are published. We now focus only on how coin tracing
and minting are implemented. New customers register a public key gC with the bank, where
gC = gxs : xs 2R Zq. The bank assigns the customer a public coin tracing key yC along with
a customer certiêcate, where yC = g
xC
2 : xC 2R Zq . Note, however, that if the customer is
not to be traced, yC is calculated as g
xC
C instead, meaning that the bank cannot know the discrete
logarithm of yC to the base g2.
The secret value xC is encrypted symmetrically in the customer certiêcate (the authors note
that one xC is used in every generation of coins, for all customers). When xC is later publicly
revealed during the audit period, all customers can determine if their coins are traceable (a cus-
tomer knows they have been traced if yC 6= gxCC ). Any customer who have been traced can request
a signed certiêcate authorising this action from the judge The authors note that the tracing key,
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used to encrypt the customer’s identity, can be proved to have been used correctly using a standard
proof of equality of discrete logarithms, due to Chaum and Pedersen (1992).
As the focus of this thesis is not on digital cash, we do not dwell further on how the spending
and deposit mechanisms of the protocol work, instead referring the interested reader to the origi-
nal paper (Kügler and Vogt, 2003). For us, the interesting part of this work is in how the spender’s
anonymity is revoked: i.e., if the customer can show that a key to decrypt her identity was ever
created, then she can assume that the bank had this intention. The protocol seems to rely on the
honesty of the bank, and on the bank’s knowledge of who to trace before coins are even minted
(with the exception of double-spenders, who are identiêed automatically through revelation of
a number of values). In electronic voting, this scenario seems inappropriate: double-voting is
not the only reason that a voter might need to be traced, and the electoral authorities cannot
expect to know who to trace beforehand. We discuss our thoughts on this problem (sometimes
identiêed as the ‘digital envelope’ problem) in Chapter 6.
2.4 Trusted Computing and the TPM
As we will discuss further in Section 3.2.1, trusted computing is still something of a controversial
concept in some circles. A trusted computer can be deêned as one which, by a number of methods,
can prove that it is running certain software, and behaving in a certain manner, without reliance
on the end-user.
As noted by Challener et al. (2008), there are many reasons why an authority may wish to
be convinced of the trustworthiness of a remote machine: viruses, phishing attacks, badly coded
software which is subject to leaks, and eavesdropping are all commonplace. Some of these issues
can be mitigated with strong encryption practices, but then, how are the keys used for encryption
to be stored? This is one of the founding ideas of trusted computing—it assumes that, at some
point, software will be compromised. As such, it provides some trusted hardware—the Trusted
Platform Module, or TPM—which protects security.
The TPM (the means of providing trusted computing on which we will focus) was designed
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by the Trusted Computing Group, and is currently on version 1.2 of its speciêcation (TCG,
2011a,b,c). It ensures the security of private keys and detection of malicious code via three main
functions:
• Public key authentication. The TPM has a secure random number generator, and func-
tionality to generate keypairs, encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify values. Private keys are
generated in the chip, and not accessible outside of it (keys may be stored in external stor-
age, but are encrypted by the TPM).
• Integrity measurement. Although private keys are secured, one has to ensure that mali-
cious code can still not access them. Thus, the TPM has a number of platform conêguration
registers (PCRs), which store hashes of conêguration values measured at boot. The TPM
can be used to encrypt certain values such that they can only be decrypted by a computer
whose TPM’s PCRs are in a certain state (this is known as sealing).
• Attestation. A machine with a TPM is able to use its private keys to sign its PCR values,
allowing that machine to prove its trustworthiness to a remote machine. This can be done
anonymously, via a protocol known as DAA (Brickell et al., 2004).
(Challener et al., 2008, p. 10)
2.4.1 TPM Structure
The components of a generic TPM are given in Figure 2.17. Note the two types of storage in
the TPM: persistent and volatile. In persistent storage, the endorsement key and storage root key are
stored. The former of these is an RSA keypair created and stored when the TPM is manufactured.
The private part of this key is never released from the TPM. The key is used during the assignment
of an owner to a TPM, when a storage root key is generated: again non-migratable to other TPMs
(with some exceptions), this key is the root of a number of keys associated with the protected
storage function of the TPM.
A number of other keys can be created by the TPM. Of these, binding keys are used to
encrypt data such as symmetric keys; signature keys are used to create standard RSA signatures,
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Figure 2.17 TPM Structure (TCG, 2011a)
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and identity keys are used in a non-migratable manner, generated inside the TPM, either to sign
PCR values or to sign other keys as being non-migratable. For us, Attestation Identity Keys
(AIKs) are particularly important, and form a vital part of anonymously identifying a user’s TPM
in the Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol (see Section 3.2.2 for further information).
A key component of the TPM for our work is the platform conêguration registers (PCRs). These
are in volatile memory, and are used to attest to the state of a machine. When the machine is
booted, initially the registers store zeroes, but can then be manipulated via the TPM_Extend
operation. To extend a PCR by a value x is to concatenate x to the current value of the PCR,
and then store the SHA-1 hash of this new value back in the PCR. Because of the hashing
algorithm used, it is assumed that one cannot manually force a PCR to be in a certain state, or
revert to another state, thus making the registers a sound base from which to verify the state of a
machine (Challener et al., 2008, p. 37).
One of the TPM’s key functionalities is to encrypt a value such that it can only be decrypted
by a TPM whose PCRs are in a deêned state (eﬀected by the TPM_Seal operation):
It is possible to infer that a machine is in a state consistent with a certain set of PCR
values if it is able to decyrpt a particular value that was locked to that PCR state
(Challener et al., 2008, p. 38)
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Another of the TPM’s operations, TPM_Quote, allows the TPM to report the state of a requested
PCR, allowing inference of the state of a machine. We use this functionality in our work.
2.4.2 Interaction with the TPM
As is perhaps clear from the previous section, the Trusted Computing Group deêne a êxed API
for interaction with the TPM (TCG, 2011c). The API document is very informative on these
commands, and we hence refer the interested user to it. For our purposes, we give an example of
a full TPM command, the aforementioned TPM_Quote, which returns a signed report of PCR
values:
TPM_Quote(tag,paramSize,keyHandle,externalData,targetPCR,authHand,
authLastNonceEven,nonceOdd,continueAuthSession,privAuth)
From the high level at which we interact with the TPM in our work, we are not concerned
with the intricate details of each command. As such, we abstract away much of the detail, leaving
only the important parts of the command. In the case of the TPM_Quote command, we leave
only the externalData parameter deêned, assuming default values for the remaining parameters:
TPM_Quote(: : : ; ca; : : :)
In our work, we make no alterations or additions to the commands deêned in the TPM API.
2.4.3 Summary of TPM Commands Used
In our work in Chapters 5 and 6, we use a subset of the TPM’s API commands. Though, for
brevity, we do not go into depth about the intricacies of each, in Table 2.8 we explain the purpose
of the commands we use. As already discussed, the API commands are the only way in which the
operating system and its software can interact with the TPM, which essentially acts as a “black
box”.
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Table 2.8 Summary of TPM Commands Used (TCG, 2011c)
Command Description
TPM_DAA_Join Begins the DAA Join protocol, discussed in Section 3.2.2.3: estab-
lishes parameters in the TPM for a particular issuer, allowing the
TPM to be certiêed as a member of a particular group
TPM_DAA_Sign Begins the DAA Sign protocol, discussed in Section 3.2.2.3: pro-
duces a DAA signature on a message, convincing the message veri-
êer anonymously that the signer was a member of a particular group
TPM_Quote Cryptographically reports requested values from the TPM’s PCRs,
using a key to sign a statement giving the value of the PCR together
with a challenge nonce
TPM_Extend Adds a new measurement to a particular PCR. This is done by
hashing the current value of the PCR concatenated with the new
value. As a result of the hash function used, it is computationally
infeasible to obtain a given PCR value in more than one way
TPM_CreateWrapKey Creates an asymmetric keypair, bound to a speciêc PCR state (such
that a message encrypted—or bound—using the public key, can only
be decrypted by TPM whose PCRs are in the designated state
TPM_LoadKey2 Loads a key into memory for further use
TPM_Seal Encrypts a message using a given key, according to a speciêc PCR
state in which any decrypting platform must be
TPM_UnSeal The reverse of the TPM_Seal command, which decrypts a cipher-
text only when the TPM’s PCRs are in the designated state
TPM_IncrementCounter Increment one of the TPM’s built in monotonic counter values
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced the requirements for remote electronic voting systems, adding
our own requirement for UK-speciêc elections: namely, revocable anonymity. We have discussed
both a variety of electronic voting protocols, and a number of approaches to provision of revocable
anonymity in other êelds, such as digital cash. Finally, we discussed trusted computing and the
TPM, something which we use extensively in Chapters 5 and 6. As noted earlier, no existing
work explicitly considers revocable anonymity in electronic voting: this is likely because it is a
notion which is not appropriate to many countries’ electoral systems. Nevertheless, the UK’s
legal requirement to be able to link a ballot to a voter motivates us to provide a solution.
One might wonder whether revocable anonymity could simply be “bundled” into an existing
electronic voting protocol. That is not the focus of this thesis. Though we could try to alter
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existing protocols, we feel that there is no suitable protocol from which to start: for us, the closest
protocol to meeting the needs of UK elections is JCJ (Juels et al., 2005), and the system based upon
it, Civitas (Clarkson et al., 2008). However, despite considerable research, no secure alternative
to the multiple rounds of ineﬃcient plaintext equivalence tests has yet been found, making the
protocol inappropriate for wide-scale deployment. JCJ, like many other remote voting protocols,
also relies upon the trustworthiness of the machine the voter uses. This is an issue which we
address in Chapter 5.
In the next chapter, we discuss the primitives we will use in our work, including cryptographic
protocols and primitives, and trusted computing.
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3 Preliminaries
Chapter Overview
In this chapter, we introduce a number of primitives and technologies which are needed for the
rest of the thesis.
3.1 Cryptographic Primitives
We assume the availability of the following cryptographic primitives. Note that we are work-
ing in the formal model, not in provable security. Therefore we make the assumption that the
cryptography in the primitives below is perfect.
3.1.1 Threshold ElGamal Encryption Scheme
For the majority of our work, we use a standard ElGamal encryption scheme, under a q-order
multiplicative subgroup Gq = hgi of Zp , generated by an element g 2 Zp , where p and q are
suitably large primes, and q divides (p  1). The security of the encryption scheme depends on
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the holding of the Computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH) assumption in Gq: that is to say that for
a chosen cyclic group G of order q, randomly chosen generator g, and a; b 2R f0; : : : ; q   1g,
given
(g; ga; gb);
it must be computationally intractable to compute gab. We may infer that ElGamal is semantically
secure if the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds in G: that is to say that for a
chosen cyclic group G of order q, randomly chosen generator g and random a; b 2 Zq, given
ga; gb, the value gab must be indistinguishable from any other value gc 2 Zq.
Both the CDH and DDH assumptions are stronger forms of the discrete logarithm assumption,
that given a generator g, large prime p, and a value x, derivation of e such that ge  x mod p is
computationally hard (Schneier, 1996, p. 540).
We now explain how encryption works in the ElGamal cryptosystem, and then discuss the
diﬀerences between decryption and threshold decryption.
3.1.1.1 Key Generation
All agents a in the protocol have a private key sa 2 f0; : : : ; q   1g of which only they have
knowledge. Each agent has a corresponding public ha = gsa where g is a known generator of
the subgroup. The public key consists of this ha along with G; g; q. Public keys are common
knowledge to all users.
3.1.1.2 Encryption
In order to encrypt a message m in the encryption scheme we use, a random value  2 f0; : : : ; q 
1g is selected. The ciphertext is then constructed as
(x; y) = (g; h  m) = (g; gsa  m)
Note that, where the nature of an encryption is unimportant (e.g., where the random exponent,
or cryptosystem, is irrelevant), we also denote by fmgk the encryption of a message m with key
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k. Now, given the secret key sa and ciphertext (x; y), the recipient can calculate gsa = xsa , and
thencem by dividing y by this value. Without the secret key, the calculation of a discrete logarithm
is required in order to decrypt y.
3.1.1.3 Threshold Decryption
In our work, we use a (t; n)-threshold decryption scheme analogous to that of Cramer et al.
(1997), which uses earlier work by Pedersen (1991). The objective of a threshold cryptosystem
is clear:
…to share a private key among a set of receivers such that messages can only be
decrypted when a substantial set of receivers cooperate (Cramer et al., 1997, p. 5)
The problems solved, then, are the joint generation of a secret key by multiple, mutually dis-
trusting parties, and thence the joint decryption of a ciphertext. Joint key generation (Pedersen
(1991) in Cramer et al. (1997)) involves each authority Aj being dealt a share sj 2 Zq of a secret
value s. Public commitments hj = gsj are released. The secret s can be recovered from any set 
of t < n shares (a quorum of t out of n members), using Lagrange coeﬃcients j;:
s =
X
j2
sjj;; j; =
Y
l2nfjg
l
l  j
The public key h = gs is publicly announced, and no single participant therefore learns s.
To decrypt a ciphertext (x; y), each participant broadcasts wj = xsj and a zero knowledge proof
that logg hj = logx wj. A quorum of legitimate authorities is able to work together to recover the
message m as
m = y=
Y
j2
wj;j
In our work, we use a threshold cryptosystem when decrypting votes, to ensure that only a
suitably-sized quorum of authorities can decrypt a ciphertext. Combined with our choice of
cryptosystem, this means that no single vote is observed by any tallier. An interesting question is
how many of the set of authorities constitutes a quorum (i.e., how many must cooperate in order
to decrypt a ciphertext). As Benaloh (2006) notes, the number should be high enough to prevent
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a small subset colluding to break privacy, but low enough that a small number of “discontented
trustees” are still able to prevent the completion of an election by not cooperating. Clearly, any
quorum size needs to be determined empirically before the election.
3.1.1.4 ElGamal as a Homomorphic Cryptosystem
It is an important factor of our work that the ElGamal cryptosystem is a multiplicative homomorphic
cryptosystem. This is to say that given two ciphertexts:
(x0; y0) = (g
; gsm0) (x1; y1) = (g
; gsm1)
the product of those ciphertexts, viz. (X;Y) =
1Y
i=0
(xi; yi), is equal to
(X;Y) = (g  g; gsm0  gsm1)
= (g+; gs(+)(m1  m2))
i.e., the product of any number of ciphertexts is equal to the encryption of the product of the
plaintexts. As with much work in electronic voting, we use this to our advantage: choosing the
form of the plaintext carefully allows secure tallying of votes, such that it is possible to accurately
determine the tally, whilst not showing how any one voter voted. We discuss this more in
Chapters 4 and 5.
3.1.2 Strong Designated Veriêer Signature Scheme
Designated Veriêer signatures and proofs have a long history (Jakobsson et al., 1996), and extensive
use in the êeld of e-voting. We adopt the designated veriêer signature scheme of Saeednia et al.
(2003) due to its eﬃcient nature, but others would be acceptable. We use designated veriêer
signatures to enable a prover (Bob, or any one of the êrst-round tellers in our case) to prove a
statement to a veriêer (Alice) by proving the validity of a signature:
Let P(B;A) be a protocol for [Bob] to prove the truth of the statement Ω to [Alice].
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We say that P(A;B) is a strong designated veriêer proof if anybody can produce
identically distributed transcripts that are indistinguishable from those of P(A;B),
except for Bob (Saeednia et al., 2003, p. 43)
However, Alice is unable to prove the signature’s validity to anyone else, on the grounds that she
could have produced it herself (Saeednia et al., 2003, p. 43).
The parameters for the scheme are the same as those for ElGamal encryption: large primes
p and q, such that qj(p   1); a generator g 2 Zp of order q, and a one-way hash function hash
that outputs values in Zq. Every user a has a secret key sa and a corresponding public key ha = gsa
mod p.
In order to generate a designated veriêer signature on a message m for Alice, Bob selects
k 2R Zq, e 2R Zq and calculates
c = hkAlice
r = hash(m; c)
v = ke 1   rsBob mod q
The triple (r; v; e) is now the signature of m (Saeednia et al., 2003). We denote this designated
veriêer signature as DVSignBob!Alice(m), where the signature is generated by i.
Alice is able to verify the signature’s correctness by checking the equation
hash(m; (gvhrBob)esAlice mod p)
?
= r
Clearly, no-one other than Alice can verify the signature (veriêcation uses her private key). How-
ever, Alice is able to select a random v0 2 Zq; r0 2 Zq and simulate the entire transcript herself (the
reader is directed to the authors’ paper for proof of this). As a result, Alice could have generated
the signature herself, and no third party will be convinced of the validity of any signature from
Bob that Alice claims to be valid (Saeednia et al., 2003, p. 45).
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Even if Alice reveals her secret key to a third party, she cannot convince that party of the va-
lidity of the signature, since she herself could have simulated the signature transcription. Further,
no party is able to reveal the contents of the signature without Alice’s secret key.
3.1.3 Proof of Equality of Discrete Logarithms
In order to prevent an attack in our voting scheme, we require that the voter demonstrates to a
veriêer that her vote is of the correct form (without revealing what the vote is).
As we discuss later, a voter’s vote is of the form (x; y) = (g; hT2g
Mi 1) where  2R Zq, M is
the maximum number of voters and i represents the position in the list of candidates of the voter’s
chosen candidate. Alice needs to prove, in zero knowledge, that she is sending to the bulletin
board some value for y where the exponent of g is in fM0; : : : ;ML 1g where L is the number of
candidates. If we did not have such a proof, any voter could spoil the election by adding spurious
coeﬃcients to the exponent, thereby voting several times.
We hence show that the ballot (x; y) is of valid form, as speciêed in the parameters of the
election:
(x; y) = (g; hT2m) : m 2 fgM
0
; : : : ; gML 1g
Cramer et al. (1997) demonstrate this via a witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge of the
relation:
logg x = loghT2 (y=m0) _ logg x = loghT2 (y=m1)
for an election with only two candidates (Cramer et al., 1997).
This proof of validity is described for an interactive, two-candidate scenario in Cramer et al.
(1996), Cramer et al. (1997) and Hevia and Kiwi (2004). Using the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic
(Fiat and Shamir, 1986), the authors convert the interactive protocol into a non-interactive one
(Cramer et al., 1997). However, the scheme provided in these papers is for votes with only two
possible outcomes.
The proof of validity for a two-candidate scenario, where a vote (x; y) = (g; hm) : m 2
fm0;m1g and the prover knows the value of m, holds, proving that (x; y) is of the proscribed form,
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providing Alice submits a vote v 2 fm0;m1g, as it provides a witness-indistinguishable proof for
the relation given above. The prover knows a witness for either the left or right part, according
to the choice of m.
We can extend the two-candidate scenario to L candidates, providing a proof for the relation
given by
logg x = loghT2 (y=g
M0) _ : : :
: : : _ logg x = loghT2 (y=g
ML 1)
We adapt the non-interactive proof of ballot validity to a scheme for a multi-candidate elec-
tion. In Figure 3.1, we give a generalised adaptation (G-PEQDL) of the above proof of equality
of discrete logarithms scheme where Alice votes for candidate k (1  k  L) with (x; y) =
(g; hgMk 1). This is the only place where we extend one of the primitives we use, and as such
we provide a proof, analogous to that of Cramer et al. (1997), for our extension. We note that
similar proofs for 1-out-of-L election schemes already exist (Lee and Kim, 2000; Hirt and Sako,
2000)—our work was merely developed independently to suit our own voting protocols. We use
the notion of a binding encryption scheme (Cramer et al., 1996). A binding encryption scheme is
one in which any encryption can be opened only one way.
Theorem 1. (Security of Generalised PEQDLs) Under the discrete logarithm assumption, the
encryption scheme we use is binding in that an encryption can be opened in only one way.
Furthermore, the G-PEQDL is a witness-indistinguishable proof of the relation given by
logg x = loghT2 (y=g
M0) _ : : : _ logg x = loghT2 (y=g
ML 1)
Proof. If an encryption of a ballot can be opened in two diﬀerent ways, i.e., if for an encryption
pair (x; y) = (g; hm), values ; 0 and v; v0 can be presented such that y = hgv = h0gv0 , where
 6= 0 and v 6= v0, it follows that logg h =
v  v0
  0 , which contradicts the Discrete Logarithm
Assumption.
Like the proof provided by Cramer et al. (1997) for their two-candidate vote scenario, our
generalised proof of equality—essentially the same as the two-candidate scenario expanded to L
candidates—is, by the results of Cramer et al. (1994), a witness-indistinguishable proof of knowl-
edge that the voter knows logg x, described by the relation above. The G-PEQDL is hence
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specially sound: i.e., given two conversations between prover and veriêer in which the initial ai; bi
messages remain the same, but the challenge, and thus di; ri messages change, a witness can be
extracted for each conversation in polynomial time. In particular, the dk and rk can always be
chosen such that veriêcation succeeds for any value of the hash function challenge c.
Further, the protocol is special honest veriêer zero-knowledge: i.e., given an honest veriêer, and
any randomly chosen challenge c, the protocol produces a conversation indistinguishable from the
space of all conversations between honest prover and honest veriêer in which c is the challenge.
We êrst consider the interactive version of the proof, in which c is chosen uniformly at random
by the veriêer, and sent to Alice after she sends (x; y; a1; : : : ; aL; b1; : : : ; bL). Alice replies with
(d1; : : : ; dL; r1; : : : ; rL), and the veriêcation proceeds as in the non-interactive version. Honest
veriêer zero-knowledge holds because, for random c and di : 1  i  L; i 6= k, and random
ri : 1  i  L, we can simulate a conversation between the honest veriêer and the prover, by
choosing ai and bi to satisfy the equations given in Figure 3.1. Since c can be chosen freely in
the interactive version, we get special honest veriêer zero knowledge. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic
used to produce the non-interactive version preserves this property.
We now demonstrate an execution trace of the G-PEQDL protocol. Referring to the pro-
tocol (Figure 3.1), Alice generates the values ; ! and ri; di (for i = 1; : : : ; k  1; k+ 1; : : : ;L) at
random, where she has voted for the kth candidate out of L.
She uses x = g; y = hT2g
Mk 1 as with her actual vote (note that the value of  does not
change), and proceeds to generate ak = g!; bk = h!T2 . All other ai for 1  i  L are calculated as
grixdi , and all other bi  hriT2( ygMi 1 )di .
Finally Alice generates
c hash(hAlice; x; y; a1; b1; : : : ; aL; bL)
Using this value she can generate dk by subtracting all other di values from c, and ênally
rk  !   dk. Alice sends all a; b; d and r values to the veriêer.
The veriêer now generates c in the same way (note that this value is not sent to him), and
trivially this c should equal the sum of all di, as Alice manipulated dk to make this the case. The
veriêer now checks each value of ai; bi:
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1. For all ai6=k; bi6=k: ai trivially equals grixdk and bi trivially equals hriT2(
y
gMi 1
)di , as these values
were calculated in the same manner by Alice
2. For ak:
(a) The value Alice calculates is ak = g!
(b) The veriêer makes the comparison:
ak
?
= grkxdk
?
= g! dkgdk
?
= g! dk+dk
?
= g!
which succeeds if Alice is honest.
3. For bk:
(a) The value Alice calculates is bk = h!T2
(b) The veriêer makes the comparison:
bk
?
= hrkT2(
y
gMk 1
)dk
?
= h! dkT2 (
hAlicegM
k 1
gMk 1
)dk
?
= h! dkT2 h
dk
T2
?
= h! dk+dkT2
?
= h!T2
which succeeds if Alice is honest.
The only way that Alice could be dishonest to her advantage is to make y equal to (for ex-
ample) hg30Mk 1 , thereby voting 30 times. Similarly she could attempt to vote for more than
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one candidate (y = hgMk 1+Mk 2), or could attempt to harm the voting tally of a candidate,
whilst voting also for her own (y = hg10Mk 1 9Mk 2). These attacks cannot work. In the veriê-
cation phase, bk could not be equal to hrkT2(
y
gMk 1
)dk if the value of the exponent of g in y is not in
fM0;M1; : : : ;ML 1g. Thus, one or more calculations for bi would fail, and the proof would be
rejected.
Figure 3.1 Our generalised non-interactive proof of ballot validity for a vote for candidate k
Verifier
ai = g
rixdi for i = 1, . . . , L
Check:
c ← hash(hAlice, x, y, a1, b1, . . . , aL, bL)
bi = h
ri ( y
gM
i−1
)di for i = 1, . . . , L
c
?
=
X
i
di
rk ← ω − αdk
dk ← c−
X
i6=k
di
c ← hash(hAlice, x, y, a1, b1, . . . , aL, bL)
bi ← h
ri ( y
gM
i−1 )
di
ai ← g
rixdi
For 1 ≤ i ≤ L; i 6= k :
bk ← h
ω
ak ← g
ω
y ← hαgM
k−1
x ← gα
(i = 1, ..., k − 1, k + 1, . . . , L) ∈R Zq
Select α,ω, ri, di
aL, bL, dL, rL〉
〈a1, b1, d1, r1, . . . ,
G-PEQDL =
Alice
3.1.4 Designated Veriêer Re-encryption Proofs
The properties of the ElGamal encryption scheme allow re-encryption (randomisation) of cipher-
texts. Given a ciphertext (x; y), another agent is able to generate (xf; yf) = (xg; yh
) :  2R Zq .
It is known that given two ElGamal ciphertexts, without knowledge of the private key or the
re-encryption factor , determining any re-encryption relationship between the ciphertexts is
hard under the DDH assumption.
In our protocol, we use an ElGamal re-encryption to preserve the voter’s anonymity. How-
ever, the voter needs to have some conviction that her vote has been counted (individual ver-
iêability). We achieve this via a Designated Veriêer Re-encryption Proof (DVRP): such a proof
convinces Alice that a given re-encrypted ciphertext is equivalent to that she generated, whilst
not convincing any third party. We adopt the scheme used by Lee et al. (2004); Lee and Kim
(2002) and Hirt and Sako (2000): if (x; y) = (ghm) is a ciphertext of a message m as described
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above, (xf; yf) = (xg; yh
) is a re-encryption of (x; y). The prover, P (the agent that does the
re-encryption) needs to demonstrate to Alice that (xf; yf) is equivalent to (x; y) in such a manner
that m is not revealed, and this proof is not transferable. P therefore does the following:
1. Selects d; j; u 2R Zq
2. Calculates (a; b) = (gd; hdP) and  = gjhuAlice, where hAlice is Alice’s public key as before.
3. Calculates c = hash(a; b; ; xf; yf) and z = d  (c+ j)
4. Sends (c; j; u; z) to Alice
Alice then merely needs to verify that
c = hash(gz(
xf
x
)c+j; hz(
yf
y
)c+j; gjhuAlice; xf; yf)
As detailed by Hirt and Sako (2000), Alice is able to generate this proof for herself as she knows
her own private key ( is a trapdoor commitment for j and u), meaning that no-one (other than
Alice) can be convinced by it. Indeed, Alice can insert ‘fake’ proofs into any communication
meant for her, to fool observers.
3.1.5 Signature Scheme
We assume the availability of a standard signature scheme in our work. Though we could use the
ElGamal signature scheme described in ElGamal (1985), it is rarely used in practice. Instead we
suggest the Digital Signature Algorithm (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2009),
based on the original ElGamal scheme.
Parameters The system requires a hash function hash. We select a value p of length L, where L
is a multiple of 64; q, a prime factor of p  1 of length N (between 160 and 256 bits, dependent
on the value of L); g = h(p 1)=q mod p, where h < p   1 such that g > 1; x < q and y = gx
mod p. The values p; g; q are public; the private key is x and the public key is y.
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Signature Generation To sign a message m, Alice selects k < q and generates r = (gk mod p)
mod q; s = (k 1(hash(m) + xr)) mod q, then sends the signature, denoted signAlice(m) = (r; s),
to Bob.
Veriêcation To verify a signature, Bob computes w = s 1 mod q, u1 = (hash(m) w) mod q,
u2 = (rw) mod q, and v = ((gu1  yu2) mod p) mod q. If v = r, the signature is valid.
3.1.6 Threshold Signature Scheme
In order to ensure that eligibility and uniqueness are always satisêed in our protocol, we employ a
(t; n) threshold signature scheme during the voting phase of the protocol. A threshold signature
scheme works in a similar way to a threshold decryption scheme: of n possible talliers, t must
collude to generate a signature on a message. The scheme that we adopt is not of great conse-
quence, but the one used by Harn (1994) has good veriêcation properties and êts in well with
the exponential ElGamal cryptosystem that we use:
The scheme, like other threshold schemes, is based on the perfect secret sharing scheme of
Shamir (1979). We begin with some values agreed by all group members:
1. p, a large prime modulus;
2. q, a prime divisor of p  1;
3. , where  = h(p 1)=q mod p, h is a random integer between 1 and p   1 and  > 1. 
is a generator of order q in GF(p). The values p; q;  are the public values; the ai values are
secret.
3.1.6.1 Key Generation
Each member i selects two integers, zi; xi at random from [1; p  1] and computes a public key as
yi = zi mod p. The pair xi; yi are then that member’s public key, with zi his secret key. Each
member then needs to use the same pre-agreed (t; n  1) secret sharing scheme to distribute his
key to the other group members. To do this, member i selects a (t 1)th-degree polynomial fi(x),
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where fi(0) = zi mod q, and computes fi(xj) mod q, and the corresponding public yi;j = fi(xj)
mod p, for each other member uj.
3.1.6.2 Signature Generation
If considering a (t; n) threshold encryption system, we note that a threshold (t)-sized quorum of
members is required to collude in order to decrypt a ciphertext. In a threshold signature scheme,
t members, indexed 1; 2; : : : t, are required in order to sign a message. Each member i begins
by signing the message using a secret key which they choose at random, ki 2R [1; q   1], and
computes a public value ri as ri = ki mod p. The public value ri is distributed publicly.
When all of these ri values are available, each member can calculate
r =
tY
i=1
ri mod p
Each member i can then use his own zi and ki, and the secret fj(xi) for j = t + 1; t + 2; : : : ; n to
sign the message m, by solving the equation
si =
(
zi +
nX
j=t+1
fj(xi) 
 
tY
k=1;k6=i
 xk
xi   xk
!)
 m0   ki  r mod q
for si 2 Zq; m0 = f(m). An assembly clerk (or, indeed, the signature’s intended recipient) is sent
fm; sig, where fri; sig is i’s partial signature on m. When the clerk has received an fri; sig, he
validates its authenticity using i’s public signature keys, as well as yj;i for j = t+ 1; t+ 2; : : : ; n to
assert the equality 8>>>><>>>>:yi
 
nY
j=t+1
yj;i
! tY
k=1;k6=i
 xk
xi   xk
9>>>>=>>>>;
m0
= rrisi mod p
where m0 = f(m).
When t partial signatures are received by the clerk, the full signature can be generated as fr; sg,
where r was already calculable and s =
tX
i=1
si mod q.
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3.1.6.3 Signature Veriêcation
As with a non-threshold scheme, the signature can be veriêed by anyone with access to the group
public key y, by asserting the equality
ym0 = rrs mod p
3.2 Other Preliminaries
3.2.1 Trusted Computing
The concept of trusted computing is still rather controversial in some circles. A trusted computer
is one that, through the use of a trusted platform module (TPM), and other technologies such as
memory curtaining, sealed storage and remote attestation, removes reliance on the end user to prove
that his computer contains a tamper-resistant module, with which communications can be trusted
to be authentic. The TPM is designed to be tamper-proof. The beneêts of its use for remote
applications requiring secure information ëow and data handling are clear.
In the êeld of remote electronic voting (that is, voting from any internet-connected terminal),
for example, we might require that a user can only vote from a machine that is running the correct
voting software, for obvious reasons. We could do this by providing each voter with a bootable
operating system ‘live CD’-type disc1.
However, we naturally still require that the voter using the trusted machine remains anonymous,
whilst still being able to demonstrate that the machine she is voting from is trustworthy.
Interaction with the TPM is permitted only through a list of predeêned commands, given
in the TPM’s API, as discussed in Section 2.4. We do not modify these commands in any way,
and denote the use of one of them as such. TPM commands are generally invoked directly
by the host machine, or by a remote machine via an encrypted transport session. For brevity we do
1We note that, as suggested by Fink et al. (2009), security of any system that obtains software and private keys
from removable media is vulnerable to compromise. This issue can be mitigated by having the TPM compare a
publicly known signed hash of the intended executable code with a hash the TPM itself generates. In fact, the user
could make this comparison.
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not elaborate on the structure of, or commands of the TPM API here. The reader is directed to
(TCG, 2011a,b,c; Challener et al., 2008) for further information. For now, it is suﬃcient to state
that actions performed by the TPM are trustworthy.
3.2.2 Direct Anonymous Attestation
Attestation in our context is the idea is that some veriêer wishes to be convinced that Alice is using
a machine which contains a valid, permitted TPM, and that (later) this TPM can prove that Alice’s
machine is running the correct software. However, the identity of the user or of the speciêc TPM
should not be revealed, as this would make her transactions linkable (Brickell et al., 2004). As
stated by Brickell et al. (2004), a possible solution to this problem was to give all TPMs the same
keypair to sign and encrypt, thereby making all transactions indistinguishable. Of course, this
solution would never work.
Hence, the Trusted Computing Group’s êrst solution was to use a Privacy Certiêcation Au-
thority as a trusted third party for every authentication. This naturally introduces problems: the
CA would have to be permanently available, and it would have to be trusted.
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is the solution that the TCG accepted, and is currently
built into the TPM speciêcation. The DAA protocol is complex, and we advise that the uniniti-
ated reader consult Brickell et al. (2004) for a full explanation. On a high level, DAA is split into
three sub-protocols: join, sign and verify. In the join protocol, a host and a TPM gain attestation on
a secret value, chosen by the TPM, demonstrating that the host’s machine contains a valid TPM.
In the sign protocol, the host and TPM anonymously prove that they gained this attestation, and
produce a DAA Signature on some message (generally a key). This signature is veriêed in the
ênal stage of the protocol.
For our purposes, we use DAA as follows. Alice, wishing to vote, engages in the DAA join
protocol with the registrar, R, using a pseudonym NR randomly generated by her TPM. R will
check that Alice is eligible to vote, and then issue her a certiêcate proving this fact.
Once Alice has obtained her certiêcate in our join protocol, she is free to (at any time after-
wards) form a diﬀerent pseudonym NT with which to vote, and then authenticate herself to T
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using the DAA sign protocol. T will employ the DAA verify protocol, and then require that Alice
proves the state of her machine in some way, and, providing her machine’s state is correct, will
accept her vote for further processing.
The Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol (Brickell et al., 2004) is used to allow a remote
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to anonymously attest to the state of the machine in which it
resides. In our context, it is particularly important that the attestation is anonymous—it is with
this feature that we allow a voter to vote. The DAA protocol uses a novel technique to detect
duplicate requests (in our case, votes), and to blacklist rogue TPMs.
We êrst point out some of the notation used by the authors (Brickell et al., 2004), and then
discuss the DAA protocol in more detail.
3.2.2.1 Notation
In order to permit the selection of the high and low order bits of some integer x, the authors
denote LSBu(x) to be x  2ub x2u c, and CARu(x) to be b x2u c, for some u. For example, if (xk : : : x0)b
is the binary representation of x =
X
i=0
k2ixi (e.g., (1100)b is the binary representation of 12), then
LSBu(x) is the integer corresponding to the u least signiêcant bits of (xk : : : x0). CARu(x) is the
binary representation of x, right-shifted by u bits. Note hence that x 2 N = LSBu(x)+2uCARu(x).
It is these functions that are later used to split a value f into two parts, f0 and f1.
A common scheme is adopted to represent proofs of knowledge, without discussing the detail
of those proofs. The line
PKf(; ; ) : y = gh ^ ~y = ~g~h ^ (u    v)g
represents a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of ; ;  2 N, such that y = gh and ~y = ~g~h ,
where u    v (Brickell et al., 2004).
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3.2.2.2 The CL-Signature Scheme
The DAA scheme is based on the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signature scheme (Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya, 2003). The scheme is mentioned here for completeness. A special RSA modulus
n = pq; p = 2p0 + 1; q = 2q0 + 1 (p; q; p0; q0 all prime) is chosen, followed by R0; : : : ;RL 1; S;Z
from the group of quadratic residues modulo n, QRn. The secret key is p; the output public key
is (n;R0; : : : ;RL 1; S;Z).
Given that `m is a parameter, and the messages space is the set f(m0; : : : ;mL 1) : mi 2
f0; 1g`mg, on input of a message m = m0; : : : ;mL 1, a random prime e is chosen with a random
number v, then the value A is computed such that Z  Rm00 : : :RmL 1L 1 SvAe mod n (this is a gen-
eralisation of the way in which A is calculated in DAA, shown in Section 3.2.2.3). The signature
on m is then (A; e; v). Veriêcation is via checking that this equivalence holds for a given message.
3.2.2.3 The DAA Protocol
The protocol has three participants: the Host (who, working with her TPM, attests to the state
of her machine); the Issuer, who permits the host to join (gain attestation), and the Veriêer, who
determines whether the host indeed gained certiêcation.
Issuer Setup
1. The issuer chooses an RSA modulus, n = pq as described above, and a generator g0 ofQRn.
It selects x0; x1; xz; xs; xh; xg 2 [1; p0q0] and generates:
g := g0xg ; h := g0xh ; S := hxs ;
Z := hxz ; R0 := Sx0 ; R1 := Sx1
(all mod n).
2. The issuer proves non-interactively that the values above are calculated correctly (proving
that each of the values in the key lie in the correct subgroups), then generates a group
of prime order, by choosing primes ;  such that   = r + 1 for some r with  which
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does not divide r (more details are given in the paper). Next it chooses 0 2R Z  and sets
 = 0(  1)= mod  .
3. The public key is declared as (n; g0; g; h; S;Z;R0;R1; ; ; ); (p; q) is stored as the private
key.
The Join Protocol
From a high level, the join protocol is where a host (and its TPM) gain attestation on a secret
value chosen by the TPM, from an Issuer. Each issuer has a basename bsnI (I for “Issuer”, resp. V
for “Veriêer”), and an associated value I = (H (1 k bsnI))(  1)= mod  , where H; H  each
represent hash functions.
The TPM veriêes the I value supplied by the host, by ensuring that I  1 mod  , and
generates two random values f0; f1, and a number of other values, by splitting an initial random
secret f:
f = H(H(DAAseed k H(PK0I)) k cnt k 0) k : : : k H(H(DAAseed k H(PK0I)) k cnt k i) mod ;
f0 = LSB`f(f); fi = CAR`f(f); v0 2R f0; 1g`n+`? ; U = Rf00Rf11Sv
0 mod n; Ni = 
f0+f12
`f
I mod  
DAASeed is a random seed used for calculation of f by the TPM, PK0I is a long-term public
key of the Issuer, and cnt relates to the number of times the TPM has run the join protocol. All
values `x are DAA security parameters, deêned further by the authors. i is equal to b` + `?
`H
c (1,
with the default security parameter values). NI is the pseudonym the Issuer will know the TPM
by. U; NI are sent to the issuer via the host.
The Issuer checks whether NI represents a rogue (i.e., non-trustworthy) TPM, and checks
whether the pseudonym has been used before. If not, the TPM and issuer engage in a signature
proof of knowledge of the values (f0; f1; v0). The authors represent such a proof of knowledge in
a high-level manner, where the protocol
SPKf(f0; f1; v0) : U  Rf00Ff11Sv
0 mod n ^ NI   f0+f12
`f
I mod  
^ f0; f1 2 f0; 1g`f+`?+`H+2 ^ v0 2 f0; 1g`f+`?+`H+2g(ntjjni)
represents a signature proof of knowledge of the values f0; f1; v0 such that the assumptions given are
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satisêed, using the nonces ni and nt. If successful, the Issuer chooses v^ and a prime e at random,
and computes v00 = v^+ 2`v 1 (`v is a security parameter), and
A =

Z
USv00
1=e
mod n
sending (A; e; v00) to the host with a proof of A’s correctness, in the form of a proof of knowl-
edge of d such that d  ( Z
USv00
)d mod n. The host forwards v00 to the TPM, which calculates
v = v00 + v0 and stores (f0; f1; v).
The Sign Protocol
Now that the host and TPM have gained an attestation credential on f0; f1, they can prove this
to a veriêer. The aim is for the platform to sign a message m (in our case, an Attestation Identity
Key—AIK, used to sign further messages).
We begin again by generating V = (H (0 k bsnV))(  1)= mod  , where bsnV is, in our
case, the basename of the talliers. The TPM veriêes V, and the host selects w; r at random,
computing
T1 = Ahw mod n; T2 = gwhe(g0)r mod n
The TPM computes NV using the same method as for NI, then sends it to the host. The host
and TPM now produce a signature proof of knowledge that T1;T2 commit to a certiêcate that
was computed using NV.
This done, the host generates a signature
 = (V; (T1;T2);NV; c; nt; (sv; sf0 ; sf1 ; se; see; sw; sew; sr; ser))
where nt is a nonce and c is a hash containing the message m, and sends this to the Veriêer. The
details of the calculation of each s value are given in the original paper. Veriêcation is simply a
matter of checking the signature’s correctness, the correctness of V, and whether NV represents
a rogue TPM.
104 Chapter 3. Preliminaries
In our protocol, we use (as is suggested in the paper) a fresh Attestation Identity Key (generated
by the TPM) as the message m which is DAA-signed by the host and the TPM. Once the Talliers
have an authenticated copy of this key, the TPM can sign its internal registers to prove their state,
and therefore to attest to the state of the machine.
3.2.3 Physical and Virtual Monotonic Counters
In the work we present in Chapter 6, one of the most important capabilities of the TPM is
the availability of secure monotonic counters. Monotonic counters are tamper-resistant counters
embedded in the TPM, which, once incremented, cannot be reverted to a previous value: this
reduces the likelihood of replay attacks, for many applications (Sarmenta et al., 2006).
Unfortunately, the 1.2 version of the TPM, being a low-cost piece of hardware, has only four
monotonic counters, of which only one can be used in any boot cycle. As noted by Sarmenta
et al., the intention here was to implement a higher number of virtual monotonic counters on
a trusted operating system. Trusted operating systems are a requirement we would rather not
enforce, however. The work of Sarmenta et al. (2006) demonstrates the creation of an unbounded
number of virtual monotonic counters with a non-trusted OS.
A virtual monotonic counter is a mechanism (in untrusted hardware or software) which stores
a counter value, and provides two commands to access it: ReadCounter, which returns the current
value, and IncrementCounter, which increases the counter’s value. The counter’s value must be
non-volatile, increments and reads must be atomic, and changes must be irreversible. Note that
virtual monotonic counters are not stored on the TPM, but instead on untrusted storage, allowing
a far higher number of simultaneous counters to be used.
The manner in which Sarmenta et al. (2006) implement their solution means that the counter
is not tamper-resistant, but merely tamper-evident. This is suﬃcient for our purposes, as an
attempt to tamper with such a counter can be seen by any observer as an illicit attempt to modify
its value. The counter produces veriêable output in the form of unforgeable execution certiêcates, via
a dedicated attestation identity key (AIK) for each counter. The counter uses this key, together
with nonces, to produce signed execution certiêcates to send to users.
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In the implementation of virtual monotonic counters suggested by Sarmenta et al. (2006, p.
31), the counter mechanism is stored in full on the host (rather than on the host’s TPM), and
supports the following functions:
• CreateNewCounter(nonce): returns a CreateCertiﬁcate containing the ID number of the
counter, and the nonce given as a parameter
• ReadCounter(CounterID,Nonce): returns a ReadCertiﬁcate containing the value of the
counter, the counter’s ID and the given nonce
• IncrementCounter(CounterID,Nonce): increments the counter, and returns an IncrementCer-
tiﬁcate containing the new value of the counter, counter ID and nonce
• DestroyCounter(CounterID,Nonce): destroys the counter.
In this work, we assume availability of the virtual monotonic counters deêned by Sarmenta et al..
To avoid use of commands that are not included in the TPM API, we adopt the êrst, log-based
scheme which they deêne (Sarmenta et al., 2006, p. 32). As noted earlier, the TPM has a limited
number of physical monotonic counters, of which only one at a time can be used. The log-based
implementation of virtual monotonic counters uses a physical monotonic counter as a “global
clock”, where the time t is simply the value of the physical counter at a given time.
The value of a virtual monotonic counter is then the value of the global clock at the last time
the virtual counter’s IncrementCounter command was executed. This consequently means that the
value of a counter each time it is incremented cannot be predicted deterministically—we can
merely say with certainty that the value of the counter will only monotonically increase. As we
discuss further in the Chapter 6, this does not present a problem for us.
The IncrementCounter operation is then implemented using the TPM_IncrementCounter
TPM API command, inside an exclusive, logged transport session, using the counter’s ID and the
client’s nonce (viz. hash(CounterIDjjnS)) to prevent replay. The result of the ênal operation, a
call to TPM_ReleaseTransportSigned, is a data structure including the nonce, and a hash of
the transport session log, which is used to generate an IncrementCertiﬁcate.
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The ReadCounter operation is more complex, and involves the host (idp, for us) keeping an
array of the latest increment certiêcates (Sarmenta et al., 2006, p. 33) for each virtual counter,
returning the right one when the client requests it. In order to prevent reversal of the counter’s
value, however, the host must send the current time certiêcate, the current increment certiêcate,
and all of the previous increment certiêcates. Veriêcation of the counter’s value then involves
checking that each previous increment certiêcate is not for the counter whose ID has been re-
quested.
We do not go into further implementation speciêcs, but instead refer interested readers to
Sarmenta et al. (2006, p. 32) for further information.
3.2.4 Anonymous Channel
Due to the nature of the DAA protocol (Brickell et al., 2004), we need to use of some sort of
anonymous channel during the voting phase (not doing so would lead to Alice’s pseudonyms
being linkable, and her vote therefore being traced). Due to the nature of our work in Chapter
5, we need this channel to be bidirectional, so that Alice can receive proofs of her vote having
been counted. We note that standard mix networks are not designed to receive replies, but onion
routing-based networks are (Dingledine et al., 2004). Like much work in electronic voting,
however, we deliberately do not specify how the anonymous channel is created, but note that it
is only important that a user’s communications through the channel are anonymous: untappable
channels are not required.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced a number of the preliminaries which we require for our work,
including our own work on a generalisation of the two-candidate proof of discrete logarithm
equality to L candidates. We have extensively discussed the TPM’s DAA protocol, which we
use in Chapter 5. In the next chapter, we discuss our êrst protocol on electronic voting with
revocable anonymity.
4 RevocableAnonymity
in Electronic Voting†
Chapter Overview
In this chapter, work on a remote electronic voting protocol providing revocable anonymity to
voters, which was presented in December 2009 (Smart and Ritter, 2009), is discussed.
The chapter details a remote electronic voting protocol which satisêes several properties con-
sidered important in electronic voting. This leads to two main contributions:
• A secure voting protocol allowing a quorum of authorities to link a ballot to its voter
(revocable anonymity), whilst achieving coercion-resistance and legitimate voter privacy
• A novel method of allowing the voter to achieve coercion-resistance without anonymous
channels or tamper-resistant devices, through designated-veriêer signatures
†This chapter is an extended version of work presented at the Fifth International Conference on Information
Systems Security (Smart and Ritter, 2009).
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The protocol discussed in this chapter achieves the above properties, as well as the stan-
dard electronic voting properties (completeness, uniqueness, coercion-resistance, fairness, and
legitimate-voter privacy).
4.1 Chapter Structure
In Section 4.2, we give a simple schematic and a high-level description for our êrst protocol. In
Section 4.3, we give the participants, trust model and threat model for our work. We present the
protocol in Section 4.4, and provide an analysis of the security properties claimed in Section 4.5.
Note that a formal analysis of the protocol is given in Chapter 7.
4.2 Protocol Schema
We present a two-phase protocol, where voters do not need to synchronise between phases they
are actively involved in. Our reasoning for splitting into two phases is to preserve the anonymity
of the legitimate voter, henceforth referred to as Alice. In the êrst phase, voters receive eligibility
tokens with designated veriêer signatures, and form ElGamal encryptions of ballots, submitting
them to a bulletin board. A member of a semi-trusted tallier group re-encrypts Alice’s vote.
In the second phase, Alice receives a designated veriêer proof of re-encryption (along with
some other fake proofs of re-encryption), and her re-encrypted vote is posted to another bulletin
board with an encrypted version of her identity. Alice can then check her vote has been included,
or contact a Judge otherwise.
Once all votes are posted to the second bulletin board, a tally is calculated and announced. A
simple schematic diagram of the protocol is given in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1 A schematic for our protocol.
Voters
BB1 BB2
Final Tally
T1 T2
Judge (External)
4.3 Protocol Model
4.3.1 Participants
Our protocol is modelled with 5 kinds of participants. A participant (agent) is an interactive,
probabilistic, polynomial-time computation. All agents are able to communicate via a network,
which is not secure or anonymous in any way.
The participants are as follows:
• Voters. The protocol allowsM voters vi 2 fv0; v1; :::; vM 1g to vote. Alice is an honest voter
who wishes to vote anonymously. She is able to vote many times, but once unobserved.
Eligible voters’ public keys are publicly known.
• First Round Bulletin Board/First Round Talliers. Our protocol uses two separate bulletin
boards. A standard bulletin board is a public broadcast channel with memory. The êrst
bulletin board we use is writable only by voters. All voters send an encrypted vote and
signed proof of validity to this board, which we denote as BB1.
The êrst-round talliers T1 are a semi-trusted group of agents1, each possessing an ElGamal
secret key sT1 in its entirety, which any one of them can use to remove the êrst layer
of encryption on Alice’s vote2. We assume that each instance would be busy enough,
and that votes would be batched before sending to BB2, so that timing attacks would be
1We discuss our need for trusting T1 later in this Section.
2The size of T1 would need to be determined empirically depending on the size of the electorate. Since each
member of the group has a copy of the same key, the size only aﬀects how much of a bottleneck (in terms of
computational power) T1 is.
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ineﬀective. Our justiêcation for having multiple members of T1 is to prevent a bottleneck
of computational power, but if this problem were ignored, we could equally substitute the
group for a single entity.
The êrst round talliers are responsible for ensuring that Alice’s vote is valid according to
the set of valid possible votes, not coerced, and not a double-vote. They are unable to see
Alice’s actual vote token. T1 also encrypts Alice’s identity, should anonymity revocation be
required. They issue Alice with vote validity tokens during registration.
• Second Round Bulletin Board/Second Round Talliers. The second bulletin board BB2
is viewable by all users of the protocol, and writable only byT1. It lists only the re-encrypted
(valid) votes in a random permutation. The votes themselves, (x; y), are encrypted with
the public key of the second round talliers.
The second-round talliers are a group of agents (disjoint from T1) who decrypt the ballots
listed on the second round bulletin board using threshold ElGamal with a shared key sT2 .
The second round talliers will also publish the ênal tally.
• Anonymity Teller Group. As well as each being separate groups T1;T2, the tallier groups
form part of a larger group which deals only with the voter’s anonymity. This group
contains an equal number of members of T1 and T2 and is simply denoted T. As such,
it has a public key gsT and associated private key sT, where the private key is distributed
amongst all members as before. In this case, to decrypt, a quorum of a size tid, greater than
the size of either T1 or T2, will need to collude to decrypt. Note that this decryption is
only ever needed when a voter’s identity needs to be traced, as our protocol is optimistic.
Further, a voter’s anonymity cannot be revoked without the agreement of the quorum and
the Judge.
• Judge. The Judge is an entity of the protocol that is rarely used. She has two purposes:
1. If Alice cannot ênd her re-encrypted vote on the public bulletin board, she asks the
Judge for veriêcation.
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2. The Judge also authorises anonymity revocation (having been presented with appro-
priate evidence of the need for revocation) in order to deliberately link a ballot to a
voter, by applying her private key for a decryption.
Note that the Judge is only used in a minority of cases, i.e., where a voter’s identity needs to
be revealed, or Alice cannot ênd her vote on the bulletin board. The Judge, understandably,
is trusted. We note that she could equally be formed from a coalition of mutually distrusting
parties, disjoint from T1/T2, and selected by the electoral authorities. However, we see the
Judge more in terms of a physical arbiter of justice in a court of law.
4.3.2 Trust Model
We make the following assumptions in our protocol:
1. All parties trust that T1 will not reveal the link between a ballot (x; y) and its re-encryption
(xf; yf)
2. All parties trust that T1 will perform valid encryptions of each voter’s identity, to aﬀord
anonymity revocation
3. The Judge and T2 trust that T1 will only sign and post to BB2 ballots which are valid
4. The Judge trusts that T1 will accurately and honestly send any data requested by it, to the
Judge
5. All participants trust that the Judge will only authorise revocation of anonymity in appro-
priate circumstances
6. Alice trusts that she will receive one (and only one) valid voting token, along with several
invalid ones, from the êrst-round talliers during registration.
7. Alice trusts the Judge to honestly state whether votes have been counted
8. All parties trust that voter identities will be stored correctly (and securely) on the second-
round bulletin board
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Note that we have already assumed that: T1 will batch votes before sending to BB2, to prevent
timing attacks; Alice can vote once unobserved; and a t-sized quorum of T2 will not collude to
break fairness or decrypt ballots until voting is over.
4.3.2.1 (Partially) Trusting T1
The purpose of the êrst-round talliers is to check the eligibility of Alice to vote and to re-encrypt
Alice’s vote before it is posted to the second bulletin board. To achieve anonymity, we need to
partially trust T1. This means that we trust that T1:
• will not reveal the link between Alice’s ballot (x; y) and her re-encrypted ballot (xf; yf),
except by request of the Judge;
• will make valid encryptions of voter identities when forming id tags;
• will act honestly in communications with the Judge (no other honest communications are
required than those stated here);
• will only sign and post to BB2 ballots which are valid
Note therefore that T1 at no point has access to Alice’s unencrypted vote. We further do not trust
T1 to reliably send communications—if messages do not arrive as expected, the voter can detect
this.
We believe that the trust we have placed in T1 is the minimum assumption necessary to assure
the properties we wish to satisfy.
4.3.3 Threat Model
In this section, we consider the potential threats that could aﬀect our protocol, based on the
attacker’s capabilities. We address how these threats are managed in Section 4.4. As to the as-
sumptions we make about the attacker’s strength based on the strength of the cryptography we
use, we assume perfect cryptography.
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Note that in our protocol, the attacker can assume the role of any entity (except the Judge). He
is able to corrupt up to t  1 talliers where collusion is required to decrypt messages (and t is the
threshold size for that quorum). All channels are public, so the attacker can:
1. Read messages
2. Decrypt and read any message m, subject to having the correct decryption key s for an
encrypted message (g; gsm)
3. Intercept messages
4. Inject bad ballots in the êrst phase, and spurious messages generally
5. Temporarily block messages (although we assume resilient channels for liveness)
4.4 Protocol
Our êrst voting protocol has four stages:
Figure 4.2 Our protocol. Dashed lines indicate a non-compulsory part of the protocol (com-
plaints). Note that the êrst communication (T1 ! Alice) is in-person.
Check δ, G-PEQDL
id = (gφ, h
φ
T
h
φ
Judge
hAlice)
β ∈ Zq :
Any member of T1:
(xf , yf ) ← (xg
β , yhβ)
(Semi-Trusted T1)
BB1
(xf , yf , id),
Tally
(T2)
BB2
Choose α ∈R Zq
SignJudge(x, y)
〈(δ0,DVSignT1
(δ0)), . . .
BB2
Judge Alice
Query
δA, hAlice}T1
{(x, y),SignAlice(G-PEQDL),(x, y) ←
(gα, hα
T2
gM
i−1
)
Look up 〈(x, y), β〉{β}Judge for (x, y)
DVSignJudge(hAlice)
Store (x, y, β)
SignT1i
(hash(xf , yf , id))
(x, y), SignAlice(x, y)
(δn−1,DVSignT1
(δn−1))〉,vcid
signT1
(x, y),
Verify
signT1 (x, y)
DVRP0,. . . ,DVRPl,
114 Chapter 4. Revocable Anonymity in Electronic Voting
Stage 1: Ballot Validity Tokens
The protocol begins with Alice registering in person to vote (this would be with T1). At this point,
she receives a random number of values i, which are generated at the point of registration. Each has
a designated veriêer signature DVSignT1!Alice(i) paired with it, which has been generated by a
member of T1. However, only one of these signatures is valid (clearly, only the voter with the
correct private key can verify this fact1). Alice hence receives a string
h(0;DVSignT1(0)); (1;DVSignT1(1)); : : : ; (n 1;DVSignT1(n 1))i
The coercion-resistance Alice enjoys increases with n (i.e., the probability that the attacker can
guess the correct  value decreases with n).
Note that Alice would be able to generate designated veriêer signatures at her liberty. Alice is
able to calculate which of the signatures is valid for the value paired with it, and the tallier stores,
on a private electoral roll (accessible only to T1) the valid  value for Alice with her name. If
Alice votes under coercion, since she received a random number of  values, an observer cannot
force her to use all values (she could conceal one or more, or arbitrarily insert values). Hence she
simply votes using invalid  values.
If she later votes without coercion2, she sends the correct  value with her vote as a ‘proof ’ of
validity. Upon checking for eligibility, the talliers simply check Alice’s submitted  value against
the correct one stored on the private electoral roll . If she were to send a value for which the
DV-Signature was incorrect when sent to her, this would alert the êrst-round talliers that her vote
was made under coercion, which would alter their response to her. However, a coercer would
not be able to distinguish a valid  value from an invalid one, as he has no way of determining
whether Alice herself made the designated veriêer signature, or indeed whether the signature is
valid.
1Note that in Figure 4.2, Alice also receives a token vcid. In practice, she would remember this value, and use
it to demonstrate to her computer that she was not being coerced, rather than having to verify designated veriêer
signatures herself. To some degree, however, the real-world implementation of our work is outside of the scope of
this thesis.
2We assume that Alice is able to vote unobserved, but she only needs to do this once.
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Stage 2: Encrypted Vote Posting
As with other voting protocols using homomorphic encryption, we choose the form of the ballot
in such a way that decryption of all ballots multiplied together leads to a simple tally of votes. A
vote for the ith candidate is given as gMi 1 , where M is the maximum number of voters.
Voter Alice selects a value  2R Zq, and encrypts her vote for candidate i using the public key
of the second round talliers, to give (x; y) = (g; hT2g
Mi 1). She groups this with the correct  value
A, and her public key hAlice. Finally, she calculates the Generalised Proof of Equality of Discrete
Logarithms (see Section 3.1.3) for her ballot (x; y) to prove that the vote is of correct form, and
produces a standard DSA signature on this. This tuple h(x; y); SignAlice(G-PEQDL); A; hAlicei is
encrypted with the public key of the êrst-round talliers, and posted to the êrst round bulletin
board, BB1.
Stage 3: Validity Checking
Once Stage 2 is complete, any member T1i of T1 removes the êrst layer of encryption on each
vote on the êrst-round bulletin board, supplying an appropriate proof of correctness if required
by the authorities. That tallier then:
1. veriêes that the vote is legitimate, by ensuring that the  value given is the one stored
with Alice’s name on the private electoral roll1. Note that because the votes themselves are
encrypted for T2, the êrst-round talliers cannot see how a voter votes — merely that a voter
has attempted to vote.
2. veriêes the G-PEQDL supplied with the ballot (x; y) to determine that Alice’s vote is a
single vote for a single valid candidate in the election
Once the validity of a ballot is assured, and any invalid ballots are disposed of, T1i re-encrypts
(x; y) with a random factor  to give (xf; yf). That member also encrypts Alice’s public key by
doing the following:
1We presume that the private electoral roll is made inaccessible (or unconvincing) to coercers. We could accom-
plish this with designated veriêer signatures.
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• Select a random  2R Zq
• Using the joint public key for both sets of talliers hT, and the Judge’s public key, form
id = (g; hTh

JudgehAlice).
The tallier then continues. He:
3. generates a signature on hash(xf; yf; id), and concatenates this with (xf; yf; id) to form the
ênal message string.
The tallier responsible for the re-encryption sends Alice a designated-veriêer re-encryption proof
(DVRP) that her vote has been included on the public bulletin board as (xf; yf), along with a
number of other correct DVRPs, which are not valid for Alice (only she will be able to determine
this), but are valid for other votes on BB2. Note that if Alice’s sent  value were invalid, the tallier
would send Alice only DVRPs which were invalid for her (but still represented votes actually
on BB2), meaning that an attacker could not determine whether her vote was invalid simply by
observing messages received by Alice. As before, Alice would be free to insert seemingly valid
DVRPs into the communication. The tallier also sends Alice a signature of her original vote,
signT1(x; y).
The tallier will then personally store the values h(x; y); i, and mark on the private electoral
roll that Alice has voted (for example, by adding a signature of her public key). This information
will never be released, except to the Judge as proof that Alice’s vote was counted. The tuple
hxf; yf; id; signT1(hash(xf; yf; id))i is posted to the second-round talliers’ bulletin board. Alice is
able to check the second bulletin board to ensure her vote appears and the signature on it is valid,
but cannot convince anyone else of this fact (nor can she decrypt the re-encrypted vote). Any
entity can check that a vote on the bulletin board is valid by verifying the signature for the hash
of that vote.
Stage 4: Tallying
Once all DVRPs have been sent to their respective voters, it is simple for the second-round talliers
T2 to decrypt votes. First, each h(xf; yf); idi is checked against its signed hash. Those not matching
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are ignored in tallying. A quorum of t talliers jointly decrypt a product
(X;Y) = (
lY
j=1
xfj ;
lY
j=1
yfj)
(without any single member having access to the private key, as discussed in Section 3.1.1), and
then post the product to a publicly viewable place. The quorum threshold-decrypt the resulting
tally, giving gr1M0+r2M1+:::+rLML 1 , and r1; : : : ; rL as the ênal tally, via the calculation of a single
discrete logarithm. Note that any party can verify that any vote must have been correct, by
comparing each published hash to the values given with it.
Anonymity Revocation
We have built into our protocol the ability to recover a voter’s identity after the voting process is
complete, but only with the co-operation of the Judge and a quorum of T, the anonymity group.
When Alice’s vote is submitted to BB2, part of it is a token id = (g; hThJudgehAlice) If, in the tallying
phase of the protocol, any ballot is found to be illegal (or if, for any other reason, anonymity has
to be revoked), a quorum of members of the anonymity tallier group T need to collude (note that
the tid value for this threshold decryption should be higher than the size of either T1 or T2).
hTh

JudgehAlice
gsT
= hJudgehAlice
The Judge must now be sent the token, with appropriate evidence justifying anonymity revoca-
tion. The Judge can then divide by gsJudge to give the voter’s identity.
Voter Complaints
A disadvantage of using designated-veriêer re-encryption proofs is that Alice cannot prove the
validity of the proof she receives from the êrst-round talliers that her vote has been re-encrypted
as (xf; yf), which she may need to do if she cannot ênd her re-encrypted vote on BB2.
A solution we might adopt would be for Alice to receive a 1-out-of-L re-encryption proof
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(Hirt and Sako, 2000), which is requested byAlice after all votes are posted to the board. However,
such a proof is quite laborious and would allow an attacker to see that Alice’s vote was counted.
Instead, Alice sends her original (x; y) to the Judge, along with signT1(x; y) as proof that she did
indeed submit that vote. The Judge requests the stored  from the êrst-round talliers, and can
then use this to check that Alice’s vote was counted. If Alice’s vote is counted, the Judge sends
her a designated veriêer signature for her public key, hAlice. Otherwise, she makes the designated
veriêer signature invalid. Only Alice can determine this fact, and can again insert valid signatures
arbitrarily. If Alice’s vote is shown to have not been counted, we could also allow her to collude
with the Judge to submit a vote a second time—in this manner, if her vote is again not counted,
the Judge can take further action.
4.5 Analysis
In this section, we provide a short list of the properties that this protocol satisêes. In Chapter 7,
we go into considerably more detail by providing several formal models for the protocol, proving
via the tool ProVerif that we satisfy many of the properties which we claim. Some properties
(such as remote voting) cannot be tested formally, but it should be clear to the reader that these
properties are achieved.
4.5.1 Coercing Alice by Selecting Her Keypair
We consider a potential attack to the protocol in which, rather than Alice using a private key
of her choice, she is provided with a public key (or complete keypair) with which to vote. We
consider êrst a situation in which the coercer provides alice with a public key (h0Alice = gs
0
Alice), and
uses his own copy of the corresponding private key s0Alice in order to generate signatures where
required, and decrypt designated veriêer signatures and DVRPs sent to her. We can avoid this
attack during in-person registration: we simply have Alice interactively prove knowledge of the
secret key, thus ensuring that she possesses both secret and private keys.
In the case where the coercer provides Alice with a public and private key to use, the situation
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is somewhat diﬀerent. Foremost, we might argue that this allows the coercer to simulate Alice
entirely, which contradicts our earlier discussion on the capabilities of the coercer, in Section
2.1.1. Nevertheless, if we assume that this could happen, then Alice would possess the required
keypair with which to interactively prove knowledge of the private key, meaning that the coercer
could read designated-veriêer messages sent to her. We can take one of two approaches to mitigate
this issue. The êrst is to simply decide that the attacker is not permitted to force keys in this manner
(this is the approach that we adopt in this work). An eﬀective way of enforcing this requirement
is to have a fresh voter keypair generated for Alice, either at registration, or at some other point
in time—receipt of a keypair need not be related to voting at all. However, in the latter case,
we would require that T1 needs to be certain of the origins of Alice’s public key: perhaps she
needs to undergo an interactive proof knowledge of the private key, and the key itself is certiêed
as having been produced for Alice. The former case, where Alice’s keypair is generated for her
freshly during registration, is more interesting. If the registrar generates Alice’s keypair entirely,
then we must assume that the registrar cannot be a coercer, else the coercer would have full
knowledge of Alice’s keypair anyway. A sensible alternative is to have Alice’s keypair generated
using two sources of randomness: one controlled by Alice, and the other controlled by another
party—perhaps T1, or perhaps some other Certiêcate Authority, external to the protocol. We
must again assume that the coercer is not able to control the registrar, if the registrar generates
randomness for Alice’s keypair, but this time, we need only be concerned if the coercer can also
access to Alice’s own source of randomness. In practice, many protocols of this type suﬀer from
a similar weakness: if the coercer can, directly or otherwise, obtain Alice’s secret data, then the
coercer can simulate Alice entirely, making the whole eﬀort futile. For this reason, as discussed
earlier, we assume that the coercer cannot simulate the registrar in order to gain Alice’s registration
secrets.
The second approach which we might have adopted to securing Alice’s registration is to allow
the coercer to force public keys, but strengthen the way in which Alice is assured of which 
value—out of those she is sent in the êrst communication between T1 and her—is valid. Cur-
rently, we use designated veriêer signatures on each  value, where the single value which has
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a ‘correct’ designated veriêer signature is the ‘valid’  value. If we replace this communication
with an interactive zero-knowledge proof of which  value is correct, we then give Alice further
ability to deceive the coercer: note that zero-knowledge proof transcripts can be simulated post
facto, meaning that Alice is easily able to generate fake proofs to fool the coercer—after in-person
registration has occurred—as to which  is valid. A similar approach to proving credential validity
was used by Benaloh and Tuinstra (1994), and later by Neﬀ (2004) in the MarkPledge system.
Given the added complications of the second solution (in assurance that a given vote has been
cast, and the added eﬀort required by Alice in registration), we require that the coercer cannot
force keypairs in this protocol.
4.5.2 Properties Satisêed by First Protocol
The protocol described in this chapter satisêes the properties listed below. We use the Dolev-Yao
model and hence assume that the cryptographic operations presented in Chapter 3 are perfect;
in other words the intruder is not able to break any of the these cryptographic algorithms but is
able to intercept, change and delete all messages. We assume resilient channels to obtain liveness
properties.
1. Eligibility Only eligible voters should be able to vote.
2. Uniqueness Only one vote per voter should be counted
3. Receipt-Freeness The voter should be given no information which can be used to demon-
strate to a coercer how or if they have voted, after voting has occurred
4. Coercion-Resistance It should not be possible for a voter to prove how they voted or even
if they are voting, even if they are able to interact with the coercer during voting
5. Veriêability
(a) Individual Veriêability A voter should be able to verify that their vote has been
counted correctly
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(b) Universal Veriêability Any observer should be able to verify that all votes have been
counted correctly
6. Fairness No-one can gain any information about the result of the tally until the end of the
voting process and publication of votes
7. Vote Privacy Neither the authorities nor any other participant should be able to link any
plaintext ballot to the voter having cast it, unless the protocol to revoke anonymity has been
invoked
(a) Revocable Anonymity It should be possible for an authorised entity (or collaboration
of entities, for us) to reveal the identity of any single voter by linking his ballot to him.
8. Remote Voting Voters should not be restricted by physical location
It should be noted that even in the event that T1 were not trusted and became compromised,
vote privacy, fairness, and individual veriêability (in so much that Alice can ensure her vote is
counted), are still satisêed—these are not dependent on trusting T1. The fact that Alice uses
the public key of T2 to encrypt her vote means that a corrupt T1 would have no access to it
whatsoever. Receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance are satisêed in that Alice still cannot show
how she votes.
The assumptions we make on T1 make it unnecessary to require assumptions made in other
approaches on remote electronic voting, e.g. anonymous, often untappable channels (Sako and
Kilian, 1995; Fan and Sun, 2008; Fujioka et al., 1993; Hirt, 2001; Cramer et al., 1996)1, availability
of a trusted Smart-Card or ‘randomiser’ to perform re-encryptions and proofs thereof (Lee et al.,
2004; Hirt, 2001; Fan and Sun, 2008), or the assumption that the voter cannot be observed at
all during voting. It should be noted that using a Smart-Card to re-encrypt instead of T1 would
aﬀect other properties, such as eligibility and remote voting.
1Note that the êrst stage of our protocol involves in-person registration, which one might class as an ‘untappable
channel’. In order to prevent Alice being simulated entirely by an attacker, this part of the protocol must be carried
out by Alice alone. Unlike many other voting protocols, however, only registration must be done in this way.
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced a protocol providing remote electronic voting with revocable
anonymity. The protocol allows for simple and anonymous tallying of votes, whilst also permitting
an authorised judge to request anonymity revocation on any ballot.
The protocol has a number of advantages: we achieve a novel method of providing coercion-
resistance, even in the presence of a coercer; the protocol is the êrst to discuss revocable anonymity
in electronic voting, as required by the UK; we achieve a voter- and universally-veriêable tally
through the encryption and re-encryption methods which we use. However, it has some short-
comings. Firstly, the amount of trust required in the êrst set of talliers—though acceptable in
a real-world scenario, we believe—is quite high, and something we we would like to reduce.
Moreover, although this protocol is for a remote electronic voting scenario, it, like many other
remote protocols, does not consider the security of the remote machine Alice votes from. This
means, for example, that a rogue machine could claim to accept Alice’s vote, and provide her
with apparently correct validations of the proofs sent to her, but in fact vote on her behalf for
another candidate. In this scenario, the ‘weak link in the chain’ becomes Alice’s machine.
In the next chapter, we introduce another protocol, which harnesses the security guarantees
provided by trusted computing and the TPM, in order to provide some assurances to the voter and
the authorities as to the state of Alice’s machine.
5 Using TrustedComputing‡
Chapter Overview
In this chapter, we build on the work discussed in Chapter 4, discussing a coercion-resistant
electronic voting protocol which satisêes a number of properties previously considered contra-
dictory. We introduce trusted computing as a method of ensuring the trustworthiness of remote
voters, and provide an extension to our protocol allowing revocable anonymity. The protocol
introduced in this chapter solves a number of the issues with the work presented in Chapter 4,
including that of excessive trust in the êrst round of talliers. The protocol is a modiêed version of
work presented at WISSec 2010 (Smart and Ritter, 2010), and is to be presented at Autonomic
and Trusted Computing 2011 (Smart and Ritter, 2011).
We introduce the êrst practical work on a remote electronic voting protocol which uses trusted
computing (speciêcally, the TPM and Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol). A number of
‡This chapter is an extended version of work presented at the Eighth International Conference on Autonomic
and Trusted Computing (Smart and Ritter, 2011). An earlier version was presented at WISSec 2010.
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existing works discuss the applicability of trusted computing and the TPM to electronic voting.
We are the êrst to extend this to remote electronic voting whilst also providing a detailed protocol
to do so, leading to several contributions:
• A remote voting protocol allowing authorities to be convinced of the state of the voter’s
machine, and allowing anonymity revocation via the TPM
• A protocol allowing Alice to remain anonymous, whilst satisfying her eligibility to vote via
a novel use of the DAA protocol
• A novel method of allowing the voter to achieve coercion-resistance, whilst also achieving
veriêability even in the physical presence of a coercer, such that one cannot determine even
if a voter has voted (a notion we name invisible absentee coercion-resistance), through the use
of designated veriêer re-encryption proofs
• An extension to the protocol allowing a voter to be traced to her vote, should the legal
need arise, but only with the co-operation of a judge.
5.1 Chapter Structure
We have already discussed all of the primitives we use in Chapter 3. Presently, we introduce the
schema for our second protocol, and then in Section 5.2, we give the participants, trust model
and threat model for our work. In Section 5.3 we present our second protocol. We then provide a
security analysis for the protocol in Section 5.4. We summarise the achievements of the protocol
in Section 5.5.
5.1.1 Protocol Schema
We present a three-phase protocol, where voters do not need to synchronise between phases. In
the êrst phase, our legitimate voter, Alice, registers in person to vote, and selects a random number
of (paper) validity cards showing printed values i, one of which (A) she chooses at random. This
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Figure 5.1 A schematic for our protocol. Alice begins by receiving validity tokens , in person.
Dotted lines indicate optional communication
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TPM
A will denote her vote as non-coerced. In the next phase, she and her trusted platform module
(TPM) execute the DAA Join protocol (Brickell et al., 2004) and receive a certiêcate proving her
eligibility to vote (the certiêcate is split into three parts, divided between Alice and her TPM).
In the ênal phase, Alice and her TPM execute the DAA Sign protocol in order to complete
her vote, which is sent as an ElGamal encryption with a proof of its validity. Voting authorities
execute the DAA Verify protocol, after which Alice’s vote is re-encrypted, and she receives back
a designated veriêer proof of that re-encryption, encrypted for her TPM. Should Alice need to,
she can request assistance from the Judge if she cannot ênd her re-encrypted vote on the reported
bulletin board, who may collaborate with her to cast a vote.
A simple schematic diagram of the protocol is given in Figure 5.1.
5.2 Protocol Model
5.2.1 Participants
Our protocol is modelled with four kinds of participants. All participants are able to communicate
via a network, which is not untappable.
126 Chapter 5. Using Trusted Computing
• Voters. The protocol allows M voters
vi 2 fv0; v1; : : : ; vM 1g
to vote. Alice is an honest voter who wishes to vote anonymously. She can vote an un-
limited number of times, but must be able to vote once unobserved. Voters’ public keys are
known to all participants.
• Administrator. The (in-person) administrator A is a single entity, responsible for ensuring
that Alice receives a random number of paper validity cards containing validity tokens j. We
expand upon this in the next section. A is responsible for identifying Alice (say, via an ID
card), but not for determining her eligibility to vote.
• Registrar. The registrar R is a single agent, possessing a secret key sR. Note that we
assume a bottleneck will not occur here, but we could equally use a group of identical
registrar agents to mitigate such a problem (though we would thereby, of course, increase
the risk of data leakage).
The registrar is responsible for ensuring, via the DAA Join protocol, that Alice is eligible to
vote, and has not attempted to register already. The registrar will send Alice a voter group
membership certiêcate, with which she can prove to the talliers that her vote is permitted.
• Talliers. The talliers, T = fT1; : : : ;Tng, are a group of agents (disjoint from R) who
authorise the addition of each submitted ballot to the bulletin board, BB, via the DAA sign
and verify protocols. Each tallier has a copy of a secret key sT, with which he determines
the validity of votes, and a share of a secret key sTv , with which he collaborates with a
quorum of T in order to decrypt the end tally, once the election is ênished. These keys
are unrelated—we use them to ensure that no single teller has access to an individual vote.
T are also responsible for re-encrypting valid votes, and sending proof of this to Alice.
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5.2.2 Trust Model
We make the following assumptions in our protocol:
1. The TPM and the manufacturers of the TPM (the root of trust), are trusted to behave as
intended by the protocol
2. All parties trust that T will not reveal the link between a ballot (x; y) and its re-encryption
(xf; yf)
3. All voters trust that the validity of any given  value will not be revealed by A, except to
members of T via a designated veriêer signature
4. All parties trust that each voter will only be permitted to submit one validity card to the
secured box for each election
5. All parties trust that R will not issue group membership certiêcates to ineligible voters, and
will only do so once for eligible voters
6. All participants trust that the Judge will only authorise revocation of anonymity in appro-
priate circumstances
7. Alice trusts the Judge to honestly state whether votes have been counted
5.2.3 Threat Model
We now consider the potential threats that could aﬀect our protocol, based on the attacker’s
capabilities. We address how these threats are managed in Section 5.3. Note that, as mentioned
earlier, we assume perfect cryptography.
In our protocol, the attacker can assume the role of any entity, except the Judge or A. He is
able to corrupt up to t   1 talliers where collusion is required to decrypt messages (and t is the
threshold size for that quorum). All channels are public (the channel between Alice and the talliers
is tappable, but anonymous), so the attacker can:
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1. Read messages
2. Decrypt and read any message m, subject to having the correct decryption key s for an
encrypted message (g; gsm)
3. Intercept messages
4. Inject bad ballots in the voting phase, and spurious messages generally
5. Temporarily block messages (although we assume resilient channels for liveness)
5.3 Protocol
Our protocol has three stages. Diagrams of these are given in Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4:
In-Person Registration (Fig 5.2) In order to begin voting, Alice êrst has to apply in person to
vote, with the administrator A. This can be at any point before the election. It is at this stage
that her identity is conêrmed. Once her identity is conêrmed, Alice is told to select a number,
r, of validity cards from a box. r is generated randomly by A when Alice’s identity is conêrmed,
and she is observed selecting (at least) r face-down cards from the box. Alice is free to select a
further, arbitrary, number of cards. These cards are simply pieces of paper with a perforation
down the middle, and the same value j : j 2 f0; : : : ; r   1g printed on each side. Alice selects
(mentally) one of the cards, whose  value, A, will denote her intended vote. She separates the
card along the perforation, and places half of it into a secure box, retaining the other half. The
bin must be designed to accept only one card per voter. Designing such a bin is an interesting
challenge. One solution is to have the administrator A ‘reset’ the box for each voter after having
conêrmed their identity. Alice then selects a random number of cards, and places one in the box.
The box weighs the card before accepting it, preventing ‘stuﬃng’, and then locks itself until reset
again. The physical implementation of such a bin is very much outside of the scope of this work,
however, and so we do not discuss it further.
With the remaining cards, Alice separates each card and places one half of each card into a
shredder. Again, we should ensure that Alice destroys half of each validity card that she has not
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chosen to denote her intended vote (as is the case with protocols such as Prêt-à-Voter, discussed
in Section 2.2.4.1).
Alice leaves in-person registration with several halves of validity cards. She has a mental note
of which is valid (and could, in fact, discard or hide that one), but cannot prove which is valid to
any observer. As she took a random number of cards, an observer cannot force her to vote once
with every card she selected. Note that only A has access to the secure box, and that the voter
has no way to prove how many cards she selected.
As an interesting aside, the reader may note that there is actually no side-eﬀect of Alice not
destroying half of each unwanted validity card in this way. Let us assume that Alice destroys none
of the card halves. She therefore leaves the polling station with several whole cards, and one half
of a card (whose other half is in A’s secure box). No coercer is able to determine if the total
number of cards Alice has is indeed the total number she was allocated, plus the further number
she chose to take: the most that can be determined is that the ‘whole’ cards do not show A.
Indeed, Alice may have thrown away, or otherwise concealed, the card which does show the A
value. As we will discuss later, the proofs which Alice receives from the talliers as to her vote being
tallied are êrstly encrypted for her TPM only, and secondly only readable by Alice, meaning that
the coercer can never gain information about the validity of any  value.
A related attack which we consider is that of “chain registration” (cf. chain voting): the
coercer has access to two voters, under the assumption that voters now do not destroy the halves
of their unwanted cards. With the êrst voter, he asks for all of the ‘complete’ cards (i.e., those
which have not been divided). Now, he gives those cards to the next voter, asking her to select the
 value on one of those to vote with, instead of any that she will receive as part of the registration
process. The question then follows: can the coercer determine that the voter has indeed voted
the way he requested, having knowledge of which  value she chose to denote a valid vote?
Again, this attack cannot succeed. As we will discuss later, when Alice votes, she sends her single
 value as part of her vote. The value is checked for validity, and the validity of a given value
is denoted by a valid designated veriêer signature on that value, which the coercer will not be
able to verify. When a vote is recorded on the tally, it is re-encrypted randomly. Proofs of this
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Figure 5.2 In-Person Registration
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re-encryption are veriêable only by Alice, and are encrypted using a PCR-bound TPM key to
begin with. This means that only Alice, working with her TPM, can verify that any vote appears
on the tally. Though the eﬀect of this is that Alice does not in fact need to destroy the unwanted
validity card halves, in the current version of our protocol, to minimise complexity, we enforce
that she should do so.
We note that our approach to voter registration is unconventional for a remote electronic
voting scheme. However, it removes the unrealistic requirement for an untappable channel to the
administrator (like that suggested by Clarkson et al. (2008)), and considerably reduces the trust
we need to place in A (he now only knows which  values are valid, not for whom, so we need
only ensure that he does not release this information).
Join (Fig 5.3) Alice and her TPM, TPMAlice, execute the TPM Join protocol: this is as with
the DAA Join protocol (Brickell et al., 2004), which we discuss in depth in Section 3.2.2.3. Alice
êrst forms a value R, using the basename of the registrar, and sends this to her TPM. The TPM
checks the validity of the value, selects random values v0; f0; f1 and forms a commitment to them,
U, and a pseudonym NR with which to allow the registrar to identify Alice. U;NR are sent
back to Alice, who sends them to R. The communication channel with R does not need to be
anonymous. We however adopt the requirement of (Brickell et al., 2004) that the channel must
be ‘authentic’ between TPMAlice and R: i.e., the registrar must be sure that it is communicating
with the correct TPM. Such authenticity can be achieved using the TPM’s endorsement key (EK)
for initial communications (Brickell et al., 2004).
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Figure 5.3 The Join protocol, where Alice registers to vote.
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R checks to see whether Alice has already applied to vote, or whether the TPM she is voting
from has been designated rogue. If not, TPMAlice and R engage in a signature proof of knowledge
protocol, with the TPM as the prover. The TPM proves knowledge of f0; f1 and v0, the blinding
factor in U.
Once this is complete, R generates Alice’s membership certiêcate:
(A; e; v00) : A 

Z
USv00
1=e
mod n
We refer to Figure 5.3, Section 3.2.2 and (Brickell et al., 2004) for more detail. This certiêcate
demonstrates the voter with pseudonym NR’s eligibility to vote, without revealing her identity.
Note that we do not need anonymity in the êrst part of the protocol—in fact, since R needs to
identify Alice on the electoral register, this part of the protocol could not be anonymous. Instead,
we need to ensure that there is no way to link the information gained by Alice in the Join protocol
with the information she imparts in the Vote protocol, by using two diﬀerent pseudonyms to
identify Alice in the registration and voting phases, and an anonymous channel in the voting
phase.
The certiêcate is sent to Alice. She then stores most of it, and forwards v00 to TPMAlice, which
can calculate v v0 + v00, and store (v; f0; f1).
Voting (Fig 5.4) The protocol by which Alice and her TPM vote is shown in Figure 5.4. If
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we assume that Alice can be tracked by an attacker with a global view of the network (and thus,
the ability to see the IP address Alice votes from), then we must use an anonymous channel to
preserve Alice’s coercion-resistance and privacy. Although using any form of anonymous channel
is undesirable, we do gain the valuable property that the machine Alice votes from can not be
traced. Voting proceeds as follows:
First, we begin with an execution of the DAA Sign protocol (denoted as such in Figure 5.4).
Alice and her TPM form tokens with which she can prove possession of a credential supplied byR.
First, as with the Join protocol, Alice forms a value T, and sends this to TPMAlice. Meanwhile, she
generates two tokens T1; T2, which are used to demonstrate to T that she possesses a certiêcate
making her a member of the ‘voters’ group, without revealing the certiêcate itself (Brickell et al.,
2004). Next, TPMAlice forms a pseudonym NT with which Alice can vote (note that NT 6= NR),
then sends this to Alice. She forwards NT to T, and then T, Alice and TPMAlice engage in a
signature proof of knowledge, with Alice and her TPM producing a signature proving that T1
and T2 commit to a certiêcate, and “[her pseudonym NT] was computed using the secret key
going with that certiêcate”(Brickell et al., 2004). Alice’s TPM generates an attestation identity key
(Brickell et al., 2004) AIKAlice which is sent to T as part of this signature, and will be used to
prove authenticity of later messages. Note that this AIK is not linkable to Alice in any way, and
the communication with T, being over an anonymous channel, is similarly unlinkable (Brickell
et al., 2004).
With the Sign protocol complete, T can then query Alice’s TPM as to the state of her machine.
To do this, any member Ti of T begins an encrypted transport session between itself and Alice’s TPM
directly (note that Alice does not see the result of any transactions that occur here). Ti selects
a challenge nonce cv, and requests a hash of the current state of the TPM’s registers, using the
command TPM_Quote, and including the challenge. The TPM responds with the appropriate
data. If Ti is satisêed that the machine is in the correct state, it requests that the TPM create a new
keypair, bound to the correct TPM register (PCR) states. This means that, when a decryption is
needed using this key, it can only occur if the TPM’s PCRs are in the correct state. We denote
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the handle of this key as kA, and note that the key is asymmetric, the private part being accessible
only to the TPM.
Next, Alice generates a fresh ElGamal keypair, (sv; hv = gsv). She then sends a message
votetoken to T. votetoken contains Alice’s vote, in the form of an exponential ElGamal
encryption (x; y) = (g; hTvg
Mi 1), where she is selecting the ith candidate, her chosen A value
(should she be voting according to her own wishes) or any other  value (if she is being coerced),
the public part of the aforementioned key hv, and the G-PEQDL proof that her vote is for one
valid candidate only. The tallier Tk that receives Alice’s vote now checks whether it was sent under
coercion. To do this, he sends ; signT() to A. A checks whether the  value received is in the
secure box, and if so, sends a correct designated veriêer signature of the value, DVSignA!Tk().
If the  value is not found in the box (meaning Alice sent a vote under coercion), an incorrect
designated veriêer signature is returned to T. Again, only Tk can determine this, and cannot
prove this fact to an observer.
Once Alice’s vote is determined to be non-coerced, her G-PEQDL proof is checked by Tk. If
this is invalid, her vote is discarded. If the G-PEQDL is correct, Alice’s vote is re-encrypted using
a re-encryption factor  2R Zq. If her vote was not coerced, Alice is sent a tuple of designated
veriêer proofs of re-encryption (DVRPs), produced using the public key hv Alice generated earlier.
One of these is valid for Alice’s re-encrypted vote; the others are valid for other votes already on
the bulletin board1. Each DVRP is separately encrypted using the public part of the wrap key
kA which Alice’s TPM generated. This means that Alice is free to generate re-encryption proofs
herself (the nature of the proof is such that the entity for whom the proof is designated can use
her private key—sv in this case—to generate further DVRPs), to fool coercers.
The re-encrypted (xf; yf) is sent to a threshold of talliers in T, along with the re-encryption
factor and the G-PEQDL proof. If that threshold agree, they jointly generate a signature on
(xf; yf), and the vote and its signature are placed on the bulletin board.
If Alice’s vote was coerced, Alice is sent several DVRPs as before. However, this time they are
all valid for votes on the bulletin board that are not Alice’s.
1Vote submissions are batched so that there are always enough votes on the bulletin board to do this.
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Note that the DVRPs Alice receives use a key which she freshly generated (to prevent her
being identiêed). Each DVRP is encrypted with a key for which only the TPM has the private
part. As a consequence, Alice needs to load the correct key into the TPM (using TPM_LoadKey2),
and then requests the TPM to decrypt each DVRP ciphertext, using TPM_UnSeal.
At this point, it should be noted that the keypair kA generated by the TPM was bound to a
certain set of PCR states. If this set of states is not in place at the time of DVRP decryption with
TPM_UnSeal, decryption cannot occur. This ensures not only that Alice still uses the same TPM,
but also that no rogue software is executed after Alice casts her vote.
Alice can then check to see if any one of the DVRPs represent valid re-encryptions, checking
the bulletin board. Note that every re-encryption will be on the bulletin board, but only Alice
can be convinced that any vote is hers. If she does not ênd her vote, Alice may contact the Judge,
who will contact T. The Judge may further allow Alice to vote again, under his supervision.
When voting is complete, votes are tallied by T:
(X;Y) = (
lY
j=1
xfj ;
lY
j=1
yfj)
This product is calculable by any observer. The ênal tally is calculated by a quorum (size t) of
T colluding to decrypt this product, giving gr1M0+r2M1+:::+rLML 1 , and r1; : : : ; rL as the ênal tally.
Note that since every vote is threshold-signed on the bulletin board, observers are convinced that
every vote is genuine.
Anonymity Revocation (Fig 5.5) The changes that we make to the protocol in Figure 5.4
in order to provide revocable anonymity are quite simple. We begin with a small change to the
registration protocol. Once the DAA Join part of the protocol is complete, the registrar R sends
Alice an encryption of her ID with the Judge’s public key, id = fidgJudge. R also sends a signature
of this encryption, SignR(id) to Alice.
The voting protocol completes the DAA Sign protocol as before. Alice then sends the en-
cryption and signature thereof to T, who verify the signature and store the ciphertext. She then
extends a TPM PCR with the value of id using TPM_Extend (this is equivalent to hashing the
current value of the chosen register, concatenated with id). T can ensure Alice has done this, by
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Figure 5.4 The Voting Protocol vote1 (without revocable anonymity). Terms are explained in
Section 3.2.2.
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ensuring that the value received from TPM_Quote is that which would be expected for a correct
machine state concatenated with the encrypted ID value.
Voting then proceeds as normal: Alice’s identity is re-encrypted by T and printed on the
bulletin board next to her vote. Should revocation be required, a member Tk of T sends the tuple
id to the Judge, along with appropriate evidence justifying revocation. The Judge is then free
to revoke Alice’s anonymity and take further action against her. Note that in order to preserve
Alice’s anonymity, we add a trust requirement that R does not collude with T to reveal Alice’s
identity, and always provides the correct identity for a voter (since R is trusted to perform the
DAA Join protocol correctly, this is not a large increase in trust). Note that Alice could later
contact the Judge to determine whether her anonymity had been revoked or not. This does not,
to us, constitute full auditability, as Alice needs to contact a third party to audit her vote. We
discuss approaches to achieving auditable revocable anonymity in the next chapter.
Figure 5.5 Changes to the Voting Protocol vote2 (with revocable anonymity)
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5.3.1 Choosing Values for Validity Cards
One might consider what form the  values printed on the validity cards actually take. In order
to minimise the memorisation demands placed on the voter, the values must be simple (or mem-
orable) enough to be ‘human-friendly’. At the same time, they must be complex enough that
brute-force guessing attacks would be ineﬀective. In the version of the protocol presented here,
each  value is randomly chosen from some ênite set of integers. Equally, however, we could
choose from a set of dictionary words, or even—with some caveats—allow the voter to select
the values on the cards herself. We would prefer to avoid this option, as humans are notoriously
bad at making random decisions, and Alice could be forced to choose certain values by a coercer.
That said, she could easily comply with such a demand, and then insert her own chosen value,
memorising it, submitting it as her chosen A, and destroying or hiding the counterpart card.
5.4 Analysis
The following properties are those satisêed by this protocol. These properties are what we con-
sider to be the most important properties in electronic voting. For each property, we give an
informal sketch of security proofs for the protocol. We assume the correctness of various crypto-
graphic primitives and assumptions (discussed in Chapter 3)—note that although these primitives
assume the provable security model, we work in the formal model, thus assuming that cryptog-
raphy is perfect. We make no further assumptions about, or changes to, the primitives that we
use.
Property 1 (Correctness and Eligibility). Only eligible voters should be able to vote. Further, there is
no trace of the protocol resulting in a successfully counted vote, from Alice, for candidate i, that did not begin
with Alice voting for i, and there is only one trace that did begin with Alice voting for i
To prove this requirement, we need to demonstrate that there is no way any two or more
parties can collude to defraud Alice or the authorities. Nor is it possible for Alice to collude with
another voter or coercer. We consider collusions between the parties shown in Table 5.1, and
discuss them below. Bob represents any other voter, or coercer.
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i. Alice and any other voter or coercer (Bob). We consider an attack in which Alice colludes with
an attacker to attempt to vote several times, or claim that her vote was not counted.
When Alice attempts to vote, part of her voting token is our G-PEQDL proof that for her
vote (x; y), y 2 fhTvgM
0
; : : : ; hTvg
ML 1g where L is the number of candidates. For any vote
to be accepted by T, this proof must hold. Hence, Alice cannot vote for more than one
candidate in any one vote casting.
Further, she cannot vote more than once—we have from Trust Assumption 5 that R will
not permit Alice to register more than once, and from the protocol that a quorum of T
would have to collude to permit two votes from the same voter. Alice is also unable to
claim that her vote was not counted—the talliers are always able to show which vote was
re-encrypted to appear on the bulletin board, if requested to do so by a judge. Further, the
Judge can request that the talliers produce DVRPs using her public key, instead. The Judge
is then able to verify that Alice’s vote has appeared on the bulletin board.
ii. Alice and the Administrator. We consider an attack in which Alice and A collude to provide
her with multiple valid  tokens. Such an attack violates Trust Assumption 4, and so is not
considered further.
iii. Alice and the Registrar. We consider an attack in which R allows Alice to register more than
once, or to register if she is not eligible. Such an attack violates Trust Assumption 5, and so
is not considered further. In the revocable anonymity protocol vote2, R may send Alice a
diﬀerent identity. This violates the trust assumption which we added to this protocol.
iv. Alice and one Tallier. We consider an attack in which Alice colludes with a second round
tallier to request that her vote is altered. Since any modiêcations to votes require the
Table 5.1 Possible Collusions in our Second Protocol
Bob A R Ti
Alice i ii iii iv
R v vi vii viii
Tj 6=i ix x xi xii
5.4. Analysis 139
agreement of a quorum of t < n members of T, this attack is not possible. Further,
modiêcations after posting to the bulletin board are not possible, since each re-encrypted
vote is posted with its signed hash to the board.
v. Registrar and a Coercer. In this attack, the registrar would collude with a coercer to provide
Alice with more than one certiêcate with which to vote, or to provide her with an invalid
certiêcate. The êrst attack violates Trust Assumption 5, and the second would immediately
be detected by Alice and her TPM.
vi. Registrar and the Administrator. The Administrator is only responsible for issuing voters with
validity cards, something which has nothing to do with registration. As a result, there is no
valid attack here.
vii. Registrar and Registrar. As there is only one registrar, this attack is not possible. It would
also not be possible for R on his own to aﬀect the election: we have already stated that
he cannot collude with Alice or a coercer, and attempting to provide invalid certiêcates to
voters would be detected immediately by the voters themselves, who could complain to a
Judge.
viii. Registrar and one Tallier. In this attack, R would generate an invalid certiêcate for Alice and
collude with T such that the certiêcate was accepted. Since the values generated by R
for the certiêcate are not directly seen by T this attack would fail. It also violates Trust
Assumption 5. R could not force Ti to reject a certiêcate, for the same reason.
Note that in the protocol vote2, including revocable anonymity, we add a trust assumption
to ensure that Alice’s identity will not be revealed to the talliers by R. This nulliêes any
collusion between the registrar and talliers.
ix. A Coercer and one Tallier. A coercer may attempt to force a tallier to accept a fraudulent vote,
or to modify one. Both of these would require a signature from a quorum of T, which
means that collusion with a single tallier would be ineﬀective.
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x. One Tallier and the Administrator. In this attack, a tallier would collude with the administrator
(and possibly a coercer) to reveal a list of valid  values, and the names associated with
them. We have from the protocol that the administrator never sees who selected each 
value. Further, the validity of any  value will not be revealed by A, except via a designated
veriêer signature (meaning the recipient of the signature cannot prove the validity of any 
value).
xi. One Tallier and the Registrar. See (viii).
xii. Any two Talliers. A quorum of t < n talliers is required to eﬀect any change in the tally.
Hence, no attack is possible here.
Collusion of more than two parties. Note that it follows from the discussion above that collusion of
more than two parties to defraud Alice or the authorities is similarly ineﬀective. Any attempt to
alter Alice’s vote, or to allow her to vote multiple times at once, would require the cooperation
of a quorum of T—something which, as with all voting schemes using threshold cryptography,
we assume is unlikely. We trust that R will not allow Alice to register more than once, and we
also note that Alice working with any number of coercers would have no eﬀect (subject to the
assumptions above): i.e., any collusion involving more than two parties will reduce to the same
collusions described above, which either require a quorum of cooperating talliers, or already break
one of our trust assumptions.
Property 2 (Uniqueness). Only one vote per voter should be counted We have from the protocol that,
during in-person registration, Alice can only place one validity card into the secure box. Trust
Assumption 4 states that Alice can only receive one such card. As such, given that a particular 
value will only be accepted once when the Talliers come to group-sign a re-encrypted vote, Alice
can only vote once per election. Similarly, she is given only one group membership certiêcate in
the join phase, and so cannot vote twice there, either—we trust that Alice’s TPM will not allow
her to generate more than one pseudonym.
Finally, when Alice comes to vote, she submits a G-PEQDL proof that her vote (x; y) is such
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that y 2 fhTvgM
0
; : : : ; hTvg
ML 1g where L is the number of candidates. She can therefore not vote
for more than one candidate in an election.
Property 3 (Coercion-Resistance). It should not be possible for a voter to prove how they voted or even
if they are voting, even if they are able to interact with the coercer during votingWe have from the protocol
that Alice receives a random number of validity cards at in-person registration. She halves each
card, putting half of only one card into a secure box. She discards the remaining halves, and
remembers which was her valid number (she is advised to discard the half of her ‘valid’ card that
isn’t in the box).
Alice has no way to prove to a coercer that the  value she submits her vote with is valid.
Since she may have thrown away the correct card, the coercer can force her to vote using all
of the values she holds. However, the proofs that Alice receives back are intended for a fresh
keypair whichAlice generated (meaning she can generate such proofs herself, and a coercer cannot
determine this fact). As such, there is no way for an in-person observer to force Alice to vote
in any particular way, as she can fool that coercer into believing that votes on the bulletin board
represent re-encryptions of a vote she cast.
Property 3.1 (Invisible Absentee Coercion-Resistance). It should not be possible for a voter to show
if they have voted, even in the presence of a physical coercer We extend our deênition of Coercion
Resistance to include invisible absenteeism—that is, even in a remote voting system, as long as
Alice can vote once unobserved, a coercer physically standing behind her cannot tell if she has
successfully voted or not.
This property is satisêed by our system because of the nature of the proofs Alice receives
when she votes. She receives in return, over an anonymous channel, only a tuple of designated
veriêer re-encryption proofs, which only she can interpret. Alice can then observe the bulletin
board without an in-person observer knowing whether she has genuinely found her vote, or is
pretending to look for (xf; yf) pairs which she put into a DVRP generated by herself.
Property 4 (Receipt Freeness). The voter should be given no information which can be used to demonstrate
to a coercer how or if they have voted, after voting has occurredReceipt-freeness is strictly a sub-property
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of coercion resistance. The only proof sent to Alice of her vote is in the form of designated veriêer
re-encryption proofs, which can only be read by her. As a result, she cannot demonstrate to any
observer how she votes, so receives no receipt.
Property 5 (Individual Veriêability). A voter should be able to verify that their vote has been counted
correctly When Alice submits her vote (x; y) (over an anonymous channel), it is encrypted using a
random seed . If valid, the vote is re-encrypted using a random seed , giving (xf; yf), and it,
with a threshold signature of its hash, is posted to the bulletin board.
Alice receives back from the talliers a random number of designated veriêer proofs of re-encryption,
which prove, to a designated veriêer, how a re-encryption occurred. All of these DVRPs are valid
for votes that are on the bulletin board, and one of them is valid for Alice’s vote, if and only if the 
value she supplied with her vote was valid. The veriêer of the DVRP is Alice, using a key which
she freshly generated before voting. Since Alice can observe whether each DVRP is correct, she
can ascertain whether a DVRP which is correct for her represents a ballot which is on the bulletin
board.
Note that all of the (xf; yf) pairs Alice receives are listed on the bulletin board: only Alice can
determine if her vote is one of them. If not, she can contact the Judge, who will allow her to
vote again under supervision.
Property 6 (Universal Veriêability). Any observer should be able to verify that all votes have been counted
correctlyWe have from the protocol that every vote posted to the bulletin board is threshold-signed
by a quorum ofT. Hence, invalid votes are not posted to the bulletin board. The talliers announce
the product (X;Y) of all votes. As all votes are shown on the bulletin board, any observer is able
to calculate this product for themselves, and also to verify that any individual vote was authorised
by a quorum of talliers.
Property 7 (Fairness). No-one can gain any information about the tally until the end of the voting process
The phased structure of the protocol implies that it is fair. Observation of any single vote is not
possible at the talliers’ end, since a quorum of T have to agree to decrypt a vote. Similarly, the
product of all votes, leading to information on the full tally, will not be decrypted until a quorum
of T agree, which they will not until all votes are entered.
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Note that it is also impossible to break fairness from the voter’s end of the protocol: we have
from Properties 3, 4 and 5 that no information about the state of any vote can be gained by the
attacker, even after the election is complete (exempting the small probability of a tally representing
a 100% vote for one candidate).
Property 8 (Vote Privacy). Neither the authorities nor any other participant should be able to link any
ballot to the voter having cast it, unless the protocol to revoke anonymity has been invoked Alice casts her
vote in votetoken over an anonymous channel. Hence, as long as no identifying data is provided
with her vote, it is not possible to link Alice to her ballot.
As such, we now discuss the form of Alice’s ballot. When Alice registers to vote, her TPM
provides her with a pseudonym NR, with which to identify herself. Communications with R
are in the clear, meaning Alice’s machine can be identiêed. However, when she votes (i.e., uses
the DAA sign protocol), her TPM generates a completely diﬀerent pseudonym NT, which is then
proven to represent the same values Alice gained attestation on. Any further transactions with T
are signed with a fresh attestation identity key or another asymmetric key, generated by the TPM
and unlinkable to Alice. The talliers send Alice back Designated Veriêer Re-encryption Proofs,
and this is the end of their interaction with her. As long as we trust the anonymous channel to be
anonymous, they cannot link her to her ballot. We already have from the properties above that
no other observer can link Alice to her ballot, either.
In the vote2 version of the protocol, with revocable anonymity, whenever Alice’s identity is
transmitted to T, it is encrypted with the Judge’s public key as id = fidgJudge. This encryption is
done by R, whom we trust to operate correctly. Thus, unless the protocol to revoke anonymity
is invoked by the Judge, Alice’s anonymity is preserved.
Property 8.1 (Revocable Anonymity). It should be possible for an authorised entity (or collaboration
of entities, for us) to reveal the identity of any single voter by linking her vote to her We have from
Property 8 thatAlice’s privacy is maintained at all times by the protocol, unless the Judge authorised
revocation. In this case, a member of T contacts the Judge with appropriate evidence to justify
revocation. We must of course assume that the Judge only revokes anonymity under suitable
circumstances.
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Property 9 (Remote Voting). Voters should not be restricted by physical locationOur protocol permits
Alice to vote from any location with a computer that has a TPM, provided she has registered at
some point beforehand, and can vote once unobserved. Note that our protocol also prevents an
observer from knowing if Alice has voted successfully, even if the observer is physically watching
Alice.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the second of our electronic voting protocols, detailing a novel
solution which uses trusted computing to assure the security of a remote voting client. Again,
we achieve the optional availability of revocable anonymity, using the TPM to ensure that the
identity Alice when voting is indeed hers. We satisfy all of the standard properties required of
e-voting protocols.
An interesting side eﬀect of revocable anonymity in our protocols so far is that the traced voter
has no way of knowing she has been traced, and can thus not hold the authorities to account in
case of fraudulent deanonymisation. In the next chapter, we introduce a protocol which solves
this problem.
6 Making AnonymityAuditable*
Chapter Overview
A number of êelds in computer security consider the anonymity of protocol users to be of critical
importance: in digital cash and electronic commerce, it is important that rogue users should not
be able to trace the spender of a coin, or to link coins that user has spent with each other. In
anonymous fair exchange protocols, multiple parties exchange items with one another, whilst
wishing to remain anonymous (sometimes for obvious reasons). In electronic voting, the voter
must remain unlinkable to their vote.
However, designers of each of these classes of protocol must consider that there are sometimes
occasions when a user’s anonymity must be revoked — a coin might be maliciously double-spent,
or used for an illegal purchase; a party could renege on their promise as part of an exchange
protocol; a voter may attempt to vote twice, or may not be a legitimate voter at all. The point of
*This chapter is an extended version of work presented at the Fifth International Conference on Trust and Trusted
Computing (Smart and Ritter, 2012).
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this chapter is not to consider for what reason anonymity revocation is required, though: instead,
we suggest that, generally speaking, users whose anonymities are revoked should be made aware
of this fact. In this chapter, we present a solution to this problem, which is essentially a digitized
version of the “sealed envelope problem” discussed in Ables and Ryan (2010).
Let us consider the physical, paper abstraction of the problem. Alice lives in a country where
it must be possible to link her identity to her vote (though only authorised entities should be
able to make this distinction). When she collects her ballot paper, her identity is sealed inside
a tamper-evident envelope, and the serial number of her ballot paper is written on the outside.
The envelope is stored securely. Alice votes. Some time later, for whatever reason, someone
may wish to trace Alice’s ballot back to her. After the election, Alice may wish to see whether
her anonymity has been revoked or not. To do this, she merely requests to see the appropriate
envelope from the authorities (i.e., that with her ballot serial number on it), and veriêes that the
envelope is still sealed.
We can apply this abstraction to a number of other êelds, and it particularly makes sense
when considering payment for goods (we discuss this more in Section 6.4). However, digitising
the (auditable) sealed envelope is not at all trivial: it is intuitively not possible to simply give
the authorities an encrypted copy of Alice’s identity: if the key is provided with the ciphertext,
then Alice has no way to know whether it has been used. If the key is not provided, then the
authorities cannot do anything with the ciphertext anyway, without contacting Alice (who, as a
rogue user, may deliberately fail to provide information) (Ables and Ryan, 2010). As a result, we
must consider that some sort of trusted platform is required, in order for Alice to be convinced
that her anonymity has not been revoked. In this chapter, we detail a protocol which uses trusted
computing—speciêcally, the TPM—to assure Alice in this way.
Related Work
The work presented in this chapter is potentially relevant to a wide range of êelds where revocable
anonymity is important: digital cash, fair exchange, and electronic voting. We do not speciêcally
address any of these areas in this chapter, as the way in which they use the identity of the user is
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unimportant to us: it is the similarity in the need for the user’s anonymity that matters. Very little
existing work considers auditable revocable anonymity: as we discussed in Chapter 2, Kügler
and Vogt (2003) describe an electronic payment protocol in which the spender of a coin can
determine (within a êxed period) whether their anonymity is revoked or not. Although the
protocol is attractive, it requires knowledge a priori of who is to be traced—something which is
not possible in êelds such as electronic voting. More generally, Moran and Naor (2010) discuss
many high-level theoretical implementations of cryptographic “tamper-evident seals”, but do not
go into detail as to how these would be realised (and seemingly place a lot of trust in the entity
responsible for generating seals).
Ables and Ryan (2010) discuss several implementations of a “digital envelope” for the storage
of escrowed data using the TPM. Their second solution is appealing, and uses a third party with
monotonic counters. However, their solution allows only a single envelope at a time to be stored
(as the TPM only permits the usage of one monotonic counter at a time), and also would require
Alice herself to generate her identity (something which would not be appropriate for us).
The work of Sarmenta et al. (2006) on virtual monotonic counters using a TPM is crucial to
our work, as we use a new virtual monotonic counter for each anonymous user, allowing each
to track their own anonymity. We discussed virtual monotonic counters more in Section 3.2.3.
Motivation and Contribution
In this chapter, we introduce a new protocol, not tied to any speciêc class of user-anonymous
security protocols (electronic commerce, voting, et cetera), which uses the TPM to assure a user
of whether or not their identity has been revealed: a property we name non-repudiation of anonymity
revocation. Our motivation is clear: if we are to have protocols providing anonymity revocation,
then it must be possible for a user to determine when their anonymity is revoked. The reasoning
for this is twofold: not only does a user have the right to know when they have been identiêed
(generally, as a suspect in a crime), but the fact that anonymity revocation is traceable is also
beneêcial:
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…the detectability of inappropriate actions and accountability for origination suﬃces
to prevent misbehaviour from happening (Weber and Mühlhäuser, 2011, p. 5)
Though protocols exist in electronic commerce which permit this (Kügler and Vogt, 2003, for
example), the techniques used are not widely applicable, for reasons discussed above. We consider
preliminary discussions of “escrowed data” stored in a digital envelope which use monotonic counters
(Ables and Ryan, 2010), and discuss the use of virtual monotonic counters (Sarmenta et al., 2006) to
allow multiple tokens to be securely stored by a single entity.
6.1 Chapter Structure
Having already discussed trusted computing and the TPM in Section 2.4, and monotonic counters
in Section 3.2.3, in Section 6.2, we discuss our trust requirements for the protocol, which itself
is presented in Section 6.3. We address the applicability of the protocol to diﬀerent computer
security discourses in Section 6.4, and give a short discussion on the security of the protocol in
Section 6.5. Finally we conclude.
6.2 Trust Model
In this chapter, we make the following trust assumptions:
1. Alice and the identity provider idp—deêned below—trust the TPM in Alice’s machine, by
virtue of it attesting to its state (and therefore, the state of Alice’s machine)
2. All users trust idp, by virtue of it attesting to its state (and therefore, the state of idp’s
machine)
3. The judge is trusted to only authorise anonymity revocation where necessary
In a strict sense, it is not necessary for users to deliberately place trust in any TPM (whether it
is in the identity provider’s machine, or the user’s): both the user’s and the identity provider’s
TPMs have the ability to verify the correctness of the other’s TPM and host machine, where the
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Figure 6.1 Our Revocation Audit Protocol.
ReadCertificate
ReadCertificate
signidp({id}s)
(pkI , skI ) :=
TPM LoadKey2(kI , . . .)
id := {id}pkI
Nonce nc
CreateCounter(nc)
ReadCounter(CounterID,n′a)
IncrementCounter(CounterID,nS)
signJudge(id, CounterID, nS)
Alice ID Provider (idp) Service Provider (s)
Encrypted Transport Session
IDP-PCR INFO:=TPM Quote(. . . ,ca,. . . )
ALICE-PCR INFO:=TPM Quote(. . . ,ci,. . . )
(pkTA, skTA) :=
TPM CreateWrapKey(binding,IDP-PCR INFO,kI,...)
ReadCounter(CounterID,na)
TPM UnSeal(id, kI )
TPM LoadKey2(kTA, . . .)
TPM UnSeal(idm, kTA)
{m,CounterID,id, signidp(hash(id||CounterID))}s
{id, CreateCertificate, signidp(hash(id||CounterID))}pkTA
idm =
TPM CreateWrapKey(binding,ALICE-PCR INFO,kTA,...)
TPM itself is assumed to be a tamper-resistant hardware module. Instead, therefore, any trust we
place must be in the manufacturer of the TPM, to construct such a device according to its correct
speciêcation.
6.3 Protocol
We begin by explaining our protocol from a high level, and then go into more implementation
speciêc detail. Note that we assume the availability of standard public key cryptographic tech-
niques, hashing and signature protocols. Our scenario is as follows. Alice wishes to engage in a
user-anonymous protocol with a service provider, s: Alice normally remains anonymous, but s has
some interest in revoking her anonymity under certain circumstances (s can obtain a signed re-
quest for the user’s identity from a judge). Alicewould like to knowwhether or not her anonymity
has been revoked at some point after her interaction with s is complete.
In order to present a solution, we introduce a third party, the identity provider, idp. The
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identity provider runs trusted hardware, and attests to the state of his machine in an authenti-
cated encrypted transport session with Alice’s TPM. Once Alice is assured that she can trust idp’s
machine, and idp is likewise assured of the trustworthiness of Alice’s machine, idp generates a
virtual monotonic counter speciêcally for Alice’s identity, using a nonce sent by Alice. He then
encrypts Alice’s identity using a key generated by Alice’s TPM. This is concatenated with a cer-
tiêcate produced by the creation of the counter, hashed, and signed. The signature, certiêcate
and encrypted ID—which we will refer to as a pseudonym—are sent to Alice, encrypted with a
binding wrap public key to which only her TPM has the private counterpart.
Alice now reads the counter generated for her. She can then send whatever message is neces-
sary to s, along with the particulars of the counter relating to her ID, and idp’s signature thereof.
The service provider is able to verify the validity of the signed hash on Alice’s identity, and can
store it for further use.
Should s request to view Alice’s identity, he contacts idp with a signature generated by a
judge, on the pseudonym and particulars of the certiêcate (the details originally sent to him).
The protocol dictates that idp êrst increments the virtual monotonic counter associated with the
certiêcate received, and can then load the appropriate key, and decrypt Alice’s identity. Alice is
later able to request the value of her monotonic counter once again, allowing her to determine
whether or not her anonymity was revoked.
6.3.1 Implementation Steps
We now present a more detailed implementation. A diagram for the protocol is give in Figure
4.2. The protocol can be split into two stages: in the êrst, Alice registers her identity with idp,
and receives a pointer to a virtual monotonic counter back. In the second, she interacts with s,
who may wish to obtain her identity. She is then able to audit this process.
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6.3.1.1 Stage 1
Alice begins with her TPM and the TPM of the identity provider, idp, engaging in an encrypted
transport session1. She invents a nonce, ca, and challenges idp’s TPM to reveal the state of a number
of its platform conêguration registers (PCRs—a set of protected memory registers inside the TPM,
which contain cryptographic hashes of measurements based on the current state of the host system;
see Section 2.4), using the TPM_Quote command (with ca being used for freshness). Alice can use
this information to determine if the TPM is in a suitable state (i.e., if its host machine is running
the correct software). The identity provider’s TPM does the same with Alice’s TPM, using a
diﬀerent nonce ci. In this manner, both platforms are assured of the trustworthiness of the other.
Alice proceeds to have idp’s TPM generate a fresh binding RSA keypair kI = (pkI; skI) using
the TPM_CreateWrapKey command, binding the key to the PCR information she acquired.
This ensures that only a TPM in the same state as when the TPM_Quote command was executed
is able to open anything sealed with pkI. Similarly, idp’s TPM has Alice’s TPM generate a binding
wrap keypair kTA = (pkTA; skTA), where the private key is accessible only to Alice’s TPM.
Next, idp receives a nonce nc from Alice. He then creates a virtual monotonic counter (Sarmenta
et al., 2006), which he ‘ties’ to Alice’s identity, using the CreateNewCounter command with nc.
This returns a CreateCertiﬁcate, detailing the ID number of the counter, CounterID, and the
nonce used to create it. idp proceeds to produce a pseudonym id = fidgpkI for Alice, an encryption
of her identity (which we assume it knows) using the TPM_Seal command and the binding wrap
key pkI. id and the ID of the counter, CounterID, are concatenated and hashed. The signed hash,
pseudonym id and the aforementioned CreateCertiﬁcate are sent to Alice, encrypted with the
binding wrap key pkTA generated for her TPM. The ID provider stores CounterID and id locally.
Alice has her TPM decrypt the message she receives, and then veriêes the hash. Note that only
Alice’s TPM, in the correct state, can decrypt the message sent to her.
Finally, Alice generates a fresh nonce na, and contacts idp to request the value of the counter, via
1We note that idp could also undergo direct anonymous attestation (Brickell et al., 2004) with Alice to attest to the
state of his machine. However, this is unnecessary for us, as neither Alice nor idp need to (or could) be anonymous
at this stage.
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the ReadCounter(CounterID, Nonce) command. She receives back a ReadCertiﬁcate containing
the counter’s value, the CounterID and the nonce she sent.
6.3.1.2 Stage 2
The second stage, which can happen at any time in future, is where Alice communicates with
whichever service provider she chooses (note that she may choose to use the same id token with
multiple service providers, or may generate a new token for each—it would obviously be sensible
to do the latter, to prevent linkability between service providers). Where Alice’s message (which
might be a tuple containing her vote, or a coin, or some exchangeable object) is represented by
m, she sends the tuple
fm;CounterID; id; signidp(hash(idjjCounterID))gs
to s. Note that the whole message is encrypted with the public key of the service provider,
preventing eavesdropping. The message m is further processed (how is outside of the scope of this
chapter). The signed hash is examined to conêrm that it is indeed a valid signature, by idp, on
the pseudonym and Counter ID provided. The service provider can then store hCounterID; idi
for later use.
Now, Alice can, at any point, check the value of her virtual monotonic counter. The service
provider may wish to discover her identity, and so will seek a signed request from a judge, gen-
erating a nonce nS. He sends this request, signJudge(id; nS;CounterID), to idp. Note that in order
to decrypt Alice’s pseudonym, idp must use the key kI—bound to the correct state of his TPM’s
PCRs—whichAlice selected. This means that he needs to be in the correct state. He begins by in-
crementing Alice’s virtual monotonic counter using the command IncrementCounter(CounterID,
nS), and then loads the appropriate key kI using the TPM_LoadKey2 command. He can then de-
crypt Alice’s identity using TPM_UnBind. Finally, idp returns id, encrypted for s. Again, what s
does with Alice’s identity is outside of the scope of this chapter.
At any later time, Alice can check the virtual monotonic counter value, by contacting idp and
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executing the ReadCounter command with a fresh nonce n0a. If idp was correctly following the
protocol (which, using a veriêed TPM, he must have been), Alice will know if her identity has
been revealed by whether the value of the counter has increased.
A key point of the protocol is that the identity provider is automatically trusted to follow it,
as a consequence of the encrypted transport session in Stage 1. When Alice quotes the PCRs
of the identity provider’s TPM, she makes it generate a key bound to the correct machine state
that it is currently in (presumably, Alice would terminate any session where an erroneous result
of TPM_Quote was reported). Even if idp were to become corrupted after the encrypted trans-
port session, this corruption would alter its TPM’s PCRs, protecting Alice’s identity from rogue
decryption.
6.4 Applicability
In this section, we discuss some use cases for the protocol: as mentioned earlier, we believe it to
have a number of areas of applicability. Here we focus on digital cash and electronic voting, two
classes of protocol where anonymity is critical.
6.4.1 When Does Alice Request a Pseudonym?
We mentioned in Section 6.3.1.2 that Alice is free to have idp generate an unlimited number
of pseudonyms for her, or just one, depending on her preference. Common sense dictates that,
should Alice wish the services she interacts with to be unable to link her transactions together, she
should generate a fresh pseudonym for each service she uses. For services which a user uses only
once (say, participating in an election), this solution is suﬃcient. For those which she uses multiple
times—such as spending multiple coins in a digital cash system—we consider whether a solution
requiring Alice to contact idp multiple times for diﬀerent pseudonyms is suitable. Digital cash
protocols such as (Jakobsson and Yung, 1996) typically secure a spender’s identity by encrypting it
with a key to which only one, trusted, entity has access. When coins are withdrawn, the identities
of those coins are stored with the encrypted ID of their owners in a database. Consequently, as
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in Jakobsson and Yung (1996), though the digital coin itself does not contain Alice’s identity, it
contains pointers which which her identity can be looked up in the database.
We note that, in Jakobsson and Yung (1996), whenever Alice withdraws a coin, she encrypts
her identity using fresh symmetric keys for two separate parties: the Bank and the Ombudsman,
both of whom have to cooperate to later retrieve her anonymity. In fact, our protocol êts very well
into this model. Alice still selects two fresh symmetric keys, but now encrypts not her plaintext
ID, but the tuple
hCounterID; id; signidp(hash(idjjCounterID))i;
obtained from idp. As idp is trusted to legitimately produce signatures on identities, the Bank and
Ombudsman can trust the encrypted ID to be legitimate, and issue the coin as before. Should
revocation be required, the Bank now simply contacts idp, allowing Alice to determine that this
has occurred.
The advantage here is that Alice’s withdrawn coins remain unlinkable—her ID is not encoded
into them, and every instance of her ID stored by the Bank is not only encrypted with the key idp
generated for it, but also with session keys generated by Alice. We note, of course, that Jakobsson
and Yung (1996) is now quite dated. However, it represents a class of digital cash protocol in
which the spender’s identity is stored encrypted in a database, and is used here for its simplicity.
A range of other digital cash systems could use our protocol in the same way (Camenisch et al.,
1997; Chen et al., 2011; Tan, 2011; Wang and Lu, 2008), or by simply storing the pseudonym in
the coin (Fan and Liang, 2008; Fuchsbauer et al., 2009; Hou and Tan, 2005; Pointcheval, 2000).
6.4.2 Digital Cash Examples
If we take any digital cash protocol where the identity of the coin spender is in someway encrypted
(whether stored on a remote server (Jakobsson and Yung, 1996) or encoded into the coin itself
(Pointcheval, 2000)), we can envisage a situation in which a user either spends a digital coin
twice, or participates in an illegal transaction. An authority will have some interest in this, and
thus requests that the Bank trace the coins spent by the user, in order to identify her.
6.4. Applicability 155
In the case of the protocols listed above, the identity of the user is simply decrypted (albeit by
two separate authorities in the êrst case). The user has no way to know that she was traced, until
she is apprehended! Now, we modify each protocol such that:
• in the case of protocols where the spender ID is encoded onto the coin, the coins instead
contain the user’s identity—encrypted using the wrap key made for idp—and the Coun-
terID, with the signed hash of both;
• in the case of a database storing the spender ID, with a lookup value in each key, we proceed
as discussed above, with the spender providing the idp-encrypted ID token which is then
stored in the database.
This done, the coin spender knows that each coin can only be linked back to her with the coop-
eration of idp, who (since he is following the protocol) must increment the appropriate counter,
allowing the spender to know if she is identiêed. Note that a protocol providing revocation au-
ditability already exists (Kügler and Vogt, 2003), but requires knowledge a priori of who is to be
traced, making the protocol unsuitable for other applications.
6.4.3 Electronic Voting Example
Our work on revocable anonymity in electronic voting, described in Chapters 4 and 5, stores the
voter’s identity in an encrypted manner in the ballot. If instead we store the encrypted ID, with
the CounterID and signed hash of both, we achieve the same property as above: if the authorities
need to trace a voter, they contact the identity provider. If a voter is traced, they know that they
will be able to determine this was the case, because the identity provider will have incremented
their virtual monotonic counter.
An interesting problem is how to deal with coercion resistance: if Alice receives an encrypted
identity from idp, and then sends it to a vote tallier who places it on the bulletin board unchanged,
then a coercer can see that Alice has voted (this is undesirable if we wish to prevent forced-
abstention attacks). In protocol vote2, permitting revocable anonymity, revocation is eﬀected by
156 Chapter 6. Making Anonymity Auditable
having Alice send the tuple hid = fidgJudge; SignR(id)i to the talliers. The ciphertext id is produced
by the registrar, R, during registration.
This is followed by an encrypted transport session between the voter’s TPM and a Tallier, in
which a sealing wrap key used to encrypt designated veriêer proofs of re-encryption is produced.
Our change to the protocol is again quite small. In the registration phase, once the “join” stage
of the protocol is complete, Alice sends her idp-encrypted id to R, who performs an ElGamal
encryption of it using the Judge’s public key. Before the talliers post this ciphertext to the bulletin
board, it is randomly re-encrypted. Should revocation be required, the co-operation of both the
Judge and idp is required, and Alice will again be able to see that this has occurred.
6.5 Analysis
In this section we brieëy discuss the security properties of the protocol. The main property that
we achieve is that Alice is always able to determine whether her anonymity is revoked or not
(non-repudiation of anonymity revocation). This property is satisêed as a result of the knowledge
that, having attested to the state of his TPM (and hence, the software being run on the host), idp
will either:
• act according to the protocol speciêcation, or
• be unable to decrypt Alice’s identity.
Our reasoning is as follows. If the Identity Provider adheres to the speciêcation, he generates a
counter for Alice’s identity using a nonce she supplies. He encrypts her identity using a keypair
which can only be used again by a TPM in the same state which Alice originally accepted.
The information that idp generates to send to Alicemust be correct, otherwise idp is deviating
from the protocol. It follows that, when s requests Alice’s anonymity to be revoked, idp must êrst
increment the associated counter. If idp does deviate from the protocol, he will not be able to use
the same key kI later on to decrypt Alice’s identity, as that key is bound to his original TPM state
(which would change if diﬀerent, or malicious, software were used).
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Thus, the most a rogue idp could achieve is suggesting Alice’s anonymity has been revoked
when it has not (i.e., tampering with the counter), opening up idp to further questioning (it is
hence not in the identity provider’s interest to lie to Alice in this way). Since the counter must
always be incremented before Alice’s identity is decrypted, Alice will always know when she has
been identiêed, by querying the counter.
We next consider Alice’s interaction with s. In her communication with s, Alice provides her
pseudonym and the counter ID tied to it, together with a signed hash of these values (as originally
provided to her by idp). This convinces s that the identity provided is genuine. This leads us to
the issue of eavesdropping attacks, allowing a user to illegitimately obtain the pseudonym of
another user, and thus ‘frame’ an innocent victim for a crime. Note that without identifying
Alice immediately, s cannot be further convinced that the pseudonym is indeed hers. However,
our protocol prevents this problem from arising: in the message idm sent from idp to Alice, Alice’s
pseudonym and counter information are encrypted using a binding wrap key, meaning that only
her TPM can obtain these values. The only other message where these two values are together
is in Alice’s communication with s, and here, the entire message is encrypted for s.
The message containing Alice’s actual identity is signed by idp before being sent back to s.
Hence, providing s trusts idp, he will always obtain Alice’s legitimate identity by following the
protocol. We might consider that s does not trust idp, in which case we could request that s and
idp also undergo some sort of attestation, like that between Alice and idp. In the case of the digital
cash example presented earlier, we could require that the Bank and Ombudsman each force idp
to attest to its state.
6.5.1 Trustworthiness of the Service Provider
Note that, as we have already mentioned, we do not consider how s behaves, as it is outside of the
scope of this protocol. However, we now discuss a possible course of action to prevent a rogue s
replaying the counter and pseudonym values sent to him by an honest user. In order to mitigate
this issue, we need to force the pseudonym’s actual owner to prove her ownership. We therefore
158 Chapter 6. Making Anonymity Auditable
alter some of the messages in the protocol (numbered according to Figure 4.2, where messages
10a–d come between messages 10 and 11):
7. idp!Alice: fid;CreateCertificate; signidp(hash(id k hash(CounterID)))gpkTA
8. Alice!idp: fReadCounter(CounterID; na)gpkI
9. idp!Alice: fReadCertificategpkTA
10. Alice!s: fm; id; hash(CounterID); signidp(id k hash(CounterID))gs
10a. s!Alice: cctr
10b. Alice!s: hash(CounterID k cctr)
10c. s!idp: id; cctr
10d. idp!s: hash(CounterID k cctr)
11. s!idp: signJudge(id; nS)
These changes are appropriate if we wish to prevent a rogue s from gaining an hid;CounterIDi
pair with which to frame another user. We begin by altering what idp sends to Alice, such that
the signed hash now itself contains a hash of CounterID. Both the request and result of reading
the counter are encrypted for idp’s and Alice’s TPM respectively.
The messages from 10 onwards are the most important. Rather than sending her counter’s
ID in the clear for s, Alice sends a hash of it, which êts in with the signed hash provided by idp.
s now returns a challenge cctr, which Alice hashes with CounterID and returns. In 10c and 10d,
s sends the pair hid; cctri to idp, who looks up id and returns a hash of its associated CounterID
concatenated with the challenge. This allows s to ensure that Alice really is the owner of the
pseudonym and counter ID she provided. No further changes are necessary, as this prevents s
from stealing Alice’s pseudonym and counter ID: s would be unable to generate message 10b as
he never sees CounterID in the clear. Note that consequently, message 11 also needs to change.
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In this section, we have discussed the security properties of our work. Note that changes
to mitigate against a corrupt service provider are only appropriate where untrustworthy service
providers are a risk—hence we do not include these changes in the main protocol.
6.6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we have presented work on a protocol which allows users of a protocol providing
revocable anonymity to audit whether or not their anonymity is revoked. We have shown how
virtual monotonic counters can be used on an authenticated host to track anonymity revocation,
for use with any other class of security protocol requiring revocable anonymity. Further, we
addressed how to mitigate the actions of a corrupt service provider. This work makes signiêcant
steps in auditable anonymity revocation, a êeld which has not been considered in detail before.
There are factors which we would like to consider in future work. Some of those are mo-
tivated by the issues Sarmenta et al. discuss regarding log-based virtual monotonic counters in
Sarmenta et al. (2006). The counters are non-deterministic, being based on the single counter in
use by the TPM in any one power cycle. This means that counter increment values are unpre-
dictable—not a problem for our application, but potentially a cause of high overhead. Indeed,
the ReadCertiﬁcate for a counter would include “the log of all increments of all counters…since
the last increment”. The size of such a certiêcate could be substantial. Power failures mid-cycle
on idp could also cause the counters to become untrustworthy.
These issues are mitigated by the idea ofMerkle hash tree-based counters (Sarmenta et al., 2006,
pp. 34–6) which would require changes to the TPM’s API. It is for this reason that we did not
adopt this solution, but would instead look to it for future work. We would also like to consider
a formal analysis of the security properties of the protocol.
We feel the protocol we have presented has wide-ranging applicability to a number of user-
anonymous protocols—particularly those in digital cash and electronic voting—allowing all users
subject to revocable anonymity to be assured of whether or not they can be identiêed. In the
next chapter, we formalise a number of the requirements set out in Chapter 2 using the applied
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pi calculus and a modelling tool based upon it, ProVerif, in order to prove the security of one of
our protocols.
7 Formalisation of
Security Properties
Chapter Overview
In this chapter, we introduce the manner in which we prove the security properties of one of our
protocols. We model our protocol using the automated reasoning tool ProVerif (Blanchet, 2001;
Blanchet et al., 2005), a tool capable of proving reachability properties, correspondence assertions
and observational equivalences.
ProVerif takes as input protocol models deêned in the applied pi calculus (Abadi and Fournet,
2001), a language used to model concurrent systems, built explicitly for modelling cryptographic
protocols. We begin this chapter with a summary of our justiêcations for selecting ProVerif to
formalise our work. In Section 7.3, we discuss the applied pi calculus, and then move onto a
thorough discussion of ProVerif in 7.4. We then discuss how we have used ProVerif to formalise
the work discussed in Chapter 4, and prove a number of important security properties.
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7.1 Why Formal Modelling?
In this chapter, we explore our use of the applied pi calculus to formalise our requirements, and
prove the security of our work. Our decision to use formal modelling stems from the belief
that automated proofs more eﬀectively guarantee that security properties are satisêed, without
the time-consuming process of interactive theorem-proving or alternative mathematical proofs
(which frequently lead to human error, introducing ëaws). Using a standard mathematical proof,
it is often diﬃcult to prove a requirement in all possible situations, and is even more diﬃcult to
‘prove’ that proof to an observer. Consequently, in our work we write a formal model for our
protocol, and then perform various tests upon it. This leaves us with two problems:
1. Writing a model that is close enough to the protocol being veriêed that important features
of it will not be missed, and
2. Formalising certain requirements is sometimes diﬃcult, if not impossible. This is a separate
problem from the êrst: we begin by writing a model that is suﬃciently close to the protocol
to capture its properties, disregarding any requirements we have. Only then do we consider
the speciêcation of the properties we are trying to prove, which may lead to a reformulation
of the model.
7.2 Why Applied Pi?
In this chapter, we use the applied pi calculus, and automated reasoning tool ProVerif, to show
that several properties are satisêed by the protocol in Chapter 4. We considered other languages:
CSP (Hoare, 1978) and CCS (Milner, 1989) to name two.
The π-calculus (Milner et al., 1992), an ancestor of the applied-pi calculus, added the abil-
ity to describe concurrent, changeable processes. Though powerful, the π-calculus alone was
not suitable for the properties being proved in our work, not least because it only permits the
transmission of channel names between processes. We might have chosen the spi-calculus (Abadi
and Gordon, 1999), which extended the π-calculus by providing a formal notation for reasoning
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about cryptographic protocols, giving primitives for simple cryptographic processes. The lim-
ited set of cryptographic primitives provided by the spi-calculus (for symmetric and asymmetric
encryption) meant that extensive work was required for each inclusion of new cryptographic op-
erations, however. Soon after, the spi-calculus was further extended into the applied-pi calculus,
which parameterised the spi-calculus using a signature and equation system for data structures,
allowing value passing and providing an equational theory over terms and functions. The calcu-
lus allows for the modelling of observational equivalence, reachability and correspondence-style
properties.
Our choice of calculus partially stems from the considerable amount of existing work in
formal analysis of electronic voting systems using the applied pi calculus (Kremer and Ryan,
2005; Delaune et al., 2006; Backes et al., 2008; Kremer et al., 2010). This has allowed us to draw
upon existing proof techniques. The calculus also has a number of automated reasoning tools
based upon it, including our choice, ProVerif, which allows not only for the proof of standard
reachability properties, but also (sometimes) for the proof of biprocess observational equivalence.
7.3 The Applied Pi Calculus
We begin with a discussion of the applied pi calculus, on which it is possible to base ProVerif ’s
input. The calculus is built upon the earlier pi calculus, adding functions and equations, and being
designed explicitly for the study of security protocols. Note that this section is adapted from the
work of Abadi and Fournet (2001).
7.3.1 Syntax and Semantics
The calculus deênes a signature  as a ênite set of function symbols, each with an arity (where a
function symbol with zero arity is a constant). Given the signature, and inênite set of names and
variables, terms are deêned by the grammar
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L;M;N;T;U;V ::= Terms
a; b; c; : : : ; k; : : : ;m; n; : : : ; s Name
x; y; z Variable
f(M1; : : : ;Ml) Function application
The symbol f represents the functions of , and l is hence the arity of f.
A term is denoted as ground when it does not have free variables, and tuples u1; : : : ; ul and
M1; : : : ;Ml are abbreviated to ~u; ~M, accordingly.
The grammar for processes is given next, where c is a channel name:
P;Q;R ::= Plain Processes
0 Null process
P j Q Parallel Composition
!P Replication
n:P Name restriction
if M = N then P else Q Conditional
c(x):P Message input on channel c
chNi:P Message output on channel c
The process 0 does nothing; PjQ represents process P running simultaneously withQ; !P behaves
as an inênite number of Ps running in parallel (cf. Pj!P). The new construct n:P makes a new,
private name n, and then behaves as P. Also of note are c(x):P and chNi:P, which represent
the input and output of a message x and a term N, respectively, on channel c, followed by the
execution of P. This leads to a further extension of the calculus to allow for active substitutions:
A;B;C ::= Extended Processes
P Plain process
A j B Parallel Composition (as above)
n:A Name restriction
x:A Variable restriction
fM=xg Active substitution
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fM=xg represents the substitution replacing the variable x with term M, thus meaning that the
process x:(fM=xgjP) is exactly equivalent to let x = M in P.
The authors note that, as usual, names and variables have scope, delimited by restrictions
and inputs. fv(A); bv(A) represent the free (resp. bound) variables of extended process A, and
fn(A); bn(A) represent free (resp. bound) names. A process is closed when every variable is either
bound or deêned by an active substitution.
The authors deêne a frame as an extended process built up from 0 and active substitutions
fM=xg by parallel composition and restriction. The domain of a frame, dom(') (where ';  rep-
resent frames), is the set of variables exported by that frame (variables x for which the frame
contains a substitution not under restriction on x). In order to map an extended process A to a
frame  (A), we replace every plain process in A with 0, giving an approximation of the static
information exposed to the attacker.
7.3.2 Operational Semantics
We discussed above the manner in which a signature is constructed. Abadi and Fournet progress
to give that signature an equational theory, i.e. an equivalence relation on terms, closed under
substitutions of terms for variables. A context is deêned as an expression with a hole, and an
evaluation context as a context whose whole is not under replication, a conditional expression, an
input or an output. A context C[_] closes A when C[A] is closed.
We begin with structural equivalence (), the smallest equivalence relation on extended pro-
cesses, such that
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P-0 A  A j 0
P-A A j (B jC)  (A jB) jC
P-C A jB  B jA
R !P  P j !P
N-0 n:0  0
N-C u:v:A  v:u:A
N-P A j u:B  u:(A jB) when u 62 fv(A) [ fn(A)
A x:fM=xg  0
S fM=xg jA  fM=xg jAfM=xg
R fM=xg  fN=xg when  ` M = N
The authors further note that structural equivalence allows every closed extended process A to
be rewritten as a substitution and a closed plain process with restricted names: A  ~n:f ~M=~xg jP,
where P; ~M have no free variables, and ~n are part of the free names of ~M.
Next, internal reduction (!) is the smallest relation on extended processes closed by structural
equivalence such that
C ahxi:P j a(x):Q ! P jQ
T if M = M then P else Q ! P
E if M = N then P else Q ! Q for any ground M;N
such that  6` M = N
7.3.3 Examples
In this section, we detail how the calculus might be used to model a number of diﬀerent primitives.
We begin with the binary function symbol pair, for example, which represents a pair of values
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(cf. pair(M;N)), abbreviated to (M;N), and leading to unary symbols
fst((x; y)) = x
snd((x; y)) = y
Wemight also represent a one-way hash function, h, where the fact that h(M) = h(N) implies that
 ` M = N, since the function is collision free. Other primitives include symmetric encryption,
viz.
dec(enc(x; y); y) = x
given a symmetric key y and message x, and asymmetric, probabilistic encryption, requiring the
introduction of two new unary primitives, to obtain the public and private counterparts of a key:
pdec(penc(x; pk(y); z); sk(y)) = x
given a message x, key y and random seed z (we note that omitting the z leads to deterministic
asymmetric encryption). Abadi and Fournet introduce an example of asymmetric encryption:
s:(ahpk(s)i j b(x):chdec(x; sk(s))i)
We can read this as a fresh seed s being generated, and the public key from it being broadcast on
(the public channel) a. The second part of the process reads a value x on channel b, and outputs its
decryption using the secret key part of s. We ênally brieëy mention the binary function symbol
sign, ternary symbol check and constant ok:
check(x; sign(x; sk(y)); pk(y)) = ok
Of course, one is free to add function symbols to the language, as appropriate.
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7.3.4 Proof Techniques
The calculus enables a number of techniques to prove the equivalence (speciêcally, observational
equivalence) of two processes. Two processes are observationally equivalent when they cannot be
distinguished by any context. Thus, if we envisage the context as the attacker’s view, we may
state that various security properties can be claimed as a result of the observational equivalence of
two processes. We begin with the authors’ deênition of observational equivalence. Observational
equivalence () is the largest symmetric relation R between closed extended processes with the
same domain, such that ARB implies
1. if A can emit a message on channel a (written A + a), then B + a
2. if A! A0 then B! B0 and A0RB0
3. C[A]RC[B] for all closing evaluation contexts C[_]
(Abadi and Fournet, 2001, p. 108)
Static equivalence (s) is the notion that two substitutions may be seen as equivalent when they
behave equivalently when applied to terms. Static equivalence can be seen as representing the
initial knowledge of the attacker.
In order to discuss processes which interact with their environment (cf. via input and output),
the authors also introduce a labeled operational semantics:
I a(x):P a(M)  ! PfM=xg
O-A ahui:P ahui  ! P
O-A
A ahui  ! A0 u 6= a
u:A u:ahui   ! A0
S
A  ! A0 u not in 
u:A  ! u:A0
P
A  ! A0 bv() \ fv(B) = bn() \ fn(B) = ;
A jB  ! A0 jB
S
A  B B  ! B0 B0  A0
A  ! A0
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These semantics allow us to construct fairly complex models, such as the one in Figure 7.1,
which represents a simple encryption and decryption. In the example, knowledge of k released
to the attacker by the operation ahki is suﬃcient to compute M from its encryption.
Figure 7.1 A simple example of labelled transitions in the Applied Pi Calculus (Abadi and Four-
net, 2001, p. 109)
k:ahenc(M; k)i:ahki:a(z):if z = M then choops!i x:ahxi    ! k:(fenc(M;k)=xg j ahki:a(z):if z = M then choops!i)
y:ahyi    ! k:(fenc(M;k)=xg j fk=yg j a(z):if z = M then choops!i)
a(dec(x;y))      ! k:(fenc(M;k)=xg j fk=yg j if dec(x; y) = M then choops!i)
 ! k:(fenc(M;k)=xg j fk=yg) j choops!i
Given the labeled semantics, the authors deêne labeled bisimilarity (l) as the largest symmetric
relation R on closed extended processes such that ARB implies
1. A s B
2. if A! A0, then B! B0 and A0RB0
3. if A  ! A0, fv() is a subset of the domain of A and bn()\ fn(B) = ; then B!  !! B0
and A0RB0
The authors go on to prove that labeled bisimilarity and observational equivalence are the same
(=l): the reader is directed to Abadi and Fournet (2001) for further details. This is impor-
tant because we use labeled bisimilarity in order to prove observational equivalence of biprocesses.
Attempting to prove observational equivalence directly is challenging as one needs a quantiêca-
tion over all contexts. This is not the case for labeled bisimilarity, making proofs of the labeled
bisimilarity of biprocesses far simpler.
We can use the calculus to consider the eﬀect of (and role of) the intruder in any security
protocol. For example, consider an election process in which voter vi casts a certain vote a, and
vj 6=i votes b. If that process were to be observationally equivalent to one in which vi votes b and
vj votes a, we could reason that the attacker could not determine how any voter voted, thus
demonstrating voter privacy.
A limitation of using any hand-written calculus is that it is subject to almost inevitable human
error, and it is often laborious to prove any property. For this reason, we adopt the ProVerif
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tool, whose input can be in the form of the (typed) applied pi calculus, to automatically verify a
number of equivalences and reachability assertions.
7.4 Using Applied Pi with ProVerif
ProVerif (Blanchet, 2001) is an automated reasoning tool, capable of proving reachability prop-
erties, correspondence assertions and observational equivalences. It takes as input a model of a
protocol, written in the applied pi calculus, and translates this input into horn clauses. When
translating a protocol into ProVerif source, one must of course be careful to ensure that the pro-
tocol is suﬃciently captured, whilst considering the limitations of the tool (for example, neither
it nor the underlying calculus can be used to model random numbers, repetition, et cetera). A
further diﬃculty is modelling the requirements which one wishes to prove, both in the calculus
and in ProVerif itself.
For the remainder of this chapter, we formally prove the security of our êrst protocol (dis-
cussed in Chapter 4). We have adopted the work of Kremer et al. (2010) in proving our protocol
to be individually and universally veriêable: these properties are modelled in terms of events and
proof of reachability properties, notions that have always been present in ProVerif.
Soundness properties (viz. eligibility, uniqueness, and inalterability) are modelled by corre-
spondence assertions in the work of Backes et al. (2008), which we adopt to prove not only those
requirements, but also coercion-resistance—and thence receipt-freeness and vote privacy—which
are modelled in terms of observational equivalences.
7.4.1 Proving Reachability Properties in ProVerif
A simple example of a reachability query in (typed) ProVerif is given in Figure 7.2, for a toy
protocol.
In the example, we create a channel comm, readable by all observers, and a channel privatecomm,
readable only by those given explicit access to it. The channel is excluded from the adversary’s
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Figure 7.2 Reachability in ProVerif
(* simple reachability example *)
free comm:channel:
free privatecomm:channel [private]:
free mess:bitstring [private]:
free privatemess:bitstring [private]:
query attacker(mess):
query attacker(privatemess):
process
out(comm;mess);
out(privatecomm; privatemess)
knowledge. We create two free names mess and privatemess, both excluded from the adversary’s
knowledge initially.
In the protocol itself (everything below process), we output the message comm onmess (resp.
privatecomm on privatemess), and then above, query whether the adversary can derive either of
mess or privatemess. As expected, when ProVerif analyses the protocol, it determines that mess
can be derived by the adversary, but privatemess cannot.
7.4.2 Proving Correspondence Assertions
If we modify the example given above, we can produce a fairly simple correspondence assertion,
as shown in Figure 7.3:
Most of the script is unchanged. However, we now read back in the message which we output
on comm. If that message is privatemess (it is not), we execute the eventmess_received, followed
by second_event. Otherwise, we just execute the event second_event. Above the process, we
have written
query event(mess_received()) =) event(second_event()):
This query analyses whether there is any execution of mess_received which does not occur after
second_event: it states that our assertion is that this is not the case: mess_received cannot be
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Figure 7.3 Correspondence Assertions in ProVerif
(* simple correspondence assertion *)
free comm:channel:
free privatecomm:channel [private]:
free mess:bitstring [private]:
free privatemess:bitstring [private]:
event mess_received():
event second_event():
query event(mess_received()) =) event(second_event()):
process
out(comm;mess);
out(privatecomm; privatemess);
in(comm; x:bitstring);
if x = privatemess then
event mess_received();
event second_event()
else
event second_event()
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witnessed without having witnessed second_event êrst. ProVerif correctly determines that this
assertion is correct. In fact, mess_received is unreachable: this can be determined separately with
the query query event(mess_received()).
7.4.3 Observational Equivalences
We may be able to reason about properties that cannot be expressed as reachability properties or
correspondence assertions using observational equivalences, where two processes P and Q have
the same structure, and diﬀer only in the choice of terms. For example, in order to test whether
vote privacy is satisêed in a voting protocol, we would test whether a process in which voter v1
votes for candidate a and v2 votes for b is observationally equivalent to one in which v1 votes for
b and v2 for a.
The test for observational equivalence is denoted by the choice operator, as demonstrated in
Figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4 A non-observationally equivalent biprocess
(* simple observational equivalence *)
free comm:channel:
free vote_a; vote_b:bitstring:
process
out(comm; choice[vote_a; vote_b])
The script above models a simple biprocess in which on one side, vote_a is output, and on
the other, vote_b is output. Of course, this biprocess does not satisfy observational equivalence, as
the attacker can diﬀerentiate between the two names. If we (probabilistically) encrypt the vote,
by introducing functions encrypt and decrypt, and a reduction rule for them, then observational
equivalence is satisêed, as shown in Figure 7.5.
It should be noted that ProVerif ’s ability to prove observational equivalences is rather limited,
in that it can only prove that a biprocess exhibits observational equivalences. This often means
that certain models have to be reformulated as biprocesses in order to allow ProVerif to work
correctly.
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Figure 7.5 Observational equivalences in ProVerif
(* simple observational equivalence *)
free comm:channel:
free vote_a; vote_b:bitstring:
type secretkey:
type pubkey:
type exponent:
fun pk(secretkey):pubkey:
fun encrypt(bitstring; exponent; pubkey):bitstring:
reduc forall message:bitstring; alpha:exponent; sk:secretkey;
decrypt(encrypt(message; alpha; pk(sk)); sk) = message:
process
new alpha:exponent;
new sk_tallier:secretkey;
let pk_tallier = pk(sk_tallier) in
let enc_va = encrypt(vote_a; alpha; pk_tallier) in
let enc_vb = encrypt(vote_b; alpha; pk_tallier) in
out(comm; choice[enc_va; enc_vb])
7.5 Proof of Security Properties in Our Work
For the remainder of this chapter, we provide ProVerif-based proofs of various security prop-
erties for our êrst protocol (shown in Chapter 4). In order to do this, we adopt the work of
Kremer et al. (2010) and Backes et al. (2008). We split the requirements that we prove into
three categories: reachability properties (individual and universal veriêability), correspondence proper-
ties (soundness, uniqueness and inalterability), and observational equivalences (coercion-resistance,
receipt-freeness and vote-privacy).
7.5.1 Reachability Properties
In order to satisfy soundness (below), we need to show correspondences between certain events.
In order to satisfy veriêability (i.e., individual and universal), we need only show that certain
events are (or are not) reachable. For this, we adopt the work of Kremer et al. (2010). In their
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work, the authors add events to the applied pi calculus. Events are modelled as outputs fhMi,
where f 2 F is an “event channel”, and input to this channel can only be in the form of “event
variables”, e; e0 (Kremer et al., 2010, p. 170).
The authors specify a reachability assertion as an event fh~Xi, where ~X is a series of variables and
constants. If an adversary can expose this event, then the process containing it satisêes reachability.
Else, the process satisêes the unreachability assertion fh~Xi.
7.5.1.1 Formalising Veriêability
The authors formalise election veriêability in the form of three boolean tests, IV;UV and EV.
Such a boolean test is an applied pi term, with free variables, which evaluates to true or false when
ground terms are substituted for the free variables. We do not consider the third test (eligibility
veriêability), as it is beyond the scope of this work. However, we produce tests, again written in
ProVerif, which correspond to the tests Kremer et al. use for individual and universal veriêability.
7.5.1.2 Test for Individual Veriêability
In their work, Kremer et al. deêne a boolean predicate test IV to take parameters v (a vote), ~x
(a voter’s knowledge), y (the voter’s public credential), and z (the bulletin board entry for a vote).
IV is a successful test if it allows a voter to identify her bulletin board entry; i.e., for all votes, if
the voter with a public credential D votes for candidate s then there must be an execution of the
protocol producing ~M such that a bulletin board entry B satisêes
IVfs=v; ~M=~x;D=y;B=zg
Furthermore, the bulletin board entry determines the vote:
IVfs=v; ~M=~x;D=y;B=zg ^ IVfs0=v; ~M0=~x;D0=y;B=zg ) (s = s0)
(Kremer et al., 2010, p. 171)
Finally, in order for individual veriêability to hold, all bulletin board entries must be distinct.
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7.5.1.3 Test for Universal Veriêability
The test UV takes two parameters, v (a vote) and z (a bulletin board entry), and is suitable if
every bulletin board entry accepted by a voter (for the test IV) is also accepted by an observer as
valid; i.e.:
IVfs=v; ~M=~x;D=y;B=zg ) UVfs=v;B=zg
Further, the observer correctly counts the vote: i.e., if the test UV succeeds for two votes s; s0
with one bulletin board entry B, then they must be votes for the same candidate:
UVfs=v;B=zg ^ UVfs0=v;B=zg ) (s = s0)
(Kremer et al., 2010, p. 171)
In order to verify that a protocol is universally and individually veriêable, voters and observers
perform the tests IVand UVon the bulletin board, possibly also using information they have
derived from voting themselves.
7.5.1.4 The Voting Process
Kremer et al. deêne a voting protocol in the applied pi calculus. The protocol is deêned as a
voter process, V, a process K modelling honest administrators (which publishes public credentials
and distributes keys); a tuple of channels ~a which are private, and a context A which performs
setup.
A voting process is hence speciêed as a tuple hA;V;K[chDi];~ai, where A and K are contexts
such that V;A;K do not contain event channels or variables, and D models public voter creden-
tials. v represents the value of the vote, and is not bound in A or V. The channel c is free (Kremer
et al., 2010, p. 174).
The authors note that votes are generated by a process Gb=!s:((!bhsi)jchsi), which selects a
vote and sends it to the voter (such that several voters can also receive this vote), also outputting
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it on a public channel. The process modelling a voting protocol VP is then
VPb=b:(A[!~a:((b(v):V)jK[chDi])]jG)
Kremer et al. (2010) go on to deêne an augmented voting process VP+ as a voting process incor-
porating reachability assertions, such that
VP+b=b:(A[!~a; b0:(bVjbK)]jGjP)jQ
where
bV = b(v):V  c(z):b0(y):(passh(IV; z)ijfailh i)
bK = K[b0hDijchDi]
P = b(v0):b(v00):c(~x0):c(~x00):c(y0):c(y00):c(z0):failh0 _ 00i
Q = pass(e):pass(e0):failhe1 ^ e01 ^ (e2 = e02)i
 = (IV ^ :UV)
0 = IVfv0=v;~x0=~x;y0=y;z0=zg ^ IVfv00=v;~x00=~x;y00=y;z0=zg ^ :(v0 = v00)
00 = UVfv0=v;z0=zg ^ UVfv00=v;z0=zg ^ :(v0 = v00)
where IV is the boolean evaluation of the test IV; e1; e2 represent projections of the pair received
on the pass channel; fail and pass are event channels, and the plain (linear) process P  Q
represents an execution of P, followed by Q (Kremer et al., 2010, p. 174).
Note that in our work, we do not consider the test for eligibility veriêability (EV), and hence
omit mentions of it from VP+. We leave investigation of this property in our protocol for future
work. The authors explain that the augmented voting process VP+ satisêes election veriêability
if the unreachability assertion failhtruei is satisêed, and the reachability assertion passh(true; x)i
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is satisêed, providing a number of variable constraints are satisêed (we refer the interested reader
to the work of Kremer et al.).
7.5.1.5 Veriêability in Our Protocol
In line with the ProVerif modelling which Kremer et al. do for a protocol similar to ours (that of
Juels et al. (2005)), we structure our model in terms of a number of equations and destructors to
represent encryption/decryption, designated veriêer signatures, designated veriêer reencryption
proofs, and the like. We then have a number of processes, representing the voter, T1, T2, a
nondeterministic vote generator, a keypair generator and processes which ascertain veriêability
and duplicate vote posting respectively. In this model, we only create two events, pass(bool) and
fail(bool), and require the reachability of pass(true), and unreachability of fail(true). The voter
process is shown in Figure 7.6. Of note are the points at which it executes the pass(true) event
(when the reencrypted vote received from the bulletin board is the same as that which Alice was
sent by T1, satisfying individual veriêability) and the fail(true) event (when the signature for an
encrypted ballot on the bulletin board does not match the hash of its purported encrypted vote,
i.e., failing universal veriêability).
Our veriêcation of universal and individual veriêability is further carried out by the processes
verifiabilitychecker and duplicatechecker, which correspond to P and Q respectively in the augmented
voting process VP+. Each process is executed according to the model code shown in Figure 7.7.
That is to say that there is an unbounded number of voters, instances of T1 and T2, and key
generators. There is one instance each of verifiabilitychecker and duplicatechecker. The former of
these works by reading two (individually veriêable) votes from two voter process executions, and
one bulletin board entry. If the bulletin board entry’s reencrypted vote is the same as the reen-
crypted vote sent by both voter process executions, then unless the underlying vote for each of
these is also the same, individual veriêability is not satisêed. Likewise, if both designated veriêer
reencryption proofs are valid for the same reencrypted vote from the bulletin board, then unless
the underlying vote is the same for both, universal veriêability is not satisêed: see Figure 7.8.
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Figure 7.6 The Voter process in our veriêability model
let voter(keychannel:channel; votechannel:channel; pk_t1:pubkey; pk_t2:pubkey;
pk_j:pubkey) =
new i:bitstring;
in(keychannel; sk_voter:secretkey);
let pk_voter:pubkey = pk(sk_voter) in
out(pch; pk_voter);
in(pch; (delta:bitstring; dvsig:bitstring));
if dvverify(dvsig; pk_t1; sk_voter) 6= delta then
0
else
new alpha:exponent;
in(votechannel; vote:bitstring);
let encvote = encrypt(vote; alpha; pk_t2; three) in
new phi:exponent;
let t1msg = encrypt((encvote; delta; pk_voter); phi; pk_t1; three) in
out(ch; t1msg);
in(ch; enct1reply:bitstring);
let (reenc:bitstring; dvrp_a:bitstring) = decrypt(enct1reply; sk_voter) in
if dvrpverify(dvrp_a; encvote; reenc; sk_voter; pk_t1) = true then
in(bulletinboard; signedbbentry:bitstring);
let (reenc_received:bitstring; vote_and_encrypted_ID:bitstring;
signedhash:bitstring) =
verify(signedbbentry; pk_t2) in
((if reenc_received = reenc then
event pass(true); (* Result is individually veriêable *)
out(ch_pass; (true; reenc_received; i));
out(verifchannel; (sk_voter; dvrp_a; encvote; reenc; vote))
)
j (if reenc_received = reenc then
if verify(signedhash; pk_t1) 6= hash(vote_and_encrypted_ID) then
event fail(true) (* Result is *not* universally veriêable *)
)):
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Figure 7.7 The main process in our veriêability model
process
new sk_t1:secretkey; let pk_t1:pubkey = pk(sk_t1) in out(ch; pk_t1);
new sk_t2:secretkey; let pk_t2:pubkey = pk(sk_t2) in out(ch; pk_t2);
new sk_j:secretkey; let pk_j:pubkey = pk(sk_j) in out(ch; pk_j);
( new votechannel:channel;
(
(!new keychannel:channel; (voter(keychannel; votechannel; pk_t1; pk_t2; pk_j)
j keygenerator(keychannel))
) j votegenerator(votechannel) j verifiabilitychecker(votechannel; pk_t2; pk_t1)
) j!t1(pk_t1; sk_t1; pk_t2; pk_j) j!t2(pk_t2; sk_t2; pk_t1; pk_j) j duplicatechecker()
)
The process duplicatechecker works by reading in any two messages from two voter process execu-
tions, on a special private channel ch_pass. If the reencryptions sent with both of these messages
are the same, then if the i value sent as the third part of the message is not the same, a duplicate
vote has been recorded, and individual veriêability cannot hold.
ProVerif successfully terminates with the model, claiming that there are no executions of the
event fail (i.e., it is unreachable), and that the event pass is reachable. This leads us to infer that
our protocol is both universally and individually veriêable.
7.5.2 Correspondences
We adopt the work of Backes et al. (2008) in order to prove soundness (i.e., uniqueness, eligibility
and inalterability) of our protocol. The authors formalise an election process as an unbounded
number of voters and trusted authorities, running in parallel and sharing some secrets. Voters can
be honest (always behaving according to speciêcation), corrupted (registering correctly but then
outputting all secrets) or ad-hoc (behaving arbitrarily between these two) (Backes et al., 2008, p.
196). The authors deêne an election process EP as a closed plain process:
EP  ~n:(!Vhonj!VcorjVid1j : : : jVidkjIDjA1j : : : jAm)
where ~n represents a sequence of name restrictions (which are secret), such that
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Figure 7.8 Disproving universal veriêability
let verifiabilitychecker(votechannel:channel; pk_t2:pubkey; pk_t1:pubkey) = (* P *)
in(verifchannel; (skv1:secretkey; dvrp1:bitstring; encvote1:bitstring; reenc1:bitstring;
vote1:bitstring));
in(verifchannel; (skv2:secretkey; dvrp2:bitstring; encvote2:bitstring; reenc2:bitstring;
vote2:bitstring));
in(bulletinboard; signedbbentry:bitstring);
let (reencvote:bitstring; vote_and_encrypted_ID:bitstring; signedhash:bitstring) =
verify(signedbbentry; pk_t2) in
(
(if reencvote = reenc1 then
if reencvote = reenc2 then
if vote1 6= vote2 then event fail(true)
) j
(if dvrpverify(dvrp1; encvote2; reencvote; skv1; pk_t1) = true then
if dvrpverify(dvrp2; encvote1; reencvote; skv2; pk_t1) = true then
if vote1 6= vote2 then event fail(true)
)):
1. for a private channel cid 2 ~n and two sequential contexts1 Vreg;Vvote, Vhon  cid(xid):Vreg[let
xv 2 ~v in Vvote]2, where ~v is the set of valid votes;
2. for the corrupted voters, there exists a process Vc such that Vcor  cid(xid):Vc;
3. there exists a process ID0, and a public channel cid pub 62 ~n such that
ID  (!id:cidhidi:cid pubhidi: let xid = id in ID0)
j let xid = id1 in ID0j : : : j let xid = idk in ID0;
All id values are not public and distinct, and the channel cid is private. ID0 is the remainder
of the ID process, and contains no events.
4. there exists a public channel cvotes, a value i 2 [1;m], a variable x, a process P, and a context
C such that
Ai  C[cvoteshxi:P]
1A sequential context is deêned as a plain context which includes no replication or parallel composition.
2Note that we have already deêned the statement let x = M in P as being equivalent to the substitution
x:(fM=xgjP). The statement let xv 2 ~v in Vvote should be treated analogously.
182 Chapter 7. Formalisation
and cvotes occurs nowhere else in EP. Note that the index i of each administrator Ai is used
only to deêne the number of administrators that are used.
(Backes et al., 2008, p. 197)
The honest voter, Vhon, registers and receives an identity on cid, selects a valid vote and then casts
it. Corrupted voters simply register and then become controlled by the adversary. The authors
use an unbounded number of corrupted and honest voters. Ad-hoc voters vidi may or may not
follow the protocol, and are not replicated. The authors also deêne an election context, S, that
is a process with a hole which runs in parallel with the voters (Backes et al., 2008, p. 197).
Backes et al. deêne soundness in terms of correspondence assertions, where a causality relation
among events within a protocol is imposed and tested. Events and execution traces are introduced
to the applied pi calculus in Abadi et al. (2007). The authors annotate their election process EP
with several events:
1. newid(id): occurs once the issuer has given an identity id to a voter
2. startid(id) and startcorid(id): occur when the registration phase begins for any voter (honest
or otherwise)
3. beginvote(id,v): marks the start of the voting phase for a voter with ID id, casting vote v
4. endvote(v): occurs when the tallying of vote v has happened.
(Backes et al., 2008, p. 197)
Backes et al. therefore redeêne an annotated version of EP:
EP  ~n:(!Vhonj!VcorjVid1j : : : jVidkjIDjA1j : : : jAm)
such that
1. Vhon  cid(xid):startid(xid):Vreg[let xv 2 ~v in beginvote(xid; xv):Vvote]
2. Vcor  cid(xid):startcorid(xid):Vc
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3. for each i, eitherVidi  startid(idi):V0i whereV0i contains at most one beginvote(idi; v) event,
or Vidi  startcorid(idi):V0i where V0i has no event
4. ID is deêned as
ID  (id:newid(id):cidhidi:cid pubhidi:let xid = id in ID0) j
newid(id1):let xid = id1 in ID0j : : : jnewid(idk):let xid = idk in ID0
where newid( ) does not occur elsewhere in EP, and ID0 has no event
5. Ai  C[endvote(x):cvoteshxi:P], and C;P;Aj for j 6= i do not contain any event
(Backes et al., 2008, p. 198)
In order to deêne soundness, Backes et al. state that the following conditions must be satisêed.
To illustrate the way in which the conditions are deêned, a trace t = t1 :: someevent(x) :: t2 ::
anotherevent(x) is a trace in which the event someevent for a parameter x is triggered, and the
event anotherevent is triggered, for the same x.
Deênition 7.5.1. Soundness (Backes et al., 2008, p. 198)
As is standard in related literature, soundness is split into three categories: inalterability (i.e.,
that no-one can change anyone else’s vote), eligibility (only eligible voters may vote) and non-
reusability/uniqueness (every voter may only vote once). The deênition of soundness which Backes
et al. (2008) deêne encapsulates these three properties. A trace t guarantees soundness if and only
if:
1. For any t1; t2; v such that t = t1 :: endvote(v) :: t2, there exist id; t0; t00; t000 such that
(a) t1 = t0 :: startid(id) :: t00 :: beginvote(id; v) :: t000 and t0 :: t00 :: t000 :: t2 guarantees
soundness
(b) or t1 = t0 :: startcorid(id) :: t00, and t0 :: t00 :: t2 guarantees soundness
2. For any t1; t2; id where t = t1 :: startid(id) :: t2 or t = t1 :: startcorid(id) :: t2, neither
startid(id) nor startcorid(id) occur in t1 :: t2
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3. For any t1; t2; id where t = t1 :: startid(id) :: t2 or t = t1 :: startcorid(id) :: t2, newid(id)
occurs in t1.
Note that all traces of the protocol must satisfy the above in order for the protocol to be sound.
Each of the three properties of soundness in Deênition 7.5.1 are satisêed by the criteria above:
inalterability is modelled by the notion that every vote v for every occurrence of endvote(v) is pre-
ceded by an occurrence of beginvote(id; v); i.e., every cast vote was cast by some voter. Uniqueness
is modelled with an injective matching between endvote(v) and beginvote(id; v); i.e., there is ex-
actly one occurrence of a vote being cast by a particular voter for every vote v. Finally, eligibility
is tested by ensuring that there are no executions of beginvote(id; v) that were not preceded by
newid (and as such, followed by startid(id)) (Backes et al., 2008, p. 198).
7.5.2.1 Soundness in our Protocol
In order to verify that our protocol is sound, we need to ensure that Condition 1 of Deênition
7.5.1 is satisêed. ProVerif can check this condition automatically, and our model for this check
is to be found in the êle soundness.pv, discussed further in Section 7.5.4. In order to test
reachability properties such as those needed to assure soundness, one speciêes the execution of
an event with the line (for example) “event pkreceived(pk_v);”. This event can then be tested
for with the query command.
Of particular interest is the query
query k:pubkey; k0:pubkey; v:bitstring;
event(voteCounted(v)) =)
(
(inj-event(beginVote(k; v)) =) inj-event(pkreceived(k)))
_
inj-event(corpkreceived(k0))
):
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which relates directly to Condition 1 above: it states that for any public key k or corrupted voter
public key k0, and for any vote v, if the event voteCounted(v) is triggered (by the tallier process),
then either there was exactly one preceding execution of beginVote(k,v), which itself followed
one execution of pkreceived(k), or there was exactly one execution of corpkreceived(k0).
At a higher level, this means that for a vote to have been recorded by the talliers, either:
• that same vote must only have been cast once, by a voter who previously received a legiti-
mate public key, or
• a corrupted voter received a public key, and then sent all information to the coercer (who
presumably cast the vote).
On analysis of our model, ProVerif correctly terminates, stating that the query above is satis-
êed, proving that our protocol is sound (subject to the correctness of the model). The model of
our protocol to check for soundness can be found in the êle soundness.pv, discussed in Section
7.5.4.
7.5.3 Observational Equivalences
We again adopt the work of Backes et al. (2008) in order to prove a number of properties using
observational equivalences. In their work, Backes et al. note that coercion resistance captures:
1. Receipt-freeness—a coercer cannot force a voter to prove how they have voted (via a receipt)
2. Immunity to Simulation—A voter cannot be forced to provide secrets required to impersonate
her (since the coercer cannot determine if any secrets provided are real or fake)
3. Immunity to Forced-abstention—a coercer should not be able to tell whether a voter has voted
or not (note that in the authors’ work, this does not apply to an in-person coercer)
(Backes et al., 2008, p. 198)
The authors later demonstrate that coercion resistance implies both immunity to forced absten-
tion and receipt-freeness. As a result, we focus on proving the four aspects of coercion resistance
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deêned by the authors in our work. As with Backes et al., we denote coercion resistance as the
property that an attacker cannot distinguish between a voter that is coerced and provided legiti-
mate secret material to him, and a cheating voter that gives him fake secrets and then participates
in the vote normally. This means that the attacker cannot determine if or how a voter votes (as
Backes et al. note, immunity to forced-abstention implies vote privacy, under the assumption
that at least one other voter abstains from voting).
Based on their previous deênition of an election process EP:
EP  ~n:(!Vhonj!VcorjVid1j : : : jVidkjIDjA1j : : : jAm);
the authors deêne another voter process to represent a coerced voter, that registers as normal,
then forwards all secrets to the coercer, and abstains:
Vcoerced(c)i  let xid = i in Vreg[ch~ui];
and a plain context Vfake representing a strategy for a voter to cheat a coercer, by providing him
with fake secrets:
Vcheat(c)i  let xid = i in Vreg[let xv = v0 in VvotejVfake[ch~ui]]:
(Backes et al., 2008)
Backes et al. note that intuitively, an election context S is coercion-resistant if the context running
with a coerced voter is observationally equivalent to the one with a cheating voter. However, on
one side a vote is cast, and on the other one is not. Introducing a second voter Vj does not solve
the problem:
S[Vcoerced(c)i jVj(v0)]  S[Vcheat(c)i (v0)jVabsj ];
where Vabsj represents a voter that registers then abstains, balances the number of votes but is
still problematic. On the left hand side, the coercer receives real secrets; on the right, secrets
that cannot be used to cast a vote. Given that this cannot be solved by assuming which way the
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coercer will want to vote and balancing the votes in this way with a third voter, the authors adopt
a diﬀerent solution.
Instead of using a third voter, Backes et al. use an extractor process which takes the voter the
coercer casts on behalf of Vi and tallies it directly. The extractor identiêes the vote cast by the
coercer, and on the right hand side casts it directly to the bulletin board, but on the left hand side
abstains (equivalent to the voter voting with invalid secrets). This means that the coercer’s vote is
always balanced. The extractor is deêned as a context
Ec1;c2;zk = let xid = k in V
reg[ ~m:(c1(x):P1j!c2(y):P2jC[if z 2 ~v then[ ]])]
for plain processes P1;P2, a sequential context C, and private channels between the coerced
voter and tallying authority, c1 and c2 respectively. If the coercer votes, the variable z holds that
vote. The result of using the extractor in the election processes is that coercion-resistance can be
expressed as the observational equivalence between the following:
S0[Vcoerced(c;c1)i jVj(v0)jEc1;c2;zk [0]]  S0[Vcheat(c;c1)i (v0)jVabsj jEc1;c2;zk [cvoteshzi]]:
In the êrst process, voter Vi complies with the coercer’s demands, providing her secrets then
abstaining. Vj votes v0, and the extractor process simulates a voter nullifying her vote. In the
second process, Vi cheats the coercer by providing incorrect secrets, and casts vote v0 herself. Vj
abstains, and the extractor tallies the vote that the coercer casts on behalf of Vi. Note that the
process Vcoerced(c;c1)i is similar to the above V
coerced(c)
i , except that the coerced voter now outputs her
secrets on channel c (for the coercer), and c1 (for the extractor) (Backes et al., 2008, p. 200).
In order to capture coercion-resistance completely, Backes et al. deêne êve criteria that an
election context must satisfy. An election process S is coercion-resistant if:
1. there exists an election context S00 and two authorities A;A0 such that S  S00[Aj[ ]]; S0 
c1; c2:S00[A0j[ ]], and c2:(A0j!c2(x))  A
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2. S0[Vcoerced(c;c1)i jVj(v0)jEc1;c2;zk [0]]  S0[Vcheat(c;c1)i (v0)jVabsj jEc1;c2;zk [cvoteshzi]] where v0 2 ~v is a valid
vote
3. c:S0[!c(x)jVcheat(c;c1)i (v0)jVabsj jEc1;c2;zk [cvoteshzi]]  S[Vi(v0)jVabsj jVabsk ]
4. Let P = c(~x):let xv = v in Vvotef~x=~ug; v 2 ~v; ~u = captured(Vreg), then
c:S0[PjVcheat(c;c1)i (v0)jVabsj jEc1;c2;zk [cvoteshzi]] 
c:S0[PjVcheat(c;c1)i (v0)jVabsj jEc1;c2;zk [cvoteshvi]]
5. S[Vinv regi ]  cvotes:(!cvotes(x)jS[Vi(v)]) where v is a valid vote.
(Backes et al., 2008, p. 200)
As the authors further note, S0 diﬀers only from the original election context S in that the tallying
authority outputs to the extractor in condition 1. Condition 2 represents the main equivalence
for coercion resistance. Condition 3 notes that if the coercer, having been cheated, abstains from
voting, then the extractor must abstain too; Condition 4 is that if the coercer casts a vote but
using invalid credentials, the extractor must tally that vote directly. Note that for any context C,
captured(C) deênes the set of names and variables that are in scope for the hole in C. Condition
5 ênally notes that votes cast with invalid secrets are ignored (Backes et al., 2008, p. 201). Backes
et al. go on to deêne immunity to forced abstention:
S[Vi(v)jVabsj ]  S[Vabsi jVj(v)];
i.e., an attacker cannot distinguish between two processes, in which voter a votes in the êrst
process, and voter b in the second; and vote privacy:
S[Vi(v)jVj(v0)]  S[Vi(v0)jVj(v)]:
The authors go on to prove that if S guarantees coercion resistance, then S is also immune to
forced abstention attacks, and thence also implies vote privacy, under the assumption of a single
7.5. Proof of Security Properties in Our Work 189
other abstaining voter (Backes et al., 2008, p. 201). They also state that under the assumption of
an extractor being an acceptable abstraction of a third voter, coercion-resistance implies receipt-
freeness.
7.5.3.1 Coercion Resistance, Privacy and Receipt-Freeness in Our Protocol
Backes et al. demonstrate their work by producing applied pi and ProVerif models for the last
four of the above criteria for the JCJ protocol (Juels et al., 2005). As we have already stated, this
protocol is of a similar form to ours, and hence we were able to write similar models in ProVerif
to test for each part of coercion resistance.
Given the relative complexity of our protocol, we encountered a number of diﬃculties in
modelling some parts of it. For example, note our original equational theory for re-encryption:
fun reencrypt(bitstring; exponent):bitstring:
equation forall item:bitstring; alpha:exponent; beta:exponent; sk:secretkey;
reencrypt(encrypt(item; alpha; pk(sk)); beta) = encrypt(item; sum(alpha; beta); pk(sk)):
It should be clear that the variable item can be replaced with an encryption itself, hence
making (re-)encryptions of unbounded depth possible. In a complex protocol, this can cause
non-termination in ProVerif. Our solution was to limit the number of permitted re-encryptions
by including a series of re-encryption equations:
fun reencrypt(bitstring; exponent):bitstring:
equation forall item:bitstring; alpha:exponent; beta:exponent; sk:secretkey;
reencrypt(encrypt(item; alpha; pk(sk); three); beta) = encrypt(item; sum(alpha; beta); pk(sk); two):
reencrypt(encrypt(item; alpha; pk(sk); two); beta) = encrypt(item; sum(alpha; beta); pk(sk); one):
reencrypt(encrypt(item; alpha; pk(sk); one); beta) = encrypt(item; sum(alpha; beta); pk(sk); zero):
Although this limits the power of ProVerif, we feel it was a necessary and acceptable limitation:
further re-encryptions could in no way give further power to the attacker (the only apparent aim
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of further re-encryptions would be to somehow re-obtain the original ciphertext, which, given
the encryption scheme we use, is mathematically and computationally highly improbable).
As noted earlier, observational equivalences are tested using the choice operator in ProVerif.
Given that the models which test for coercion resistance are very long, we do not provide them
here in depth, but instead give an example of our use of the choice operator in Figure 7.9.
Figure 7.9 The choice operator in use
let voterchoice(ch_voter_issuer:channel; ch_voter_registrar:channel; pk_t1:pubkey;
pk_t2:pubkey; sk_vc:secretkey) =
let pk_vc:pubkey = pk(sk_vc) in
new noncevc:nonce;
out(ch_voter_registrar; (n1; noncevc; pk_vc));
in(ch_voter_registrar; (= n2;= noncevc; delta:bitstring; dvsig:bitstring));
if dvverify(dvsig; pk_t1; sk_vc) = delta then
in(chvote; vote:bitstring);
new fakedelta:bitstring;
let fakedvsig = fakedvsign(fakedelta; pk_t1; sk_vc) in
new alpha:exponent;
let encvote = encrypt(vote; alpha; pk_t2; three) in
new phi:exponent;
let t1msg = encrypt((encvote; choice[delta; fakedelta]; pk_vc); phi;
pk_t1; three) in
out(comm; t1msg):
The example above models the choice of the voter to either vote using a genuine or fake 
value. Each of the models for coercion resistance terminate successfully. In each case, ProVerif
claims that the suggested observational equivalence holds, leading us to infer that our protocol is
coercion resistant, and, by extension, permits voter privacy, is not susceptible to forced abstention
attacks, and is receipt-free, allowing for the abstraction of the third voter by the extractor.
7.5.4 Location of ProVerif Source Code
The ProVerif source êles relating to the models and proofs presented in this chapter can be found
at
http://mattsmart.co/research/proverif
At this address, six êles can be found, which each relate to a diﬀerent test:
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Table 7.1 ProVerif Source Code Files
Filename Description
ivuv.pv Our model for individual and universal veriêability (Section 7.5.1.5)
soundness.pv Our soundness model (Section 7.5.2.1)
cr2.pv
Four models for parts 2–5 of the coercion-resistance, receipt-freeness and
privacy proofs (Section 7.5.3.1)
cr3.pv
cr4.pv
cr5.pv
7.6 Summary
In this penultimate chapter, we have presented an extensive discussion of the applied pi calculus,
and of the automated reasoning tool ProVerif, whose input may be in applied pi syntax. Using
the abilities of ProVerif (namely, proving reachability and correspondence assertions, and selected
observational equivalences), we have been able to prove that the protocol we discussed in Chapter
4 is universally and individually veriêable, sound, and provides voter privacy, receipt freeness and
coercion-resistance.
Whenever using formal veriêcation to prove the security properties of a protocol, one must
ensure that certain problems are solved. Foremost, the (ProVerif) model must accurately represent
the underlying protocol. In a language such as ProVerif, which only proves observational equiv-
alences when using speciêc model formulations, and has no means for representing persistent
storage, this is often a demanding requirement. Consequently, there is often a need to abstract
away the complexities of a protocol (such as exactly how a designated veriêer re-encryption proof
works) from the model, allowing the basic purpose of the function to remain. A similar problem
arises when formalising the requirements to be proved: how can one ensure that the formalisation
of a requirement accurately captures what is meant?
At present, our work has focused on the modelling and veriêcation of our êrst protocol,
as discussed in Chapter 4. We are keen to extend our work on formalisation to our trusted
computing-based protocol, as discussed in Chapter 5, and plan to consider this in future work.
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8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we conclude the thesis. We begin by reviewing the results and contributions
achieved by this thesis, and the lessons learned in pursuit of those results, and ênish with a dis-
cussion of avenues for future work.
This thesis presents three key contributions:
• A concise, readily implementable protocol to provide remote electronic voting for United
Kingdom national elections, allowing anonymity revocation in the case of personation;
• A remote electronic voting protocol which uses trusted computing (and Direct Anonymous
Attestation) to assure authorities (and the voter) of the state of a remote voter’s machine;
• A method by which remote users whose anonymity is revoked may be informed of this
fact, generalised for many types of security discipline.
It seems êtting to close this thesis by repeating the statement with which it opened: designing elec-
tronic voting protocols is diﬃcult. In the face of ever-increasing security requirements—conëicting
with voters who wish to use an easily comprehensible system—producing a protocol which is
attractive to both voters and security researchers alike is a formidable challenge.
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In this thesis, we have striven to present work which satisêes this challenge. We began with
the introduction of a protocol which, with minimal trust in a set of tellers who are not able to
observe a vote, allows a voter to vote remotely, whilst unable to prove to a coercer whether how
(or even if) they are voting. Our assumption, as with our later work, is simply that the voter can
vote once unobserved, but an unlimited number of times otherwise, where her legitimate vote is
the one counted. We introduced a novel use of designated veriêer signatures, and an extension
of earlier work to provide a proof of ballot validity for 1-out-of-L elections, to allow the voter to
remain coercion-resistant.
The trust we placed in the êrst round of talliers in our êrst protocol was, we reasoned, the
minimal required amount of trust for our protocol, given no further assumptions. However, we
noted that this level of trust might be undesirable for a general election scheme. This prompted
our work into use of the TPM and the DAA protocol for remote anonymous authentication
of voter machines. In this work, we provided another novel method for voters to distinguish
coerced from non-coerced votes, without the requirement for the user to generate designated
veriêer signatures. Our work is the êrst to utilise the TPM of a remote voter’s machine to
allow her to vote from home, whilst also assuring authorities of the state of the machine. This
presents considerable avenues for future development, and a credible way in which to increase
voter turnout.
In both of our êrst two protocols, we provide the ability for authorities to determine the
identity of a voter from their ballot. This functionality is legally required in the United Kingdom.
However, both protocols failed to alert the voter as to when her anonymity was revoked. We
rectify this with our work in Chapter 6: we detail a generic protocol in which an anonymous
user interacts with a remote server—proved to be trustworthy—to encrypt her identity, such that
it can later be retrieved with suﬃcient authority. The nature of the deanonymisation is that the
user is automatically able to determine whether her identity has been traced or not. This protocol
is readily applicable to a number of security protocols, including that presented in Chapter 5. For
this reason, we do not apply it directly to our electronic voting protocols, but the speciêcs of this
application should be clear.
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In our ênal chapter, we drew on the work of several authors on the formalisation of security
protocols and their requirements in the applied pi calculus, a process calculus speciêcally designed
for reasoning about security protocols. We used the automated reasoning tool ProVerif to for-
malise our work from Chapter 4, drawing on recent work on formal veriêcation in e-voting to
prove a number of security properties. We are, to our knowledge, the êrst to prove as many
properties as we do in this manner.
8.1 Further Work
We consider our work on remote electronic voting to be deployable in the United Kingdom with
a small amount of extra eﬀort, and here discuss extra steps which could be addressed in the future.
Our work on the use of trusted computing in e-voting (Chapter 5) relies on the availability
of a TPM in each voter’s machine. At the moment, despite the increasing prevalence of TPMs
in domestic computing environments, we are not yet ‘there’. As service providers further de-
mand secure communications with their users in the future, we envisage that the TPM will be
included in more and more machines. Clearly, any deployment would need to consider trust in
the makers of the TPM: a sensitive issue such as general elections means that one must be able to
unquestionably trust any entity which could have access to secret data (a voter’s vote, or identity).
Manufacturers residing in countries with a questionable interest in UK electoral results would
need to be carefully scrutinised. This aspect of future work is outside of the scope of this thesis,
however.
An issue to consider for future work on trusted computing in e-voting is how to allow more
than one voter to vote from a particular TPM—something which we do not currently consider.
We anticipate that one suitable approach would be for each voter from a given TPM to complete
a separate DAA join/sign protocol execution using fresh pseudonyms. However, allowing this
whilst also preventing a voter from voting multiple times is complex, and we hence leave it as an
interesting open question.
Another avenue for future work concerns our preliminary work on auditability of revocable
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anonymity, discussed in Chapter 6. We feel that virtual monotonic counters provide a promis-
ing method for satisfying the ‘digital envelope’ problem, and would like to further explore the
applicability of our auditability protocol to other security êelds, such as digital cash and fair ex-
change/contract signing. As the work discussed in Chapter 6 was not the main focus of this thesis,
we would like to spend further time formalising the security requirements of its area, and proving
the protocol correct.
This leads us to further work on proving the correctness of our protocols. The main focus of
this thesis is not on formal veriêcation. However, we would like to formally prove the security of
our second protocol. Though work has been done on formal veriêcation of the DAA protocol,
combining this with proving the security of our work is challenging. One must also bear in mind
the issue that, as the basic applied pi calculus and ProVerif do not cater for protocols which are
concerned with persistent state, an alternative approach to formalisation must be considered.
Our next step is to trial a small-scale implementation of the e-voting protocols we have devel-
oped, using a TPM simulator for the protocol in Chapter 5. We envisage that the contributions
in this thesis will aid work on the deployment of national electronic voting schemes in countries
concerned with remote voting, and particularly in the UK.
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